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ABSTRACT 
 
In the milieu of the global development and ‘state’ formation of Bangladesh, the Khyang 
people of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) are in a situation of economic transition and 
marginalization. Bangladesh state’s persistence to build Bangalee and Bangladeshi nation 
and its commitment to develop the country socio-economically (formulated and funded by 
the international development agencies) has led the state’s encroachment of the CHT which 
were beyond direct state control for most of its history. During my ethnographic fieldwork in 
Rangamati and Bandarban of CHT, I found that with the expansion of the state space there 
has been a mutation of citizenship for the Khyang, where their rights and access to land and 
forests are being limited (and sometimes denied) through government actions and policies. 
Based on my ethnographic information I argue that as the state built infrastructure and as 
planned migration of Bangalee people took place the livelihood options for the Khyang 
changed from subsistence to market economy and today the Khyang are involved in diverse 
non-agricultural occupations. Consequently, class distinctions emerged in the social structure 
and, the gendered division of labor is altered (as men are taking more responsibility in 
household tasks and women are doing income-generating activities). Further, I have observed 
changes in indigenous practices of food consumption and dressing. With the changed 
economic frontiers forced by governmental seizure of access to land and forest the Khyang 
were required to change from Jhum (shifting cultivation) to plough cultivation, and became 
integrated in the market economy. New rights, entitlements and opportunities have opened 
avenues for establishing social networks with people of other ethnic groups; yet, it has also 
marginalized the Khyang economically and socially. While some Khyangs benefitted from 
these processes, the Khyang remains as a ‘minority of the minorities’ in CHT as they are 
denied of minority quotas in jobs and education, which are mostly availed by the larger ethnic 
groups like the Bangalees and Chakmas. During fieldwork, it became evident that within a 
shifting socio-political context Khyang identity has diversified. Engagement of the Khyang 
with diverse social networks has created internal differences regarding the subjective belief in 
their common descent as a group. I found that the idea of Khyang identity has become fluid, 
as for many hill populations of Southeast Asia, being subjected to state expansion and people 
from the valleys. Based on my ethnographic findings I argue that Khyang of different 
economic, political and educational backgrounds have different thoughts regarding the 
common history and historical consciousness of Khyang as a group is not reproduced by the 
younger generations. Thus, the Khyang now act as ‘ethnic amphibians’ in the CHT.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
CONTEXTUALIZATION OF CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS (CHT) AND THE 
RESEARCH PROLBEM 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), the area of my fieldwork is situated in the southeast 
corner of Bangladesh and constitutes about 10 percent of the total land area. In this region 
people from different ethnic groups such as Bawm, Chak, Chakma, Khyang, Khumi, Lushai, 
Marma, Mro, Pangkhua, Tanchangya, and Tripura, live including the majority ethnic group 
of the country the Bangalee people. I did my fieldwork among the Khyang people. 
Throughout history minority people have been treated as Pahari- ‘people living in hills/ hill 
people’- by the neighboring Bangalee population, while these communities claim to be the 
indigenous people of that area having their own individual cultural history (Chowdhury 2008: 
61). The identification of these different groups by the common term Pahari involves a 
variety of pejorative conditions and Pahari populations are seen as different from, and 
inferior to the majority Bangalee population in respect of race, language, religion, social 
organizations etc. Though the word Pahari is a local term of the Bangla language to label 
ethnic minorities it does not express the identity of a particular ethnic group. During the 
colonial era (1760-1947), the term ‘Hill men’ was used to refer to the ‘tribal’ people living in 
the Hill Tracts (Nasreen and Togawa 2002: 103). 
 
The main objective of this thesis is to analyze and discuss the different dimensions of 
interconnectedness and contestation of ethnic minority groups with the dominant Bangalee 
group who constitute the majority of the country in terms of number of people and economic 
and political power (Mohsin 1997; Schendel, Mey and Dewan 2001). Through a discussion 
of state policy, development projects of NGOs and social networks I aim to show how 
expanding state space and economic transition in the CHT has dispossessed and marginalized 
the ethnic minority groups and altered their livelihood options, social structure and also 
limited their rights and access to resources, such as land and forests. Moreover, I will analyze 
their social networks and identity formation in the changed socio-economic contexts. In this 
regard, I have will analyze the interrelations of the Khyang with other ethnic groups.  
 
The Khyang are one of the ethnic minority communities living in the CHT. The geography of 
the region, in contrast to the rest of the country’s plains, is comprised of hills, valleys, and a 
dense semi tropical monsoon forest. The three districts in the CHT are known as Rangamati, 
Bandarban, and Khagrachhari (see Annex 1). My field sites were located in Rangamati and 
Bandarban district. 
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RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
Objectives and research questions of the thesis are: 
I) Make a profile of Khyang people who are living in CHT in order to understand their 
livelihood strategies 
a. What kind of economic activities are the Khyang involved with? 
b. How is the seasonality of their economic activities? 
c. How are gender roles and responsibilities of the Khyang distributed in 
resource management and livelihood-strategies (production, distribution, 
consumption and exchange)? 
d. How do the Khyang respond to the changing economic scenario and 
interacting with others? 
II) Analyzing rights and access to resources such as land and natural resources in order to 
understand the effect of government and non-government policies on Khyang 
livelihood 
a. What factors (especially government policies) affect Khyang economic 
opportunities and livelihood strategies? 
b. How do policies of land and forests affect inter and intra dynamics of Khyang 
community and their relation with other groups?  
c. How do the Khyang perceive government and non-government policies and 
other factors, which affect their access to land and other resources? 
III) Exploring Khyang identity and social networks of Khyang life in order to understand 
the interconnectedness and contestation of the Khyang with other ethnic groups 
(Bangalees and others) and the outside world 
a. What constitute Khyang identity? 
b. How do they interact and connect with different social, religious, ethnic or 
political networks? 
c. How do the Khyang perceive and counteract factors (if any) that prevent them 
to connect with the wider social networks? 
d. What role does Khyang identity play in economic relationships within and 
outside the group? 
e. Whether involvement with diverse livelihood activities has created 
diversification in identity internally and public image for the outside ethnic 
groups? 
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THE CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS (CHT) OF BANGLADESH 
 
Bangladesh is a country in South Asia. It is bordered by the Republic of India to its north, 
west and east, by the Union of Myanmar (Burma) to its southeast and by the Bay of Bengal to 
its south. Siliguri Corridor of India separates the CHT from the Democratic Republic of 
Nepal and the Kingdom of Bhutan. Together with the neighboring Indian states of West 
Bengal and Tripura, it makes up the ethno-linguistic region of Bengal. The 
name Bangladesh means ‘Country of Bengal’ in the official Bangla language. 
 
With a population of more than 160 million people in a territory of 56,977 square miles, 
Bangladesh is the world’s eighth most populous country, as well as one of the world’s most 
densely populated. Bangladesh got independence from Pakistan in 1971 and founded on 
Bangalee nationalism (Mohsin 1997: 50). The Bangalee form the country’s predominant 
ethnic group, whereas there are different groups of people in northern 
and southeastern districts who form a significant and diverse ethnic minority. The four largest 
religions in the country are Islam (89%), Hinduism (9%), Buddhism (1%) 
and Christianity (0.5%).  
 
The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) of Bangladesh lies on the country’s international borders 
with Myanmar (Burma) and India (the ‘states’ of Tripura and Mizoram). The British colonial 
empire carved out the present boundaries of the CHT in 1860 (Roy 1995; Mohsin 1997). 
CHT covers an area of approximately 13,189 square kilometers. Formerly, the Chittagong 
Hill Tracts was a single unified district, but administrative reorganization has led to its 
division into the three districts of Rangamati, Khagrachhari and Bandarban. The CHT was 
under the British Rule from 1860-1947, followed by Pakistani rule until 1971 and then 
became a part of Bangladesh (when Bangladesh got independence from Pakistan). 
 
The landscape of CHT differs from the rest of Bangladesh, which is flat and faces regular 
monsoon flooding. The hills of CHT stretch 1,800 kilometers from western Myanmar to the 
eastern Himalayas in Tibet. Along this mountain range are a variety of ethnic minority groups 
live in a scattered manner. The hills are rich in natural resources, for example timber and 
bamboo. In recent years, Bangladeshi companies and investors through government 
allocation of forests have developed parts of the CHT for pulpwood and rubber plantation 
(Ray and Salam 2009). 
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There are 11 different indigenous ethnic minority groups (recognized by the government) in 
the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Customary laws and practices within these communities vary, but 
there are commonalities in terms of their social and political organization. They differ 
significantly from the majority Bangalee population in relation to religion, as most ethnic 
minorities are Buddhist whereas most Bangalee are Muslim. There are also significant 
differences in terms of language, social and political organization, marriage customs, birth 
and death rites, food, and agriculture techniques. The hilly and forested terrain is suitable for 
the indigenous form of subsistence cultivation in CHT called Jhum
1
 (Roy 1995).  
 
The CHT became formally a part of the then province of Bengal in 1860. Historically, the 
CHT had largely been an independent and self-governed territory until 1860 when the British 
took it over (Ishaq 1975). In the year 1900, the British passed and enforced the ‘Chittagong 
Hill Tracts Regulation of 1900’, which declared the CHT as an ‘Excluded Area’ and put an 
embargo on ‘outsiders’ (people other than members of the indigenous groups) to settle or 
purchase land in the territory of CHT. This regulation provided substantive autonomy to the 
indigenous people. The autonomy was in force until 1962 when the government of Pakistan 
replaced the ‘excluded area’ status of the CHT with that of ‘tribal area’ in a constitutional 
amendment. This constitutional change paved the way for an influx of people other than 
those of the indigenous origin into the region in a large number. The non-indigenous 
population (mostly Bangalee) in 1872 was 1.74%, which rose to the level of around 9.09% 
(1951) over eight decades, and doubled by the next two decades (19.41% in 1974). At present 
the Bangalee population stands at almost 50 percent in the CHT (Barkat et al. 2009: 17).  
 
The percentage of Bangalee people in the CHT increased rapidly in mid-1950s when the 
Pakistan Government initiated construction of the Kaptai Hydro-electric project to meet the 
demand for energy for industrialization and domestic consumption with financial assistance 
from Canada and the World Bank (WB). The project was completed in early 1960s. This 
project, along with development of other industrial units in CHT (for example the 
Chandraghona Paper Mill in Kaptai area) has provided the government with an opportunity 
for allowing non-indigenous population’s influx in the name of economic development (Ray 
and Salam 2009).  
                                                          
1
 Slash and burn cultivation 
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In present days, the Chittagong Hill Tracts are divided into three ‘circles’ each led by a 
‘Circle Chief’ or ‘Raja’ – the Chakma circle, the Bomang Circle and the Mong Circle. Each 
circle is roughly equivalent to each district in the Chittagong Hill Tracts – the Chakma is 
responsible for Rangamati district, the Mong for Khagrachhari and the Bomang is for the 
Bandarban district. Each circle is divided into numerous of ‘mauza’2  (territorial zones). 
There are about 380 mauza in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. A ‘Headman’ leads each mauza. 
Mauzas are further divided into several villages and each led by a village ‘Karbari’3. These 
traditional leaders exercise jurisdiction in relation to matters of family law, lower level crimes, 
and allocation of customary interests in collective lands, such as the allocation of land for 
Jhum and homesteads (Amnesty International 2013). 
 
KHYANG OF THE CHT 
 
With a population of 1900, the Khyang is one of the smaller ethnic communities within the 
CHT (Adnan 2004). Khyang have the same origin as the Chin of Burma and the Khyang 
language is similar to that of the southern Chin with a partial influence of the Burmese 
language (Shafie 2000).  
 
There are two kinds of Khyang communities, the Kongtu Khyang and the Laitu Khyang 
(Chapola 2009). The Kongtu Khyang lives on top of the mountains and have mostly 
converted to Christianity (Seventh-Day Adventists) from Buddhism while the Laitu Khyang 
lives in the plain land of the valleys in CHT and they are mostly Buddhist.  Laitu Khyang 
people are involved in plough cultivation, while Kongtu Khyang people are more dependent 
upon shifting cultivation (Jhum) because of living at high altitude (Chapola 2009).  
 
Among the Khyang the father of a family is the head of the household. Men are the decision 
makers in the home and society. Male dominance among the Khyang is evident by the fact 
                                                          
2
 Mauza is the grass-root revenue unit. Mauza is placed under a Headman (or Dewan) appointed by the 
concerned Circle Chief, in concurrence with Deputy Commissioner. 
3
 Each mauza is sub-divided into smaller units called Para, which actually contains individual village settlement. 
Such villages are placed under a Karbari, who is appointed by the mauza Headman with the concurrence of the 
concerned ‘Chief’. 
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that sons get share of paternal land however, the daughters do not have any share in 
inheritance (Khyang 2007: 96). The logic is as girls get married to other families and goes to 
her husband’s house after marriage. So they are organised after a patrilineal kinship system 
and inheritance follow the patri-lineage and at marriage they practice parti-local settlement. 
However, if the parents want they can give the daughters a share in inheritance. 
 
In conversations with the Khyang, they said that they are very peaceful and always love to 
live at a safe distance from other groups of people. That is why they always choose to settle 
on remote hilltops far from the villages in valleys. They call a house ‘em’ and a village ‘nam’. 
Most of them depend on Jhum cultivation and it is their only source for livelihood/ 
subsistence. The Khyangs through generations has practiced Jhum/ slash and burn cultivation. 
 
There is no other population in the entire region who has been as badly affected by the 
expansion of governmental Reserved Forests (RF
4
) and plantations as the Khyang (Chapola 
2009: 5). Life became extremely difficult for them after the British Government had imposed 
a ban on Jhum cultivation in 1900. However, at the local level people continue to practice 
Jhum. Though the ban on Jhum has continued it is enforced strictly in different areas at 
different times periodically to restore soil fertility which degrade because of continuous Jhum 
cultivation, one such strict ban was imposed during the Jhum season of 2009 (World Food 
Programme 2011: 4). Some Khyang families have developed fruit garden, some earn their 
income by selling labor in plantations while many families rely on a very small income from 
collecting and selling fuel wood, bamboo, etc. (Chapola 2009: 5).  
 
The Khyang require vast land for Jhum but they have been losing accessible land for 
cultivation because of expansion of the reserved forest (see chapter three) and construction of 
government driven hydroelectric project in the Kaptai Lake (Uddin 2008: 18). In some 
instances, entire Khyang villages have disappeared (Adnan 2004; Schendel, Mey and Dewan 
2001). The precarious conditions of the Khyang are no exception from other indigenous 
communities in the CHT due to insurgency, counter-insurgency, militarization, and Bangalee 
settlement (Adnan 2004; Schendel, Mey and Dewan 2001; Mohsin 1997; 2003). These forces 
                                                          
4
 Reserved Forests (RF): These are lands under the direct control of the FD. The Forest Act is applicable for 
their protection. Forest Department (FD) is responsible for the management of the forest reserves. However, the 
collective rights of ethnic groups to use and extract forests resources are not recognized. 
Dispossession and Ethnic Identity in Expanding State Space of Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh 
Contextualization of Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) and the Research Problem 8 
allegedly invoked armed resistance by different ethnic groups to which the Bangladesh 
government responded by means of military operations. However, in 1997 Bangladesh 
government and the Pahari groups demanding autonomy signed a peace accord after decades 
of violence in CHT (Barkat et al. 2009).  
 
On this backdrop, different ethnic groups of CHT including the Khyang are in competition 
with Bangalee people and complying with the government and non-government policies to 
make use of the available resources to sustain their livelihood. Thus, I will describe the 
diversified interrelations between different ethnic communities living in the CHT (specially 
the Khyangs) and discuss how the Khyang negotiate and sustain their ethnic identity in this 
changing context where they cultivate limited Jhum, depend on the market for selling their 
products and buying daily needed groceries. That is how they are responding in their 
transition from subsistence to market economy.  
 
FIELD LOCATIONS 
 
The locality in Bandarban (Dolbonia) is about 15 kilometers away from the Bandarban town 
center, and three kilometers away from the nearest road that goes to the town center. The area 
has no electricity and from the nearest road junction to the cluster of households one 
generally has to walk but occasionally one may reserve mini-taxi or motorbike. People of the 
Khyang community here are Buddhist. Among the 65 Khyang household (360 people) most 
are plough cultivators, thus, they are the Laitu Khyang. However, there are people with other 
occupations also, such as small business (shop owner), school teacher, non-government 
officials, and daily laborers who work in the agricultural fields nearby, in the brickfield or at 
the Bandarban town. These forms of wage labor however, are generally a supplement to 
people’s income from agriculture. They cultivate rice, different kinds of vegetables, some 
spices like ginger and many of them cultivate tobacco. Another distinctive feature of this area 
is that the surrounding areas of the Khyang cluster of houses are settled by Bangalee Muslims. 
 
The area of Rangamati where the Khyangs live is within a kilometer of a major road junction 
to Rangamati Town, Bandarban Town, Chittagong City and Karnafully Paper Mills.  There 
is a bus terminal, taxi stand, commercial bank, big market place, ferry to cross Karnafully 
river, commercial banks, hospital, industries, abundance of shops and stalls where a great 
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variety of commodities are sold. People of the Khyang community here are follower of the 
Baptist Church. In the ‘Mission Para’ (neighborhood) of Rangamati, there are 54 households 
(297 people). Traditionally they were Jhum cultivators (shifting cultivation) and they regard 
themselves as Kongtu Khyang. Since they settled in this area around 1900 they have 
gradually stopped cultivation, and as of now none of the Khyang living here are engaged with 
any sort of agricultural production but a few cultivate fruits in homestead garden for 
consumption. People here have diverse forms of wage labor including medical doctor, 
accountant, medical technician, nurses, cook, cleaner, security guard, beautician, garments 
worker, daily labor, shop owner, non-government officials, etc. People of this area are more 
politically active compared to the Khyang of Bandarban and there is an elected Khyang 
member in the local government body called ‘Union Parishad’5. Khyang of the Rangamati 
live in close contact with different ethnic groups such as the Bangalee, Marma, Chakma, 
Tanchangya, However, Bangalee people living in adjacent areas are either Christian 
(followers of the Baptist Church) or Hindu. 
 
None of my field sites is in any respect a bounded system. The personal networks of 
inhabitants have so many dispersed interrelations. However, Khyang of the Rangamati have 
more non-local linkages than the Khyang of the Bandarban. In addition, their social identities 
are partly defined through their engagement with other ethnic groups, political organizations 
and institutions of national scale, which contribute to the creation of shared understanding 
and situational identities.  
 
The context of my position as a researcher in relation to my field sites can be analyzed in line 
with Gupta and Ferguson (1997: 13) where they discuss the distinction between ‘field’ and 
‘home’ and the hierarchy regarding purity of field sites. They claim that if the ‘field’ is a 
place that is ‘not home’ then some places be more ‘not home’ than others, and hence more 
appropriate, more ‘fieldlike’. According to them, largely because the idea of ‘the field’ 
remains un-interrogated such hierarchies of field sites remain in anthropology.  
 
Further, Gupta and Ferguson (1997: 12) argue the function of narratives of entry and exit into 
field is to authenticate and authorize the material that follows, most of which used to be 
written from the standpoint of an objective, distant observer. Fieldwork at ‘home’ or distant 
                                                          
5
 Union Parishad is the smallest rural administrative and local government units in Bangladesh. 
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‘field sites’ and anthropological writing implies presumption that ‘otherness’ means 
difference from an unmarked self (Gupta and Ferguson 1997: 14f). Doing fieldwork in a 
situation where I as a person and my ethnic identity as a Bangalee are a part of the social 
context has blurred the subject/ object distinction on which an ethnography is conventionally 
founded (Gupta and Ferguson 1997: 33). Though I am part of the Khyangs’ everyday life 
being a Bangalee, in my interaction with them I tried to be impartial in my opinion during 
discussions. 
 
As I have combined two field sites, I also had to integrate observation and interview methods 
as many of my enquiries were to be discovered from the memories of the Khyang as Malkki 
(1997) did among the Hutu refugees in Tanzania. In line with Malkki (1997: 87), I was 
investigating the transitory phenomena among the Khyang, which is not produced by any 
particular cultural milieu. I will continue my discussion on method in the methodology 
section later in this chapter. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Ethnicity and identity 
 
In anthropology, the term ‘ethnicity’ is contested and there are many different understandings 
of what ethnicity is about. According to Weber (1978 [1922]), the term ‘ethnic group’ can be 
defined as human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because 
of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization 
and migration. Ethnic identity is further marked by a group’s distinctiveness and the 
recognition of common cultural, linguistic, religious, behavioral or biological traits, real or 
presumed, as indicators of contrast to other groups and it can make differences in interaction 
and social relationship (Eriksen 2001; 1993).   
 
My field sites and the CHT are comparable to Eriksen’s (1992 b) field situation in Trinidad, 
which, he termed as ‘creole cultures’ suggesting presence of an incongruous admixture of 
cultural traditions classified as ‘plural societies’. In line with Eriksen, I will treat ethnicity as 
the systematic and enduring social reproduction of basic classificatory difference between 
categories of people who perceive each other as culturally distinct. 
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In this thesis, I will discuss how Khyang ethnic identity is formed and through what means it 
may change. I will analyze how the Khyang talk and think about their own and other groups, 
explain ethnic identity of the Khyangs in line with Eriksen’s concept of ‘situational ethnicity’.  
In Trinidad and Mauritius, as in the CHT virtually any situation involving people from 
different ethnic membership has a varying ethnic character (Eriksen 1992 b: 18). For example, 
Eriksen claims personal economic failures in Trinidad are frequently explained by the 
notorious dishonesty/ partiality of an ethnic category and where informal economic networks 
are ethnically bounded (Eriksen 1992 b). Similarly, in case of CHT and my field sites 
interactions between the Khyangs and other ethnic groups especially the Bangalee people are 
characterized by distrust (see chapter two). 
 
Fredrick Barth pointed out that ethnic group boundaries are a matter of membership and only 
socially relevant (Barth 1969). Barth (1969: 15) argues the boundaries to which attention 
must be given are of course social boundaries, even if they have territorial counterparts. If a 
group maintains its identity when members interact with others, this entails criteria for 
determining membership and ways of signaling membership and exclusion.  
 
Barth (1969) understood ethnicity as ideas perpetually negotiated and renegotiated by both 
external ascription and internal self-identification. He argues that a Southern Pathan from the 
homogeneous, lineage organized mountain areas, can sometimes find the behavior of Pathans 
in Swat so different from their own values that they declare their northern brothers ‘no longer 
Pathan’  as their overt pattern of organization seems much closer to that of Panjabis (1969: 
13). Thus, the cultural diversity which is observed between different Pathan communities and 
which is comparable to communities and neighboring non-Pathan groups does not provide 
criteria for differentiating persons in terms ethnic identity. Comparatively, in CHT since the 
massive migration of Bangalee people, the day-to-day interactions between different groups 
might create a situation where the Khyang and the Bangalee people are having similar 
customs and practices. In such a situation I will analyze how the Khyangs’ ethnic boundaries 
are maintained in line with Barth’s (1969: 19) argument that members of this society select 
only certain cultural traits (for instance patrilineal descent for the Pathans), and make these 
the unambiguous criteria for ascription to the ethnic group.  
 
Further, I will analyze how, when, and why different markers of ethnic identity become 
salient during Khyangs’ interaction with other group members, involvement in diverse social 
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networks in changing socio-economic settings (see chapter four).  In addition, I will analyze 
the transformation of identity of the Khyang. There are always internal tensions and 
inconsistencies among the various identities and group memberships of individuals (Calhoun 
1994). Individuals negotiate their identities within the ‘interaction order’6 and present an 
image of themselves (of self) for acceptance by others (Jenkins 2008: 93). The more people 
have to do with each other in everyday life, the more likely they will be to identify each other 
as fellow individuals, rather than primarily by reference to their collective identifications 
(Jenkins 2008: 147). In CHT, the Khyang has been involved in different activities for 
livelihoods and I therefore discuss whether these activities have created diversification in 
identity among the Khyang internally and in their public image for the outside ethnic groups.  
 
Further, from the point of view of national politics, the national constitution of Bangladesh in 
1972 did not have any provision for ‘autonomous status’ to the CHT or cultural 
distinctiveness to the hill people (ignoring their claim). This has generated a deep-seated fear 
among the hill people that more lands will be taken away by the government as previously 
during 1957 and 1963 the ‘Kaptai dam’ had submerged 40% of the CHT cultivable lands. 
Further, ethnic identities were and are being used as a means to mobilize and politicize 
people along ethnic lines towards a separatist movement (Kabir and Ahmed 2012). I will 
therefore, discuss the ways different ethnic groups maintain their interrelationships and 
connect with the outside world and how ethnic identity is involved in ‘politics of identity’ (c.f. 
Scott 2009: 243). 
 
Resources and livelihoods: production, consumption, distribution and exchange  
 
Even though not all societies have specifically subsistence economies, they all have specific 
ways of producing food, shelter, clothing and income. There is no society without methods of 
production, distribution, consumption and some form of exchange (Herkovits 1974: 143).  
How the Khyangs maintain their livelihoods and the ways they are involved in production, 
distribution, consumption and exchange (of resources) are in particular discussed in chapter 
two. 
 
                                                          
6
 The interaction order is the human world as constituted in relationships between individuals, in what-goes-on-
between-people (Jenkins 2008: 39). In other words, it is the face-to-face domain of dealings between individuals. 
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Turner (1986: 114) argues that forms and processes of production is the manner in which a 
society pragmatically defines itself and the boundary between itself and another society. 
Therefore, it is essential to focus on the situations of interaction between different ‘modes’, 
sectors or levels of production. I hold that such an approach will open up for understanding 
the possible interrelationships of Khyang with other ethnic groups as they had to change their 
cultivation practice from Jhum to plough and also integrated with the market economy 
(Mohsin 1997; Schendel, Mey and Dewan 2001). The consequences of this change in mode 
of production might alter the way in which the society (in this case the Khyang) organizes 
access to land, labor, energy, technology, information and economic, political and social 
relations (c.f. Narotzky 2001: 4070). To explore the transformations associated with the 
change in mode of production among the Khyang is important for my thesis because in line 
with Gudeman (2005) I analyze how the Khyang responses to adapt with the transition from 
economic transactions at the community level to the market realm where people engage in 
short term exchanges. 
 
More frequently, ‘division of labor’ is used to address particular production processes and the 
assigning of individuals or groups to positions within the process. The concept of ‘division of 
labor’ was designed originally to explain the ‘integration of the social body’ through the 
necessary dependence between specialized domains of work (Durkheim 1933). Therefore, I 
discuss on the division of labor among the Khyang in order to illuminate the new frontiers of 
interaction of the Khyang and impacts of the changing economic pattern. In this regard, I will 
analyze my data and discuss in chapter three in line with Kasmir and Carbonella (2008: 7) 
who argue that the process of economic assimilation creates its own ‘other’.  
 
Changes in production systems influence the kind of produce and goods are exchanged. On 
the other hand, production for exchange is a principal catalyst for the transformation of social 
life (Bloch and Parry 1989: 7).Through new economic activities and being involved in a 
larger market networks older solidarities erodes and it might also promote a wider and more 
diffuse sort of social integration (Simmel 2004 [1978]: 410f). Thus, it is also pertinent to 
investigate the new forms of networks of the Khyang in economic and social life. I discuss 
the forms of social networks of the Khyang  in chapter four and analyze how ethnic identity 
place the Khyang  in a hierarchical order during interaction with Bangalee people and people 
of other ethnic groups (see chapter four). 
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Social networks 
 
The connectivity of social networks and dynamic exchange among its members and with 
members of other social groups might allow a multiplication of resources that one owns 
(Rosas 2001: 42) and access to entitlements is contingent on having a well-connected patron 
who can channel claims and applications (Hansen and Stepputat 2006: 306). In North-
western Bangladesh, Shafie and Kilby (2003: 3)  show that the clustering and hierarchical 
arrangement of ethnic identities constructs social barriers, such as discrimination in the labor 
market that prevent wider social networks of ethnic minorities. Thus, in chapter four I discuss 
how the Khyang identify, connect and maintain social relations with the different social, 
religious, ethnic or political networks including the dominant ethnic groups. This is deemed 
important because each person’s network – the particular set of other persons with whom he 
or she recurrently interacts – is based on that persons own selection among the opportunities 
of persons that occur.   
 
International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) (2012) reports that in CHT the 
military are directly involved and on many occasion provide covert support to the numerous 
ethnic/ communal attacks on minority villages. These communal conflicts between the ethnic 
minority communities and the Bangalee people are often motivated by the quest for control 
of lands. I assume incidences of violence over the years may have created disruption in the 
life and networks of the Khyang and they might have developed indigenous strategies of 
intercommunity connections like the Iroquois discussed by Jordan (2013). The Iroquois 
remained largely self-governing until after the American Revolution. Thereafter, they were 
confined to reservations and became engulfed by thousands of Euro-American settlers 
moving into lands secured by a series of controversial treaties between the Iroquois, the new 
United States, and its constituent states (Jordan 2013: 31).    
 
The Iroquois responded establishing ‘satellite villages’- smaller communities placed nearby 
the principal towns, usually labeled ‘satellite villages’ (Jordan 2013: 31). Satellite 
communities appeared within the Iroquois’ homeland during the 1500s. These satellites local, 
regional, and extra-regional served numerous functions for both Haudenosaunee communities 
and newcomers (Jordan 2013: 38). Incorporation of outsiders provided the Iroquois with 
allies. Such allies were useful for military expeditions and marriage possibilities, and they 
could provide valuable information about their former home regions and social ties to those 
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groups that still resided there. For allied populations, close ties with the Iroquois provided 
military protection coupled with ongoing semi-autonomous status (Jordan 2013: 38). Because 
of the settlement of Bangalee population, presence of the military and new market 
opportunities I discuss how the Khyangs’ relations with the people of other ethnic groups is 
shaped and take forms.  
 
The diverse social networks of the Khyang and the transformation  of identity and historical 
consciousness is will be analyzed in line with Malkki’s (1995) discussion on how historical 
consciousness is embedded and emerges from particular, local and lived circumstances. She 
argues, based on information collected from two groups of Hutu refugees from 1972 conflict 
in Burundi. Among that, one group was living in refugee camps and other in town 
neighborhood. This is comparable to my field sites as the village in Bandarban is distant 
from urban localities whereas the area of Rangamati is at the vicinity of Chittagong city and I 
found variations in identity formation in the two sites.  
 
State policy and development: dispossession, marginalization and graduated sovereignty 
 
During 1980s, the practitioners of Jhum were subjected to the development program of the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board (CHTDB), which encouraged people to practice a 
settled mode of cultivation in cooperative farms. The objective of the program was to settle 
the landless swidden cultivators into a settled form of land usage. The people who had 
communal properties were allotted 5.25 acres of land on individual basis for the cultivation of 
various vegetables. However, the land allotted had slopes of 20% to 40%, which were only 
suitable for fruit and tree crop cultivation, and not suitable for rice cultivation, the staple food 
for the hill people (Mohsin 1997: 124). As they did not had the opportunity to cultivate rice 
they became dependent on the market for selling their produce and for buying the necessary 
staple foods. The development project did not plan for marketing, preservation or storage and 
consequently made the hill people dependent on the Bangalee people who controlled all the 
local markets. Bangalee traders can manipulate prices as the produce of the Pahari people are 
of perishable nature that needs to be sold fast before getting decomposed (Mohsin 1997: 
124ff; see chapter three). 
 
The resentment of the minority ethnic groups against the initiatives of allotting lands for 
plough cultivation by the government of Bangladesh was backed by their idea regarding 
Dispossession and Ethnic Identity in Expanding State Space of Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh 
Contextualization of Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) and the Research Problem 16 
lands. The concept of landlessness was alien to the Khyang and other ethnic minorities 
practicing Jhum as they regard land to be communal property. It was therefore, a case of 
imposing Bangalee notion of settled agriculture and land ownership upon the Pahari people. 
The land acquired by the state was subsequently settled with Bangalee people (Mohsin 1997). 
The program of allotting lands to the ethnic minority families to be settled was financed by 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB), who also recommended and financed the formation of 
CHTDB in 1976 to prepare projects and programs for the development of CHT (Mohsin 1997: 
120). 
 
Further, the absence of adequate transport infrastructure was identified by the government as 
a primary restraint in the economic development of CHT. Eventually the Australian 
Development Assistance Bureau (ADAB) then undertook the construction of 66-kilometer 
long road from Rangamati to Khagrachhari, besides other roads were upgraded (Mohsin 
1997: 131).  However, the local population resented this road construction and regarded it as 
a way of controlling the hill people through swift military movement and for the benefit of 
Bangalee traders (Mohsin 1997: 131). The initiatives of the Bangladesh government, such as 
allotting private lands to individual families and construction of road networks can be 
analyzed in line with Scott’s (2009: 330) argument of expansion of state space for making the 
hill people taxable.  
 
Scott (2009) writes about how hill-people people deal with a predatory state. Scott’s analysis 
focuses on the various groups residing in the hills of Zomia in South East Asia, which is an 
area comprised of parts of Burma, Cambodia, China, India, Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand.  
His focus on Zomia is driven by the fact that the region is the largest remaining area that has 
not been (until quite recently) integrated into a nation state.  Scott analyzes how the hill 
people negotiate with the coming of the state and argues that Zomia can be understood as a 
‘state effect’. In line with Scott I discuss in chapter three (see also chapter four) how the 
Khyangs negotiate their rights, maintain their livelihood and ethnic identity in an area 
comparable to that of Zomia. 
 
The situation of the CHT and the ethnic minority groups in relation to Bangladesh states’ 
endeavor to modernize and introduce private ownership and subsequent land loss or 
dispossession of the Khyang and other ethnic groups can be analyzed in line with Murray Li’s 
(2010: 394) argument that in much of Asia peasants (plough agriculturists) were sent into the 
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highland as the ‘territorial spearhead’ of the state in order to tame unruly tribes. They were 
also expected to supply the labor, taxes, and surplus produce that would boost 
industrialization. As the settler/ migrated people take center stage, the populations that 
distinctly marked as ‘tribal’ in the colonial period are been treated as a national 
embarrassment to be brought up to modern standards as quickly as possible. 
 
In this way the use of land is reserved from some actors and denied to others, consequently 
the Khyang are excluded from access to land (c.f. Hall, Hirsch and Murray Li 2011: 4). In 
this regard, different kinds of regulations, fear of possible violence and market demands have 
been critical for Khyangs’ dispossession from land (c.f. Hall, Hirsch and Murray Li 2011: 
16ff; see also chapter three). Here I would also like to mention that the marginality of the 
Khyang is to be understood as a social construction and an ongoing relationship with power, 
be it the power of the state, market forces or power of the majority people of the country 
(Murray Li 1999: 2). 
 
The differential treatment of populations through bio-political measures may insert different 
groups of people differently into the process of global capitalism something which may 
overlap with pre-formed racial, religious, gender hierarchies, and fragment citizenship for 
people who are all nominally speaking, citizens of the same country– this is what Ong termed 
graduated sovereignty (Ong 2000: 62). I hold that this is a similar tendency in Bangladeshi 
policy as the Bangla language and prioritization of Islam have been the main tools in shaping 
Bangalee and Bangladeshi nationalism. This was done by the governments to gain political 
power, which in turn have alienated the ethnic minority groups (Mohsin 1997: 75). I will 
discuss the process of marginalization of Khyang in relation to state formation and citizenship 
in chapter three. 
 
Moreover, as the state’s interventions also are influenced by the international development 
organizations as powerful actors impose their interests, values and beliefs onto people of the 
developing world, I also discuss the relation between state policy and foreign aid, 
investments, Non-governmental Organization (NGO) projects as part of commitment to 
international development (c.f. Crewe and Axelby 2013).  
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METHODOLOGY  
 
Initially, I made contacts with some of people who live in my research areas so that I could 
hire research assistants from the Khyang community and find a place to live in the 
community. However, I could not find a place to live among the Khyang in Rangamati, so I 
stayed as a paying guest with a Marma minority family five minutes’ walk from a Khyang 
cluster of households. The household head of my host family works for the Christian Hospital 
and lives in a house in the ‘Mission Para’ with his wife, son and daughter. They also provided 
me with food during my stay at Rangamati. In Bandarban, I lived with a Khyang family with 
four children and where both the head of the household and his wife worked as farmers in 
their self-owned farm. In both neighborhoods, there were a few shops where different snacks 
and tea were sold. These were the localities where I could get in touch with men of the 
community and discuss different issues. There were also open spaces where young people 
used to play football and cricket. To talk with the women I used to visit Khyang houses in the 
afternoon. 
 
Though most of the Khyang speak Bangla, I hired assistants because the Khyang also use 
their own spoken language in conversations.  The research assistants helped to get acceptance 
in the community and in gaining the trust of the people I wanted to engage in conversation. 
However, hiring research assistant had its drawbacks too; they proposed to go to the people 
they thought would know much about my research topic. To avoid being directed towards 
their own friends and family and to get access to different groups and collect broad data, I 
had to tell my research assistants that I would go to every households of the community. I 
hired three research assistants, one in Rangamati and two in Bandarban. All of my research 
assistants were young men; two of them were studying in Rangamati town. While one of the 
research assistants of Bandarban left school before completing secondary level. At the time 
of my fieldwork, he was working as a teacher.   
 
In the field, I tried to come into contact with different ethnic communities and talk to people 
randomly on the streets, markets, tea stalls, bus stops, etc. I participated in informal 
gatherings of different groups of people, in particular the Khyang, with an intention to get 
information about their local networks and their interaction with others and amongst 
themselves (c.f. Barth 1983).  
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During my stay in the villages, I was a participant observer among the Khyang. In fact, sitting, 
asking, listening and participating in their daily activities- is to conduct participant 
observation, which entails the systematic, detailed, nonjudgmental, concrete descriptions of 
events, behaviors, and artifacts in the social setting chosen for study (Marshall and Rossman 
2006). Being a participant observer I gathered information about the economic activities of 
the households and how values and norms are employed and produced through everyday life. 
For example, I have participated in prayer meetings of the Khyang in Rangamati and seen 
how they interact with the Bangalee people who they identify themselves with in terms of 
religious belief. Further, in those meetings different individuals raised and talked about 
different issues which they would like to seek blessings of the God. This revealed the priority 
issues for the Khyangs and gave me cues for further exploration.   
 
I was a keen observer of the Khyangs’ daily lives and activities. The importance of 
observation is supported by Jenkins’s (1994: 435ff) argument that what goes on at the French 
cattle market is to be discovered by observation rather than by listening and the knowledge 
involved is largely ‘non-verbal’. Jenkins show how knowledge and values are transmitted 
from father to son, but not only by words of mouth but through experience. Without using 
verbal discourse, it is possible for them to examine the animals and to different series of 
economic transactions. In the CHT as the Khyang are generally perceived as someone from 
the lower status compared to the Bangalee people, I tried to observe the interaction in the 
market places or in daily activities to bring out the underlying and unuttered knowledge and 
meanings.  However, during observation and data analysis I was aware of the issue that there 
is no such thing as objective, uninvolved knowledge. Jenkins’s (1994: 443) argues that the 
anthropologist gets caught up in the series of events that constitute social life, where there is 
no objective truth, but different versions of truth that constitute the event. However, through 
participant observation with the Khyang I could investigate everyday activities and find 
patterns of interaction and activities (Whyte 1997: 19ff).  
 
I had chosen to be a participant observer, as ethnographic material collected using this 
method can yield understanding which cannot be obtained through other methods (Jenkins 
1994: 436; Keesing 1987: 163). However, since not all aspects of an event are observed 
simultaneously, the bringing into awareness of the components of the event, as well as the 
field within which it took place, becomes a retrospective process. To avoid personal biases 
during data collection I wrote down whatever I had observed and subjective interpretations or 
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my understanding of the same event (c.f. Mack et al. 2005: 15). I tried to write notes when 
the events were taking place; however, sometimes I did it afterwards based on my memory. 
 
As a Bangalee male participant observer among the Khyang I had certain limitations for 
example I had to inform the families before I went and to talk with the women. So I think I 
did not have enough information from Khyang women compared to the information I have 
got from Khyang men. My situation in the field was similar to what DeWalt and DeWalt 
(2002: 83ff) noted on male and female researchers access to information. They argued that as 
the sex of the researchers sometimes determine their access to different people, settings, and 
bodies of knowledge ‘participant observation’ is conducted from a biased or partial position 
from which stance data is collected. 
 
I have also conducted informal interviews to elicit individual experiences, opinions, feelings, 
the connections and relationships a person sees between particular, events, phenomena and 
beliefs. Whenever I met someone who was willing to talk I used to talk and discuss about the 
day to day problems they face to sustain life, how is the education of the Khyang child in the 
area, what programs they arrange in the locality where people from other communities take 
part, how do the farmer sell their products in the market places, how arrangement for 
cultivation are made, or even what do the young people do for recreation. I used to go and sit 
at the small tea stalls on the afternoons where I could meet almost all the men and took part 
on whatever issues were being discussed, for example, the political turmoil over general 
election or reality shows on TV. 
 
Through interviews I also tried to explore how the Khyang perceive government policies 
regarding forest reservations and how those are interlinked with the other ethnic groups and 
what are the barriers (if any) to engage in their livelihood pursuits and how do they 
counteract those barriers. I also conducted interviews regarding how the Khyang understand 
past events of their village establishment, what did they do in the past to live and what 
economic activities they are involved with at present. I have also asked them and tried to 
understand how they use knowledge of the past for making livelihood and interacting with 
Bangalee people living in the areas (c.f. Giles-Vernick 2006: 90). For example, how the 
Khyang are being dispossessed from the land access to cultivate Jhum, what are the problems 
the Khyang face during marketing and selling agricultural products or accessing loans or 
credits. The interviews were informal initially and as I identified informants that might have 
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extended knowledge on the areas of my research interest or proposed to talk in detail later, I 
also conducted formal interviews (c.f. Crane and Angrosino 1992: 57). However, during 
interviews it was difficult to make people talk about issues regarding government policies 
and community dynamics. Rather they were interested to talk about my background and how 
I am feeling living in the village or even how my fieldwork and data collection is going on. 
During an interview, Ongsha Khyang was telling me about parental land holdings and how 
some of the land was sold to Bangalee people at nominal price. In addition, when I asked 
about his current landholding situation he did not wanted to talk more and said, “if I start to 
talk about this then a lot have to be said.” However, after a pause he shared his experience 
regarding how powerfully linked Khyangs of his village are talking land controls exercising 
political and administrative linkages. On other instances, they talked very general which I 
took as an indication that they did not wanted to talk on the issue. 
 
Interviews supplemented my data gathered from observation, as during interviews informants 
own experience and understanding can be captured (Giles-Vernick 2006: 87). I also did group 
discussions, which helped and aided interpretation of my observations (c.f. Short 2006: 104). 
However, I was also aware that sometimes the informants may overstate the reality as I was 
dealing with sensitive issues like the interrelationships between the Bangalee and the Khyang 
I did not rely on only one method of data collection rather I have combined observation and 
interviews. During interviews, I have not put my perspective on the research issues so that 
participants do not modify responses and describe their own perspectives (c.f. Mack et al. 
2005: 39).  
 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
As a researcher, I followed several ethical considerations such as assurance of confidentiality 
and anonymity (Bernard 2006). I had taken verbal informed consent through informing the 
purpose of the research and a description of the researcher (an introduction of myself). The 
participants were informed about the expected duration of the research, the expected role 
from them, how the information provided by the informants are stored, how privacy will be 
ensured and what will be final products of my research (c.f. Scheyvens, Nowak and 
Scheyvens 2003: 143). Moreover, they were be given the opportunity to withdraw at any time 
in the process (Mack et al. 2005: 10). Participants were ensured that they will be asked only 
to express their opinion regarding their life, government policies, their relationship with the 
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others, how do they make a living. I also assured them that no information they provide 
would be stored and preserved in a way that nobody except the researcher (me) has access to 
it. Moreover, to ensure anonymity of the informants’ pseudonyms are used. I have also used 
pseudonyms during writing my field notes. 
 
Further, I was aware that minority groups may remain wary about outside researchers 
because of their historical experiences (c.f. Scheyvens, Scheyvens, and Murray 2003: 177); 
however, I did not face any unwelcoming attitude from the community. I have been 
respectful to the culture and to individual personalities (c.f. Mack et al. 2005: 4). 
 
Moreover, I tried to interview people in their free time not to harm them economically by 
interviewing during their work hours. However, in many cases whenever I visited homes or 
talked with them at tea stalls it become very difficult to pay for the food they provided.  
 
As a student in Norway, I have filled in and send in the notification form to the Norwegian 
Social Science Data Services (NSD), and complied with the required ethical issues. 
 
CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
 
In chapter two, I describe and discuss the various Khyang economic activities in relation to 
the changes, which occurred in the Khyang communities in terms of livelihood opportunities. 
The chapter also explores the ‘new frontiers’ the Khyang encounter because of the changing 
socio-economic scenarios, that is, the coming of the state, administration and commerce. I 
analyze the changes in Khyang production, consumption, distribution and exchange and 
consequent changes in Khyang society, customs and cultural practices concerning ethnic and 
gender relations and seasonality of economic and agricultural activities. I also analyze the 
changes in inter and intra community relations of Khyang. Based on the findings of my 
research I argue that the integration with the market economy is responsible for changes in 
social structure and practices in the Khyang community (c.f. Bloch and Parry 1989) and these 
changes blur the ethnic boundaries of Khyang (c.f. Turner 1986). The state-space making 
process has arguably been constantly reformulating the livelihood and identity of the Khyang 
and in the process they are being marginalized (c.f. Scott 2009).  
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Chapter three is about Khyangs’ rights and access, to resources such as land and forests. I 
discuss how state and government(s) policies have affected the livelihoods of the Khyang and 
how the Khyang perceive the policies and development projects undertaken by the 
government. In line with Ong’s (2006) argument for Southeast Asia, I hold that rights and 
entitlements of the Khyang have shifted with the changes of administration of the CHT and 
influx of the Bangalee people in the region. Further, based on my ethnographic findings I 
argue that in Bangladesh the relations of state officials and the minority groups of the CHT is 
determined by the differences of power and perception by each groups of the other a 
tendency observed by Rosaldo (2003) in Southeast Asia, where state officials and also 
powerful individuals treat the minority groups differently than others, as it is assumed that the 
powerless people will not be able to resist them. By comparing CHT with Scott’s (2009) 
concept of ‘Zomia’ for Southeast Asia I find that the government through acquiring Jhum 
land and forcing the Khyang to settled cultivation has expanded state space. Development in 
terms of developing better infrastructure has helped the government to relocate some of its 
population into CHT, easy transportation of resources from CHT, and facilitated a better 
administration of the CHT and its people who were partly outside of the state space 
previously.  
 
In chapter four I describe and analyze different forms of social networks of the Khyang, how 
Khyang ethnic identity is produced, transformed and reproduced through engagement with, 
and establishment of, different networks. As the Khyangs increasingly are being involved 
with different economic activities different forms of social networks are created. I argue that 
social networks of the Khyang define their perception of ethnic identity, that is, a Khyang’s 
educational, political and occupational background create situational identities (c.f. Eriksen 
1992 b). Further, in line with Barth (1969), I hold that though the Khyang put emphasis on 
their own language, agricultural practices of Jhum and historical consciousness as marker of 
their ethnic identity, with the changing socio-economic circumstances the emphasis on these 
issues are not necessarily identity markers in all situations. Similar to what Malkki (1995) 
argues about the collective identity of the Hutu refugees of camps and the assimilating 
shifting identities of refugees in the town, I hold that the Khyang interacts beyond their ethnic 
boundaries and present themselves differently in different contexts. This tendency is more 
prominent if perception of the younger vs older Khyang or urban vs village dwellers are taken 
into consideration. Thus, the idea of Khyang identity is becoming fluid.   
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In chapter five, I will summarize the central findings and arguments regarding economic 
activities of the Khyang, relationships between state formation, government policies and 
marginalization of the Khyang. I will also discuss formation of social networks and 
production and reproduction of the Khyang identity. Further, I will situate the CHT and the 
condition of the Khyang, CHT and Bangladesh in the international development discourse. 
Describing the global processes and ‘development’, I will argue in line with Crewe and 
Axelby (2013) that the Khyang, CHT and Bangladesh have been subject to interest, values 
and beliefs of powerful international actors and development organizations. The global 
discourse of ‘development’ understood as economic growth has been influential in changing 
the life and livelihood of the Khyang through promoting and forcing settled agriculture, 
infrastructural development and market integration. However, these changes in CHT and 
Bangladesh state have altered customary practices, created an economically vulnerable 
situation by reformed rights and entitlement on resources, and placed them at the lower tier of 
hierarchy in their interaction with the state officials and the Bangalee people in market places 
and social contexts.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE CHANGING ECONOMIC FRONTIERS OF THE KHYANG 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
As the frontiers of Bangladesh government, administration and commerce have pushed into 
CHT and progressively out to the villages expanding state space (c.f. Scott 2009), people of 
other ethnic groups especially the Bangalee people has encroached further into areas 
surrounding the Khyang villages. Forest conservation and land acquisition are the main 
effects of these processes, which has caused major changes in Khyang livelihood.  
 
In this chapter, I discuss the various ways the Khyang people make a livelihood; what shapes 
their efforts and their interaction and interconnectedness with other groups of people in their 
daily activities in the CHT. I will argue that among the Khyang the changes of economic 
frontiers have been taking place with the coming of the administration and security forces, 
massive migration of Bangalee  people, encroaching market and urbanization, which in the 
end I see as ‘the coming of the state’. In the process, the Khyang have been experienced 
changes in gender and ethnic division of labor, agricultural production, seasonality of 
economic activities, intra community and inter community dynamics. The growing market 
economy and increasing commercialization of agriculture, more interaction with wider 
community, dependence on the market and credit facilities are initiating changes in Khyang 
community in regard to social structure, customs and practices, and gendered division of 
labor (c.f. Bloch and Parry 1989: 7). Bloch and Parry (1989: 8) also argue the integration 
with market economy does not dissolve the relations of dominance that arise from interplay 
of norms and structure of the society, and I will illuminate how integration with the market 
has affected the Khyang and its position in the social structure of CHT. Based on my 
ethnographic information I will argue that the changes in the Khyang customs and practices, 
which were part of their unique cultural identity, have blurred the boundary of the Khyang 
ethnic group (c.f. Turner 1986: 114).  In the end, the shifting social landscape, social and 
structural categories and relationships are constantly reformulating economy and identity of 
Khyang (c.f. Scott 2009: 244).  
 
ECONOMY OF THE KHYANG: ACTIVITIES AND SEASONALITY 
 
While not all societies have specifically subsistence economies, they all have specific ways of 
producing food, shelter, clothing and income. Different societies also have different ways of 
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sharing, distribution and exchange. As Herkovits (1974: 143) argues, there is no society 
without methods of production, distribution, consumption and some form of exchange, in this 
section I discuss the Khyangs’ economic activities in the CHT.  
 
During my fieldwork, the Khyang talked about their livelihood in the old days. Traditionally, 
most of the Khyang villages were founded on hills and most of the Khyangs depended on 
Jhum (slash and burn) cultivation. Throughout history, it has been their only means for 
sustaining their livelihood and they have continued this subsistence agricultural production 
from generation to generation. Jhum crops are grown on the slopes of the hills. The Khyang 
farmers usually uproot bushes and weeds that grow on the slopes during January- March, and 
dry them in the sun. They burn them during April- May, clean the ground and finally make 
beds for sowing seeds such as rice/ paddy, sweet potato, watermelon, bean, oil-seed, melon, 
ginger, etc. When it rains, they dig holes and sow a variety of vegetables and paddy. It only 
takes a few weeks for the seeds to sprout. The farmers remain very busy attending the crops 
in the months of September and October and eventually start harvesting crops during 
November and December. They commonly live in a temporary makeshift house (‘peng’ or 
‘pengem’) on the Jhum lands until the crops are harvested.  
 
However, this practice of Jhum is today no longer carried out on a large scale by the Khyangs 
of my field sites. I have observed that Khyang at the Rangamati engage in a range of diverse 
professions such as: medical doctor, accountant, medical technician, nurse, cook, cleaner, 
security guard, etc., while younger people are involved in daily/ day to day wage labor such 
as coolie, agricultural labor, house repairing work, etc. There are also a few non-government 
officials among the Khyang. Khyang in Rangamati seemed to be more diverse regarding 
wage work and employment compared to the Khyang of Bandarban. Though the Khyang of 
Bandarban also are involved in different activities, most of them are plain land agriculturist 
(plough cultivation) followed by daily labor. Khyangs of Bandarban are involved in non-
agricultural occupations as a supplement to their income from cultivation as now-a-days they 
do not get enough production to meet their need. This is inflated by increase in consumption 
needs and decreasing land ownership of the Khyang. Influx of Bangalee population in the 
adjacent area has influenced the Khyang people to sell much of their land (see chapter three). 
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Agricultural work and cash crops 
 
There are two major ways by which a people can earn an income from agriculture other than 
by owning land. These are sharecropping, and casual labor. A man commonly rent out his 
land to a sharecropper because he is unable to work it himself. Very occasionally, a rich man 
will allow a poorer man as a favor to sharecrop a field, but usually it is necessity, which 
drives the owner to let someone else to the work. A well to do man commonly allows to be 
share cropped only those fields which lie in villages too distant for cultivation by himself and 
his servants. The produced crop is usually divided in half between the landowner and the 
sharecropper.  
 
Agriculture is often combined with cultivation of cash crops such as ginger, turmeric, banana 
and other vegetables. The production of cash crop is decided by the head of the household 
(usually a male) but the whole family participates in the production process. In terms of 
marketing and selling the produce, both men and women take part if they are going to sell it 
in the local market. I have also seen women carry the products to the local market and sell. 
However, when they produce enough crop to supply to different markets they sell to the 
middlemen/ agent (Paikar) who come to the fields to buy the harvests. The farmer only picks 
the products and piles it near the field from where the middlemen take/ buy the products. 
 
There is an increase in the production of cash crops and marketable resources in the 
indigenous community, which raises many concerns for people. The growing market 
economy and increasing commercialization of agriculture,  more interaction with wider 
community, dependence on the market and credit facilities and also kind of creating ‘others’ 
in the market sphere. Stephen Gudeman (2005: 95) argues that the economy consists of two 
realms, the community and the market. The community refers to real on-the-ground 
associations and to imagined solidarities that people experience while the market realm 
designates anonymous, short-term exchanges (Gudeman 2005: 95f). Market and community 
complement one another, as no market system exists without the support of communal 
agreements. In case of the Khyang the broader social structure influence the market and the 
Khyang remain marginalized also in the market when they go to sell their products.  
 
In case of selling their produce, they have a double disadvantage as they do not have access 
to the bigger markets in Chittagong as these are controlled by the Bangalee businessmen. In 
the large markets, they could get better prices for their produce but they have to depend on 
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the Bangalee middleman for trading there. Middlemen buy their produce and transport those 
to the large markets as the Khyang themselves cannot afford to transport their produce to 
Chittagong. Ongsha, 48 years in Bandarban said that to hire a pick up van to carry goods to 
Chittagong city  required BDT 80,000 to 100,000 (USD 1000-1300) which he does not have, 
thus, even after knowing all the information and exposed to all the procedure he can not avail 
the opportunity. However, even if they go to the large market of Chittagong or at Dhaka the 
syndicate of the whole sellers offers lesser money for their produce and they are forced to sell 
at a low price because they do not have the capacity to preserve (as most of the good are 
perishable vegetables and fruits). Mongchin, 40 years, who works as a school teacher in 
Bandarban, had shared his experience at wholesale market in Chittagong. He said:  
 
“Last year I had cultivated ginger in my fields and the yield was good so I 
wanted to sell those directly at Chittagong. I had hired a pick up van to 
transport the ginger but when I reached there, I was offered BDT 50,000 (USD 
625). However, I had to pay this amount just to transport the ginger from 
Bandarban to Chittagong. The storehouse owners suggested me to leave the 
products there and go after a week and they will let me know if they find any 
buyers. I went there a week later but no luck and they suggested me to go 
again after a week. Eventually I had to sell the products at BDT 40000 (USD 
500).” 
 
Therefore, the Khyang face economic loss and thus, become marginalized through 
indebtedness and land loss (see page 72-73). Different NGO officials I spoke to in 
Bandarban also mentioned this problem of the Khyang, that there is a syndicate for 
marketing of agricultural products to the cities and town and that the NGOs are working to 
create a better marketing strategy for the marginalized.  
 
Another crop not traditionally planted which seems to have become quite popular in the 
recent years is tobacco. There is a large element of environmental degradation (deforestation) 
involved in tobacco cultivation, as wood from forests is used for drying and curing tobacco. 
The tobacco companies provide money in advance to the farmers for tobacco cultivation. 
Tobacco company’s (local company like ‘Akij’ and British American Tobacco) local agents 
contract the farmers and almost all the households in Bandarban cultivate tobacco in the 
winter.  
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When I asked both men and women about effects of growing cash crops, they said that the 
positive side of introducing cash crops outweighed the negatives. The positives are that it is 
now possible to get easy access and consume different luxury goods because of the advent of 
the market. They buy different things with the money they earn by selling the crops they 
produce in the fields. However, this has negative sides as they are no more subsistence 
agriculturists and they have to be depended on the market for daily necessary goods. 
 
Daily labor 
 
Khyangs are also involved with daily wage labor.  They look for work in the local area and 
work on the mutual understanding with the person who requires some labor to fix his house 
or to cultivate land. The wage rate for daily labor varies between 160-200 Bangladeshi Taka 
(BDT)/ 2- 3 USD per day. Both men and women work as daily laborers but women normally 
get lesser payment than men do. This is in line with the overall situation of Bangladesh where 
women get almost 20% less wage than men, when the education of the people considered is 
below the primary level (Kapsos 2008: 21). This is because women are perceived to have 
lesser endowments than men do. Women also do domestic work for rich people, as 
housemaids or domestic servants but in return of rice or other products usually and not cash/ 
wage. 
 
Skilled labor 
 
Some of the Khyangs who have technical skills like installing tube wells, masonry usually 
works with the contractors. The contractors make contract with the client to do the job and 
hires technician to do the technical tasks. However, the Khyang have some reluctance to work 
for the Bangalee contractors and prefer to work with other ethnic minority groups. The 
reasons for their reluctance was that Bangalee people do not really pay as agreed before 
starting the work and they commonly try to find some faults in the work to pay less. 
“Bangalee contractors want more work with lesser price” Namishi, 26 years said to express 
his view on working for the Bangalee.  
 
Shop keeping/ small trading 
 
Khyangs are also involved in small business in the locality where they sell daily needed 
groceries such as salt, spices, snacks, rice, etc. Sometimes they run the shops themselves but 
they also hire someone to run the shop. I have seen one of the shops owned by a Khyang, 
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(Shimul, 36 years) was maintained and run by a Bangalee in Rangamati. Shop keeping is not 
an exclusive task for men or women, I have seen shops run buy Khyangs of both sex. These 
shops become the place for passing time of the youth and they come and sit there and talk and 
gossip about different issues, which are going on in the locality. These are the places where 
people of different ethnic backgrounds meet and interact with one another in a light pleasant 
mode. In these shops, they bring goods from the nearby market places and the income from 
the shop range from 2000-15000 BDT (USD 25- 200) per day.  
 
Private service sector: the new opportunities 
 
Khyangs are involved in different kinds of private services like teaching at schools, 
administrative work at different NGOs, nursing, work at the beauty parlors or at the garment 
factories, etc. Among these, work in garments and work as beautician are mostly done by 
Khyang women. These opportunities has presented themselves as the communication system, 
that is, infrastructure such as roads, trains, and busses, have become better and connected the 
Khyang with the cities. Once a Khyang get a job in the garment factory, beauty parlor or in 
any NGO, they usually help their relatives to find jobs. In this way many Khyang are being 
connected socio-economically with the Bangalee and outside of their immediate village. 
 
Another important factor is that the Khyang are a minority among the minorities. There are 
many quotas in job sectors (decided by the government) for ethnic minority groups, however, 
those were generally for the broad categories and the majority groups among the minority 
avail those opportunities and with time the Khyang are systematically excluded.  
 
Thoi Khyang, 52 years, of Rangamati said that he had been applying for a job at the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) project operating at the CHT. He said that he had 
applied four times but was rejected every time. He further said: 
 
 “I did not get the job because I did not have any connections. People with 
lesser qualifications have been appointed. I never got the opportunity because 
I am Khyang and do not know any higher officials.” He further said, “When a 
Chakma gets a job he always tries to support other Chakmas in getting a job. 
As they are well off people, they and Bangalees never let us get into the job 
sector easily.” 
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Multiple occupations 
 
The occupational pattern has changed as the Khyang increasingly are taking up multiple 
occupations to maintain their livelihood. Khyangs who have permanent jobs at NGOs or other 
non-agricultural jobs are also involved in small farming. Sometime members of the same 
household are involved in different job sectors. For example, a Khyang man, Jibon, 29 years, 
who works as school teacher also has a small shop, a nurse in Government Hospital Camelia, 
40 years, also runs at private medical center. These multiple forms of occupation provide for 
those extra cash at hand to meet the need of ‘luxury’ consumer goods like mobile phone, 
television and laptops, which is a sign of high status in the local community. 
 
CHANGING OCCUPATIONAL PATTERNS 
 
Development of CHT and marginalization of the hill people 
 
When the British penetrated CHT in 1760, the initial contacts between the hill people and the 
British were limited to the collection of taxes (Mohsin 1997: 79f). The tax was collected in 
the form of cotton locally known as ‘kapas’ and the amount of revenue varied. The British 
company had made arrangement for collection of taxes through Bangalee middleman. Thus, 
the hill people were vulnerable to exploitation by the Bangalees who usually collected more 
cotton than the amount to be paid to the company (Mohsin 1997: 79). Eventually the CHT 
became a supplier for raw material for British textile industries. In 1789, the form of tax was 
changed from kind to cash of three to four rupees for each adult. This further caused the 
introduction of money-economy in the CHT and made them dependent on the Bangalee 
traders to be able to pay the taxes (Mohsin 1997: 80). 
 
Subsequently the British colonial state planned to change the hill peoples’ mode of 
production. They attempted to replace Jhum cultivation by plough cultivation, which required 
no follow period for land, thus perceived economically more profitable and was considered 
technologically more superior. After 1860, taxes were demanded on a territorial basis rather 
than on the basis of personal following to tie the hill people to a piece of land. Mohsin (1997: 
83) argues the introduction of plough cultivation was motivated by the British’s interest in 
increasing revenues from the CHT. 
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Hill people were also suffered from the government initiated hydroelectric project in the 
Kaptai Lake of Rangamati in the late 1950s (see page 5 and 12). After the independence 
Bangladesh the government also tried to settle the perceived landless Jhum cultivators into a 
settled form of land usage (see page 15-17 and section below). Mohsin (1997: 136) argues 
development in CHT has stripped the local people from their land consequently made the hill 
people wary about the government’s economic development plans and projects. The hill 
people started to believe that the government led development projects will not change their 
life for betterment rather would facilitate the influx of Bangalees. 
 
Development projects at the village level had also impact the community dynamics. There 
have been many development projects in CHT and different organizations organize 
development committee in areas and provide funding for initiating income-generating 
activities for example through buying and rearing cattle. However, a problem is that with the 
inflow of money/cash an increasing tendency of distrust between committee members 
regarding the proper use of money has emerged. Typically, the development organizations 
tend to give the total organizing-power to the local committee as part of their commitment of 
participation of the local people and empowerment in decision-making but this in turn has 
created distrust among the people involved. Ongsha, 48 years, in Rangamati said:  
 
“With 0.5 to 0.8 million BDT (USD 6250- 10000) in the hand of few people for 
deciding how to spend the money create difference of opinion and distrust.” He 
further mentioned, “when this huge amount of money comes, people do not 
even spend it properly rather use it for their own purposes and during 
evaluation meetings they report that the cattle was dead to illness or sometimes 
say that predators from the forest came and killed the cattle.” 
 
Reserved forest and land loss: expanding state space 
 
From the British and Pakistan period, the forest department has defined one quarter of the 
CHT as Reserve Forests (RF) (Adnan and Dastidar 2011). After the independence of 
Bangladesh, the Forest Department has since the late 1980s been attempting to expand such 
forests. However, new Reserve Forests can only be created by acquiring the Unclassed State 
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Forest (USF)
7
 lands on which the ethnic minority of the CHT had common or private land 
rights (Adnan 2004: 51). Thus, expansion of state forests necessarily entails the loss of lands 
of the inhabitants of the CHT. 
 
According to my informants forest dependent communities have been involved in such 
projects of creating new RF merely as providers of cheap wage labor. Even though formally 
designated a ‘beneficiaries’ or ‘participants’, they have never been allowed to have any 
meaningful decision-making roles in these forestry projects (Roy 2004: 7). Since 1989, the 
cumulative total of lands in the CHT targeted for acquisition by the Forest Department has 
amounted to a staggering 218,000 acres. These are in the USF areas in which most of the 
lands used by the ethnic minority groups are located (Adnan and Dastidar 2011). From 2009, 
the government attempts have been renewed to acquire customary lands (and, in some 
instances, the private property) of the local ethnic groups for afforestation
8
 projects to set up 
new RF (Chakma and Tripura 2010).  
 
The afforestation projects of the Forest Department typically involve expansion of 
monoculture plantations, such as rubber tree, which often are initiated and funded by 
international banks and donor agencies (Halim and Roy 2006: 3). For example, major 
forestry initiatives in the CHT, including the National Forestry Policy of 1979 and the 
Forestry Master Plan of 1994, have been undertaken with the assistance of the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB); that is, the support (loan) was allocated with implementation of 
rules and regulations for formulating development strategies for the hill people. The forestry 
policies and program activities of the World Bank and the ADB in the CHT have had 
unfavorable impacts on the traditional land rights (Roy 2004: 6) and were guided by concepts 
of progress and economic development that are often insensitive to local customs and values 
(Mohsin 1997: 121) of the Khyang and other ethnic groups. The policies and projects of the 
government have systematically promoted industrial forestry by expanding rubber and timber 
plantations (none of my research participants were involved in such projects) and 
strengthening the policing function of the Forest Department. The ADB’s Forestry Master 
Plan and other policies and projects have impacted negatively upon the forest commons, 
                                                          
7
Un-classed State Forest Land: These are the lands that are under the control of the Ministry of Land, 
Government of Bangladesh. They are designated as Un-classed State Forests (USF) and/or Khas lands. 
8
 Afforestation is the establishment of a forest or stand of trees in an area where there was no forest. 
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traditional land rights and community participation of the local minority people (Roy and 
Halim 2001; Roy 2002; 2004; Adnan 2004).  
 
Furthermore, plans for creating completely new categories of state forests (such as ‘Notified 
Forests’) have been in circulation in the CHT since 2010. Supported by international donor 
agencies, when making the case for acquiring lands for afforestation, the Forest Department 
(FD) is required to undertake field inspections on the ground to assess the actual conditions 
and nature of habitation in the concerned areas. In order to get approval, FD has to certify 
that during field inspection the land to be acquired was found to be either uninhabited or 
fallow. Alternatively, if the land is inhabited, the department has to certify that the people 
who has been using the land are willing to move away if paid with due compensation. 
However, such certification by the Forest Department can be deceptive and the reported 
findings of the field inspections may turn out to be fictitious (Adnan and Dastidar 2011: 49).  
My informants in the Bandarban mentioned that many hills and Pahari lands have been 
covertly acquired by the Forest Department based on false claims that these are not populated. 
Uchachi, 47 years, mentioned, “much of my ancestral lands in the hills are acquired by forest 
department.” This ploy has enabled the department to circumvent the requirement for making 
public announcements and enquiries and consult with the affected people, as required by law 
and official procedures. 
 
Transmigration of Bangalee people and land loss 
 
The pattern of migration of Bangalee people in the CHT became a political project in 1979 
when the government decided to settle 30,000 landless Bangalee families on government 
owned ‘Khas’9 land (Mohsin 1997: 112). By the end of 1984, about 400,000 families were 
settled in the CHT (Mohsin 1997: 112).  Mohsin (1997:115) argues that the settlement policy 
evicted around 100,000 hill people from their land, about half of those took refuge in Tripura 
and Mizoram states in India and the rest were scattered around CHT. Besides evicting the hill 
people, this migration of Bangalee population also had consequences for Jhum cultivation. 
The population pressure and lad scarcity lead to the reduction of fallow period of Jhum lands 
to two-three years from two-five years. We can get a sense of impact of the transmigration 
project on CHT from the ratio of Bangalee population in CHT. The non-indigenous 
population (mostly Bangalee) in 1872 was 1.74%, which rose to the level of around 9.09% 
                                                          
9
 Government owned fallow and, where nobody has property rights. 
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(1951) over eight decades. However, the ratio was doubled by the next two decades (19.41%) 
in 1974. Further, Barkat et al. (2009: 17) state that as of today Bangalee population in CHT 
stands at almost 50 percent. 
 
The people of the CHT are today producing more for the market and the private ownership of 
land has become important in order to secure peoples’ livelihoods. Consequently, more and 
more forest-commons of the communities are being converted into homesteads and family-
owned orchards and plantations. However, those who, for whatever reason, cannot obtain a 
private plot are now deprived of access to former commons. Similarly, some areas of 
Rangamati have been leased out to non-resident entrepreneurs, causing conflict with local 
people who used the area for agriculture. Furthermore, indigenous communities do not share 
the same motivation as the Bangalee people for becoming registered owners of their land. As 
they understand land as a common property of all the Khyang and they had no notion of 
private property in the recent past. Thoi Khyang (52 years) mentioned that during the 
establishment of the Christian Hospital in Rangamati, in the early 1907 his father was 
working as a cook and support staff for the missionary people and the British governor of the 
area. If he had asked them for land in the area, he could have got the whole Rangamati on his 
name. However, he did not think of doing something like that and said, “as for me swidden 
cultivation was the way of life and notion of registering land on personal name was not a 
need.” 
 
Improved communication system: roads and markets 
 
The government in its way to develop the socio-economic condition of the CHT has been 
involved in infrastructural development and continuing creating roads and markets (see page 
16). After the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, the pace of marketization accelerated 
with the expansion of the road network in the region. The two main factors were defense 
strategies of the government and the government’s intention to exploit the region’s forest 
resources for its industrial needs (Roy 2000: 96). These developments produced positive and 
negative results for the minority groups. The positive impacts were easier transportation of 
farm produce to the markets and the increase of government extension services with regard to 
health, education and credit in remote areas of the CHT. The negative impacts included a 
drastic increase in the rate of deforestation, as well as an increase in the population 
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settlements coming from outside, which added to the pressure on the already stretched 
resources of the region (Roy 2000: 96).  
 
Some Khyangs mentioned that their new interest in farming cash crops has been influenced 
by the improved communication system. They commonly said that as new roads have been 
created wholesale marketers do come and buy the products from their fields so they now tend 
to cultivate vegetables and spices that they can sell for cash. 
 
Educational advancement  
 
Some of the Khyangs have been accessing different job opportunities with advancement in 
education. Many Khyang are now being educated in the mainstream curriculum of the 
country. The Khyang who have passed secondary level of education are mostly involved in 
non-agricultural works. I met four school teachers and three NGO workers in Bandarban. In 
Rangamati, on the other hand, Khyang women mostly find employment as nurses, beauty 
parlors and in garment factories. For nursing and work at beauty parlors they get training 
before starting the job and for work at the garment factories, they join as apprentices with 
salary and after three or six months they are offered a permanent job. 
 
However, I have also found during my fieldwork that the Khyang do not put much emphasis 
in education as they regard that education will not ensure any job for them. They say that 
they do not have the capacity to compete with the Bangalee people and thus they will not get 
any job after completing education. As they lack the money sometimes, they have to make 
choices between education and working for earning. They cannot continue education because 
of money also. As one of my informants (Ongsha, 48 years) in Rangamati said that, “I cannot 
continue paying for my four children’s education. I have to support all the children I cannot 
spend all the money to send one child to the university.”  
 
In case of education, and especially in cases of admission at the public university and medical 
college, the Khyang believe they do not have equal opportunities compared to other minority 
groups (contrary to the fact of being minority at the national context some groups are 
majority and powerful groups among the minorities). I have heard another incidence of a 
Khyang girl wanting to pursue medical studies after passing her secondary and tried to get 
admission to a public medical college but she did not get admission. Angela, 22 years, in 
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Rangamati said she has tried to contact the ministers and other officials along with her father 
so that she gets admission, however, they were not successful. She said “it was the first time a 
Khyang girl was in a position to get herself admitted in medical studies but could not because 
of being minority among the minorities.”  
 
This tendency of minority groups being discriminated is also seen in India, where among the 
Rabhas (indigenous forest dwellers) positive discrimination in the field of education and a 
system of reserved employment quotas in government institutions  has produced a category 
of well-off tribals and thus created tribal elites (Karlsson, 2000: 18). In case of CHT, the 
ethnic minority groups who have larger population size, such as for example the Chakma 
compared to the other minority groups like the Khyang take such opportunities. 
 
The ethnographic information of my fieldworks suggests that as the Khyang are being 
educated they are getting themselves engaged with non-agricultural jobs, however, they are 
being discriminated in higher education and also in different larger organizations of the 
country, such as civil administration,  United Nations’ (UN) local office and local NGOs. 
 
THE NEW FRONTIERS OF INTERACTION 
 
With the changing trend of land and forest access, no compensation was paid to the 
indigenous people for the loss of their traditional resources such as lands and ceasing the use 
of natural resources from the forests required to meet subsistence strategies. A forest when 
notified as a ‘reserved forests’ it restrict the use of resources for the inhabitants of that area. 
During discussions with the Khyang at several occasions, such as social gatherings and 
personal interviews, people told me that with the social, economic and political changes in 
the CHT, the Khyang have been subjected to engagement with different contexts which 
include:  dealing with government and administration, interacting with the security forces/ 
state army forces, living with the Bangalee people, engaging to new form of economic 
activities, non-governmental development programs, adapting to encroaching market and 
urbanization. 
 
Within the Reserve Forests, any use or extraction of forest produce is prohibited. 
Nevertheless, Forest Department, sell the produce or market it after processing. The majority 
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of the indigenous people are subsistence farmers, they have to engage in subsidiary hunting 
and gathering of forest products, their principal source of livelihood is the use of natural 
resources. With no measures taken to facilitate a transition to a market oriented economy, the 
indigenous farmers are experiencing difficulties in seeking alternative opportunities for 
income generation. Yet, as we see from the above, the Khyang do sometimes find alternative 
modes of sustaining their livelihood. 
 
If the present policy of converting the communally owned forests of the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts into extraction areas for the government’s sole use and enrichment continues, the 
decline of the indigenous people’s subsistence opportunities is inevitable. As they are being 
marginalized in both finding daily wage labor and in the market places to sell their products, 
if they are denied access to land to cultivate their daily needs they might fall into economic 
hardship (will be discussed in the later sections, see also chapter three). Although the use of, 
and extraction from, the forest and its resources is prohibited in the Reserve Forests, and is in 
fact penalized by physical assault and legal cases, the indigenous people often have no 
alternative but to enter these forests for use and extraction to meet their domestic 
requirements, and in some cases for commercial purposes too. However, I found that only in 
a few cases people did speak of using reserve forests for resources (this may be because most 
of the villages I was visiting were not near reserve forests). The interviewees who said that 
they were sometimes compelled to use the reserve forests added that this was because they 
felt they had no other choice; they were in desperate need of resources to meet household 
requirements. From interviews, it seemed that women were more inclined to use reserved 
forests, as their first priority was to meet household needs, while men replied that they did not 
use reserve forests. The interviewees stress that when people become desperate they have no 
other choices than to take the risk that comes with entering the reserve forests and cutting 
down trees. The process inevitably forced the Khyang to negotiate and sometimes override 
the forest officers from the government. 
 
When armed conflict was in rise during 1980s and 1990s, the Khyang faced double pressure 
from the insurgent groups and the military. Both the parties forced the Khyang and other 
ethnic minority groups of the CHT to keep supporting the armed conflict by giving food, 
shelter, and information. Khyang people told me that they were assaulted by both military and 
the insurgents who would visit the villages and took shelter in their houses also demanding 
food and money. On the other hand, the military always kept them under surveillance - for 
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instance, they would ask questions if they bought grocery more than they would require for a 
normal week. Ongsha, 48 years, in Bandarban said: 
 
“Those were terrifying days for us. Members of the ‘shanti bahini’ would 
sometimes come to the village and ask for food and money. When they are 
gone the military would have come and beat us for giving shelter to the ‘shanti 
bahini’. Therefore, when military forces are gone from the village ‘shanti 
bahini’ would come again and ask ‘why the military forces were here? Who 
have informed them that we were here?’……. We were beaten by the ‘shanti 
bahini’ and by the military. We had no place to live peacefully at that time.” 
 
Apart from administration and the military, many Bangalee people were relocated in the CHT 
by the government through transmigration projects (Mohsin 1997: 112). This brought 
different kinds of job opportunities because the Bangalee started businesses and the ethnic 
minority groups started to compete with the Bangalee people for wage labor and land. With 
many people living in the locality resulted in a bigger consumer-group for the different 
businesses, thus the Khyang faced encroaching markets and urbanization. The situation of the 
nearby market places testifies the claim of Agni Khyang, a grocery store owner, who said that 
when he started his store there was only one store (except his shop) in the small market place 
where he runs his store. However, in the last seven/ eight years the population increase has 
been so high that now-a-days there are around 50 more stores (run by both Khyangs and 
Bangalees). 
  
Landlessness caused by forest policies, the dam and the mass settlement program have 
created changes in the pattern of resource use and land-access by the ethnic minority groups 
but the Khyang (in Bandarban) are still reliant on agriculture to some extent. They sometimes 
work on other people’s plot of land. When asked about the methods of management of 
sharecropped lands, there were many different responses. Some said they are paid in cash for 
the work they do on other’s land. Some said that they use the land to plant seeds they have 
selected and then give a portion of the harvest to the landowner, there is no fixed amount, and 
this is negotiated between the landowner and the sharecropper.  
 
Another change is that the landless and displaced people of Rangamati now are engaged in 
the production of rice wine for sale (which is sold secretly from their homes). ‘Rice wine’ 
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production and consumption is an element of their daily life, however, in the past rice wine 
was prepared at home for community and family members and not for sale. In the villages of 
Bandarban and in Rangamati people were very reluctant to talk about wine production. 
However, through a series of interviews it became apparent that wine was being produced in 
homes. I was also offered rice wine during having meals at their homes. The rice needed for 
wine production was purchased at the market. It has also been noted by Tebtebba Foundation 
(2000) that there is a marked increase in the use of alcohol and drugs within the indigenous 
community of CHT. Further, this has made them reliant on easy cash earned from the sale of 
rice wine and during the interviews, it became apparent that many people do not tend to work 
because they can earn quick cash selling rice wine. A liter of rice wine is sold at the price of 
BDT 200 (USD 2.2). On the other hand, as it is illegal to sell rice wine sometime the police 
raid the area and sometimes arrest the Khyang wine sellers. Selling rice wine or any sorts of 
alcohol is prohibited by law in Bangladesh and ethnic minority groups are only allowed to 
produce rice wine for self-consumption but not for sale. 
 
The consequences of the new forms of economic activities and increased interaction with the 
Bangalees, administration and market places on inter and intra community practices of the 
Khyang will be discussed in detail in the following sections. 
 
IMPACT OF CHANGING ECONOMIC PATTERNS  
 
Social structure 
 
The effects of the changing occupational patterns on the economy of the indigenous people of 
the CHT have been complex and manifold. One of the major consequences has been the 
widening gap between the rich and the poor. This is what Thoi Khyang, 52 years said during 
an interview: 
 
“30 years ago there was little economic disparity and social distance between 
and among the indigenous people. This is no longer the case. Class distinctions 
have increased. Along with this, there have been significant changes in the way 
that the families and household deal with their everyday challenges. 
Traditionally, such challenges were met by a community platform on a 
collective basis.”  
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Social changes have taken place in the way indigenous family law and other customary laws 
(Dung) are being practiced. Here again, the changes vary from people to people (sometime 
smaller groups and sometimes individuals). However, perhaps the most distinctive difference 
can be seen between Rangamati and Bandarban. In Bandarban, it is the traditional village 
elder (Karbari) who still presides over arbitration and judicial proceedings, but he tends to 
act in concert with other leaders including the elected government leader and decisions are 
usually taken by consensus on the basis of customary laws (Dung). In urban areas the 
prevalence of customary practices are far less pronounced compared to rural areas. Overall, 
the community responses to dealing with problems and challenges based upon traditional 
values are fast giving way to responses by families and individuals. I argue this based on my 
discussion with Thoi Khyang and my observation in Rangamati. 
 
As during the foundation of their village they did not appoint any village head (Karbari), it 
continued without any formal village head. Thus, for any problems within the community 
they usually go the police or chairman of the Union Parishad. Not having any village head 
leads to a situation where Khyang rules and regulations are not being followed. Thoi Khyang 
further said that there is an open area beside his house, which is captured by his maternal 
cousin to build a house if there were any village leader he could have retained that place. The 
changing pattern of Khyang customs and practices will become more evident from the 
discussion in the following sections. 
 
Sanskritization of customs and ritual  
 
Occupational changes have also induced significant changes in cultural practices. This is 
especially noticeable among the people of Rangamati who have connections with urban areas. 
In other words, among the Khyang who are not dependent on land for their livelihood (who 
are not farmers) that is to say, Khyangs who have to interact more frequently with Bangalee 
people. ‘Sanskritization’ of customs and practices are visible in modes of dressing, food 
habits, and ceremonies, which I exemplify on the basis of my fieldwork below.  
 
Srinivas (1956) introduced the concept of ‘Sanskritization’ to explain the changing custom 
and practices of lower caste groups in India. He mentions that the  structural  basis  of  Hindu  
society  is caste,  and  it  is not  possible  to  understand  Sanskritization  without  reference  
to  the  structural  framework  in  which  it occurs.  Speaking  generally,  the  castes  
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occupying  the  top  positions  in  the  hierarchy are more  Sanskritized  than  castes  in  the  
lower  and middle  regions  of  the  hierarchy,  and this  has been  responsible  for  the  
Sanskritization  of  the  lower  castes as well  as the  outlying  tribes.  The lower castes 
always seem to have tried to take over the customs and way of life of the higher castes. The 
idea of  hierarchy  is omnipresent  in the  caste  system;  not only  do the various  castes  form  
a hierarchy,  but the occupations  practiced  by them,  the various  items  of  their  diet,  and 
the customs  they  observe,  all form  separate hierarchies (Srinivas 1956: 483). 
 
The changes among the Khyang in the Chittagong hill tracts of Bangladesh are comparable to 
the ‘Sanskritization’ process in India. I find that, the Bangalee and the economically powerful 
people set the standard for cultural custom and practices. For example, the Khyang who are 
rich and powerful smoke cigarettes while people who smoke ‘bidi’ (without filter) is of lower 
class. Many Khyang who have the financial means now build houses with bricks and cement 
instead of the traditional houses made of wood. Some of the Khyangs also changed their 
cooking pattern, during my fieldwork, of the respondents asked me, where do I stay and 
where do I eat?, as I replied that I live with a family nearby and also eat with them the Thoi 
Khyang (52 years) said, “can you eat the food they cook? Do not they eat only boiled food? 
Whenever you want to eat some good food you are welcome to visit our home.”  He was 
making sure that I understand about him and that he is no longer practicing the food habits 
that the other Khyangs have. In this way, he could also reflect his higher position in the area. 
He is regarded a rich person in the area and others tend to ask for his opinion if they wanted 
to buy new electronic products. I came to know this when one evening he was called by Rimi 
Khyang who wanted his opinion regarding which laptop she should buy. From this, I argue 
that food habits of the Khyang are changing. Another reason, which is responsible for this 
change, is their dependence on the local market for buying and trading rice, spices and meat 
in recent times. Whereas, previously the Khyangs used to meet most of their food needs from 
the produce of the swidden cultivation and from hunting, trapping, gathering and fishing.  
 
Another incidence of the Khyang custom being treated as something uncivilized was 
mentioned by the head of the village (Karbari) in Bandarban. He said that during his 
childhood his father was ‘Karbari’ of their village and an influential person in their locality so 
he was invited to a meeting with a minister and higher civil administration officers in the 
Bandarban city. When his father reached there to greet the minister, he bowed in a way he 
normally does in order to show respect to a religious leader. At this event, everyone laughed 
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at him so later he never wanted to join such meetings and wanted his children to be educated 
more and be like the higher officials so that they never have to face such embarrassing 
incidents. The experiences of the Khyang are in line with the Scott’s (2009: 120) argument 
that people from the valleys regard the people of the hill as uncivilized, that is, those on the 
mountain tops are the most backward; those living midslope are slightly more elevated 
culturally; those living in upland plateaus and growing irrigated rice are, again, more 
advanced, though certainly inferior to those at the core of the valley state. It also reflects the 
power dimension of people residing in the valley and in the hills.  
 
Further, in line with Scott (2009) ‘Hilliness’ in the CHT is disqualifying per se. Scott cites 
example that many of the Palaung in Burma are Theravada Buddhists, dress like Burmans, 
and speak fluent Burmese. They are not however, considered civilized so long as they live in 
the hills. In the CHT too, though many Khyangs have taken many practices of the higher-
class people in the locality, they are considered of lower class by the people who came from 
the valley, that is, the Bangalees. 
 
I have also seen changes in dressing. The Khyangs and other ethnic minority groups are not 
wearing their traditional dress and are adopting dresses of the Bangalee. Traditionally they 
used to wear dresses, which are not like the clothes of Bangalee people. So when they go 
outside the community they are easily recognized as people form an ethnic minority, thus, 
treated differently. I could understand this from my observation at the Khyang villages and 
from my discussion with Roma Khyang (28 years). One evening I was invited to her home as 
see came home on holidays. She works at the Chittagong town at garment industry. She was 
amazed by the fact that I was there doing research about the Khyangs. As I replied I want to 
investigate the problems of people in CHT, she promptly replied, “there is no end to our 
problems. How many do you want to listen? We have problems here and it does not end even 
if we go to the town. Whenever Bangalee men see us (recognize that they are from an ethnic 
minority group) they never miss a chance to tease us.” From her comment I argue in line with 
Malkki (1995: 156) that the Khyangs are wearing dresses like the Bangalees as a strategy 
where they are not recognized as a minority people which gives them opportunity to avoid 
everyday hassles (see chapter four). However, I have observed that women tend to wear their 
traditional dresses more than men do. I will discuss the changes in marriage customs and 
practices in chapter four (see page 94-96). 
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Household responsibilities and division of labor 
 
The changes in occupational practices among the indigenous people have, of course, affected 
both men and women, but these changes have not been uniform. In agriculture, women and 
men shared the work more or less equally. However, with the growth of non-farm activities I 
find that the division of labor between men and women has become far less pronounced. 
 
In Rangamati, though the Khyang are engaged in more diverse occupations, there is little 
difference between responsibilities of men and women (expect child rearing related activities). 
On the other hand, in Bandarban the division of labor and household responsibilities is more 
prominent. During my stay in the village, I observed that in terms of cultivation men are 
generally expected to plough and prepare isle of the agricultural lands while women are 
expected to involve in other activities. Other than these two tasks, men and women perform 
all the other tasks together in agriculture. However, decision-making is a task for the 
household head, that is, men. During my fieldwork in Bandarban, I have been in touch with a 
family who has been cultivating rice and other vegetables and they had banana orchard in the 
hills. The household head had three sons and one daughter. The second son was studying 
diploma on agriculture and wanted to cultivate mixed cropping mango with banana. However, 
his father decided not to do so and kept half the hill unproductive.  The son who was studying 
agriculture was frustrated and told me that none here understands the economic benefit that 
could have been achieved if a mixed cropping orchard was there.  
 
On the contrary, the household preparation of food is exclusively done by the women for the 
extended family and caring of children is expected to be done by women. Whereas in 
Rangamati I have seen men contribute in food preparing tasks as many of the women here are 
engaged in office work, which require a specific amount of time outside the household. 
During a visit to Thoi Khyang (52 years) and Camelia Biswas’s (40 years) home, I saw that 
Thoi Khyang was preparing food he said that he has been cooking for lunch as his wife will 
be coming back from the hospital where she works as a nurse after 15.00 hour and they will 
go to the medical center, which they both run together after 16.00 hour. Therefore, he usually 
cooks for lunch and sometimes his wife tries to wake up early cook before going to her work 
place.  
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However, food-preparing tasks are considered a task for women and commonly women 
prepare food for her family. In Bandarban, contrary to Rangamati I have hardly seen men 
performing cooking. I have never seen women joining meals when I was present. Ongsha (48 
years) said, “usually a man’s responsibility is to bring food to the house and women perform 
all the activities regarding cooking.”  
 
The scenario is similar to the Bangladesh scene in general, women in farm household are 
relatively more involved in reproductive roles like household chores, but less involved in 
productive activities than their husbands. However, they are more involved with home 
gardening and livestock rearing (Parveen 2009). 
 
In Bandarban, agriculture is still considered the mainstay of the Khyang economy. Within the 
agricultural field, men would clear the area and women would tend to the weeding and 
harvesting. In agriculture, related activities in Bangladesh women are more involved with 
process of harvest like winnowing, parboiling, drying and storing and preservation of grains 
and straw. They are less likely to be involved in land preparation to transplanting, threshing 
and marketing (Parveen 2009). However, as I have observed during my fieldwork it seems 
that women are becoming increasingly involved in all aspects of agricultural cultivation and 
are often taking the lead role as men move towards daily labor in neighboring places. This 
may not be the case in remotest areas; this finding is based on villages close to town 
(accessible in approximately two to three hours) and villages that are slowly moving towards 
urbanization. Thus, I hold in line with Narotzky (2001: 4070) that changes in mode of 
production have altered the ways the Khyang organizes access to land and labor. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The situation in the CHT and the changes in the employment pattern and economy of the 
Khyang can be explained in line with Scott’s (2009) argument of how ordinary hill-people 
deal with a predatory state. Scott’s analysis focuses on the various groups residing in the hills 
of Zomia - a mountainous region in South East Asia comprised of parts of Burma, Cambodia, 
China, India, Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand.  Zomia is the largest remaining area that has not 
been (until quite recently) integrated into a nation state.  Indeed, for over two thousand years, 
the people living in the highlands of Zomia lived outside the reach of the powerful lowland 
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government (padi-states).  The common view of these ‘hill people’ is that they are remnants 
of the pre-state period and represent an uncivilized and primitive form of living with slash 
and burn cultivation and animist beliefs.  In contrast, those that have moved into the lowlands 
and become part of the state system have progressed and become civilized.  Although Scott 
focuses on Zomia, it should be noted that governments and those involved in international 
development efforts tend to hold a similar view towards those living outside ‘the reach of the 
state’ in other settings as well.  Indeed, this view underpins the efforts to ‘fix’ the various 
institutions (economic, legal, political, and social) in societies around the world in the hope of 
bringing modernity and development to people who are viewed as primitive. I have discussed, 
and will provide more detail in the following chapter; how the Bangladesh government is no 
exception and has undertaken many development programs with such a motivation. In 
contrast to the view that the people of Zomia are primitive leftovers of the pre-state period, 
Scott argues that those living in the highlands consciously choose to live outside the reach of 
the state. Given the possibility of being subject to predatory behaviors by states- including 
conscription, slavery, excessive taxes, forced labor, and war- people move into the hills as an 
act of state avoidance. Thus, settlement in the hills is a state-effect (Scott 2009: 24). 
 
According to Scott (2009: 324) mankind has historically inhabited four eras:  I) a stateless era, 
(II) an era of small-scale states encircled by vast and easily reached stateless peripheries, (III) 
a period of in which such peripheries are shrunken and beleaguered by the expansion of state 
power, and (IV) an era in which virtually the entire globe is ‘administered space’ and the 
periphery is not much more than a folkloric remnant. The Chittagong Hill Tracts is 
somewhere between the era of III and IV as since 1980s there has been a truly massive 
transfer of Bangalee population in the CHT. The valley population in the CHT as in the case 
of Zomia (Scott 2009) has served the dual purpose of peopling the frontiers with a 
presumably loyal population and producing cash crop for export to all over the country and 
relieving population pressure from the valleys. 
 
The government initiatives in CHT have seized much of their land, established military 
camps and resettled a huge number of populations in the region. The Khyang and other ethnic 
minority groups who had been practicing swidden cultivation could not avoid the state and 
have been in competition with the settlers for livelihood. Thus, to have benefits in the trade 
relations with the Khyangs and ethnic minority groups the Bangalee started to ‘ethnicize’ and 
marginalize the others (c.f. Bloch and Parry 1989: 8; see also chapter three). 
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The situation of the Khyang indicates that with the changing economic scenario of the area 
they are bound to do something to keep up with the daily needs. However, they can no longer 
themselves produce all the daily necessary items, which they consume. This has created a 
transition  from subsistence to market/cash oriented agriculture (as with the pressure on land 
and encroaching market there is few options left for the Khyang), and their culture is evolving 
due to constant influxes of new social and economic determinants (c.f. Bloch and Parry 1989: 
7). As I have shown and argued, the changes in their social structure, gendered division of 
labor, and ‘Sanskritization’ of their customs and practices are all related to the changes in the 
economic sphere and the Khyangs interaction with the state and Bangalee people. Therefore, 
in line with Turner (1986: 114) I hold that the changing production system and Khyangs’ 
engagement with diverse occupations have blurred the boundary between the Khyangs the 
Bangalees. Besides, the changes in the marriage system in terms of more intermarriages and 
use of language in relation to the Khyang identity will be discussed in chapter four. 
 
This process has created a ‘shatter zone’ or ‘zones of refuge’ and a constantly reformulating 
economy and identity of the Khyang. Scott (2009: 7) argues that a pattern of state-making and 
state-unmaking produced a periphery that is composed as much of refugees as of peoples who 
had never been state subjects. Much of the periphery of states became a zone of refuge or 
‘shatter zone’, where the human remains of state formation and rivalry accumulated, creating 
regions of bewildering ethnic and linguistic complexity. State expansion and collapse often 
had a ratchet effect as well, with fleeing subjects driving other peoples ahead of them seeking 
safety and new territory (Scott 2009: 7). Thus, Scott (2009: 7) argues much of the Southeast 
Asian massif is, in effect, a shatter zone. On the basis of my ethnographic information, I 
argue in line with Scott (2009) that as the state has consolidated and created new frontiers the 
Khyangs and other communities of the hills face new and altered opportunities and 
limitations in terms of livelihood. There has been economic specialization, trade and 
administrative and political links flourishing as the community is taking advantage of the 
opportunities that the state has brought them. Selling cash crop at the market, engaging 
themselves with non-agricultural occupations are two kinds of new opportunities. However, 
ethnographic information that I collected suggest that in availing this opportunities the 
Khyang are in a marginalized position in their interaction with the Bangalees and other ethnic 
groups (see chapter three). In response to state supported economic expansion, and state 
encouragement of settlement, the Khyangs have taken up sedentary cultivation; some of them 
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moved closer to state center and establishing trade relations and incorporating traits 
linguistically and assume identity compatible with the Bangalee people. 
 
CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 
The Bangladesh state’s aim of building a ‘Nation’ and better control its population in the 
CHT has led to its focus on initiating development activities. This has been supported by 
transmigration programs transferring Bangalee populations from the valley to the hills. 
Through the government’s civilizing projects the Khyang have changed their livelihood 
practices based on subsistence shifting cultivation to a diverse range of professions. This 
change in the economic frontiers has, as I have shown had many impacts on the way of life of 
the Khyang, which include class distinctions among the Khyang, that is, economic and 
political power difference has emerged. This change has also led to ‘Sanskritization’ among 
the Khyang and they have now adopted new housing pattern, dressing style and food 
preparation, which are compatible with the valley people, that is, the Bangalees. I have also 
noticed changes in gendered division of labor as in urban areas now-a-days both men and 
women share the household tasks, which was exclusively a task for women previously. The 
civilizing project of the Bangladesh state has also created a diversification among the Khyang 
and new social spaces (for instance, the market places) where the relations between the 
Khyang and Bangalee is a relation between the powerless and the power full (people from the 
hill: people from valley :: uncivilized: civilized). I will discuss this marginalizing process of 
the Khyang in the following chapter focusing on the process through which the Khyang are 
being dispossessed of their livelihood means (for example: land). 
 
Dispossession and Ethnic Identity in Expanding State Space of Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh 
Bangladesh State and the Genesis of Dispossession and Marginalization in CHT 50 
CHAPTER THREE 
BANGLADESH STATE AND THE GENESIS OF DISPOSSESSION AND 
MARGINALIZATION IN CHT 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter I explore the changes of the administrative system of the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts and how government policies regarding natural resources especially land and forests, 
have created a situation of ‘dispossession’ for the ethnic minority groups of  Bangladesh. By 
dispossession, I point to the situation of stripping the Khyang of CHT of the means of their 
social reproduction and commodifying resources and forms of labor that had hitherto been 
outside of capital’s realm (Kasmir and Carbonella 2008: 8). Focusing on the period after 
independence of Bangladesh in 1971, on the basis of my ethnographical findings I will argue 
that government initiatives to improve the situation of the CHT have created mutations in 
citizenships in the multi-ethnic region of CHT (c.f. Ong 2006). The government interventions 
have taken place through processes of land and forest governance, improvement of the 
transport and communication systems, the offering of quotas for admission in schools and 
education and the development of markets and job opportunities. The encroaching borders of 
the nation has over-ridden some aspects of ethnic boundaries, that is, some of the Khyangs 
are not being able to sustain a life which were part of their ethnic identity. 
  
Small ethnic groups are in a disadvantageous position in terms of receiving and making use 
of the different opportunities presented by the government, because the government policies 
has inserted different groups of people differently in the process of development which 
sometimes overlap with pre-formed racial, ethnic and gender hierarchies and thus, fragments 
citizenship for the people of the same country (Ong 2000: 62). In line with Rosaldo’s (2003) 
argument for Southeast Asia, I hold that in Bangladesh the relations between state officials 
and hinterland minority groups involve differences of power and perception by each group of 
the other something, which shapes the production of marginalization.    
 
In this chapter, I will illuminate and argue that as part of the ‘Nation State’ CHT is exposed 
to a process of continuous recreation of inequality and marginalization. The chapter explains 
how the Khyang are being dispossessed from land access and from other rights and 
entitlements, in other words, how the process of assimilation has an effect in the production 
of difference (Kasmir and Carbonella 2008). Based on my ethnographic findings I will 
discuss and illustrate the ways in which the policies and development interventions of the 
state has created certain assemblages where particular groups of people are facing 
dispossession and also finding it hard to sustain their livelihoods (c.f. Murray Li 2009).  
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THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE RELATION BETWEEN THE CHT 
AND GOVERNMENT(S)  
 
Pre-Bangladesh period (before 1971) 
 
Historically the Chittagong Hill Tracts existed as an independent territory and did not belong 
within any formal authority (colonization) until the 18th century (Ishaq 1975).  The different 
groups living in the CHT functioned as independent communities until the time of British 
entry into the administration of Chittagong Hill Tracts (Roy 2000: 38). 
  
Previously, the hill region comprised an area greater than what is now the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts. It included parts of present day Chittagong (Rangunia, Ramu and Sitakunda areas), 
Cox’s Bazaar districts as well as Mizoram (Lushai Hills). Roy (1995) mentions that there are 
traditional Chakma songs describing how the Chakma people living in the plains around 
Chittagong were forced by migrating valley people to move further into the hill region. This 
is in line with Scott’s (2009) claim that hill people were further moved into the hill because 
of the encroaching state and the valley people.  
 
Although the Chittagong Hill Tracts and Chittagong District (a plain district) are contiguous, 
their historical development has differed. Most of Chittagong and Cox’s Bazaar districts were 
part of the Tripura or Arakan kingdoms and later became integrated into the Mughal Empire 
(1666), whereas the CHT always retained its independent status and remained with a separate 
administrative structure where the customary laws (Dung) of the Pahari people were 
paramount. Thus, despite their geographical proximity, the plain districts and the CHT have 
for a long time experienced different political and legal regimes. Thus, in the hills, the 
different groups of people were self-governing small entities without any formalized political 
systems, whereas the people in the plain were always subject to external powers (Mey 1984; 
c.f. Scott 2009).  However, there were economic factors involved in the relationship between 
the neighboring areas as raw products from the CHT such as timber, cotton, sun grass and 
bamboo found a ready market in the plains, while the Pahari people needed utensils, salt and 
kerosene, which were not available in their area. 
 
The Chittagong Hill Tracts became a part of the modern nation state system in the late 19th 
century and the major factor responsible for the penetration of outside influences has been 
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economic. Thus, the CHT could not continue its relative isolation from the market economy 
of the rest of the Indian sub-continent. Economic relationships in the form of trade and tax 
collection were the first step in the process of gradual encroachment into the area by external 
powers. The external administrators (colonizers) were initially motivated by purely 
commercial interests, but subsequently guided by expansionist policies (Roy 2000: 39). 
 
When in 1760, the British East India Company had succeeded in annexing Bengal the CHT 
drew their attention as a strategic area, which could facilitate their access to and control of the 
neighboring countries. Moreover, CHT were rich in natural resources, in particular forest 
produce, which increased the interest of the colonizers (Hutchinson 1906: 2). When the 
colonizers took control, initially, the jurisdiction extended to the collection of the cotton tax 
only, but gradually this tax collection exercise was instrumental for the British in establishing 
their authority over the entire Hill Tracts. The tax collection process has been instrumental 
for any expansion of state space in South and Southeast Asia throughout history (Scott 2009). 
However, the colonial powers did not interfere in the internal administration of the area, 
which remained in the hands of the chiefs and their headmen (Ishaq 1975).  
 
The British started a military campaign in 1776 to include the Hill Tracts within their control. 
However, during the process they met with strong resistance from the local ethnic groups and 
tribes. Subsequently, a treaty was made between the people of the CHT and the British 
company on 1787 (Anti- Slavery Society 1984). 
 
In 1860, ‘Act No. XXII of 1860’ declared the CHT as a district within Bengal and a 
superintendent were appointed to the Chittagong Hill Tracts under the supervision of the 
commissioner in Chittagong. When the annexation process of incorporating the Hill Tracts to 
the British Empire was formalized, and finalized, there were three Rajas. The Chakma Raja 
whose territory covered about half the Hill Tracts, the Bomang to the south up to the border 
with Burma and the Mong Raja in the north-west (Hutchinson 1906: 24). As part of the 
British colony the traditional Rajas continued to exercise their authority within their 
jurisdiction affecting all matters directly related to the people of CHT, given that they paid 
the annual revenue to the British administration in India (Anti-Slavery Society 1984: 45).  
 
Although the number of valley people in the Hill Tracts were nominal (less than 2% of the 
total population) during the colonial period as protective measures to preserve the cultural 
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and territorial integrity of the hill people, the British administrators formulated a number of 
administrative regulations of which the 1900 Regulations are of prime significance 
(Hutchinson 1906: 44). This regulation was expected to restrict the entry of non-indigenous 
people to the area. Until de-colonization following the Second World War the people of CHT 
enjoyed a wide degree of independence and protection from the intrusion of Bangalee settlers 
of the more populated plain lands (Burger 1987: 130).  
 
In 1920, the CHT was declared a ‘Backward Tract’, which was to be administered as an 
‘Excluded Area’ (Mohsin 1997; Roy 1997). Further, the Government of India Act of 1935 
designated the region as a ‘Totally Excluded Area’. Subsequently, during the partition of 
British India in 1947, the CHT was annexed to the Muslim-majority state of Pakistan, despite 
the unwillingness of the leaders of the minority ethnic groups (Mohsin 1997). The 
constitution of Pakistan, formulated in 1956, retained the status of the CHT as an ‘Excluded 
Area’ (Shelley 1992). However, as the Pakistani government was interested in exploiting the 
rich natural resources of the CHT, they showed little concern about the possible adverse 
impacts on the ethnic groups of CHT and their habitat (Mohsin 1997). In this new post-
colonial context, the colonial policy of keeping the CHT isolated from the rest of the country 
became an impediment for majority groups’ concern to lift the restrictions on their entry, 
residence and rights to hold landed property in the area. As a result, the status of the CHT 
was altered from an ‘Excluded Area’ to a ‘Tribal Area’ in the new constitution adopted by 
Pakistan in 1962. The limited protection provided by even this modified status was stripped 
away by a constitutional amendment in 1964 (Mohsin 1997; Adnan 2004). 
 
In 1964, the list of tribal areas
10
 was amended by a constitutional amendment in the National 
Assembly and the CHT was removed from this list. The CHT no longer had the official 
recognition of being designated as a separate homeland for the indigenous people as it had 
under its previous designations as ‘Excluded Area’ and ‘Tribal Area’. More significantly, this 
had the effect of facilitating the access of non-indigenous people to the CHT; that is, opening 
it up for the settlement valley people. In practical terms, this enabled non-indigenous people 
to enter, acquire and own land in the CHT.  
 
                                                          
10
 The government of Bangladesh also recognizes different groups living in the CHT as ethnic sects or tribes. 
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From the above discussion, we can see that the people of the CHT had been suffered from the 
government policies and from development interventions of the British administration and 
Pakistan governments. This historical trajectory is important because I find that many of the 
Bangladesh governments’ strategies are similar to the ways the previous governments had 
dealt with the CHT issues.    
 
Bangladesh period (after 1971) 
 
With Bangladesh’s independence in 1971, ethnic minority political leaders of the CHT 
lobbied the new government for specific recognition of their identities and autonomy in the 
nation’s first constitution. In this regard, ethnic minority leaders met with the Prime Minister 
and called for regional autonomy, while remaining within the new state of Bangladesh. They 
also requested for the recognition of traditional governance system, and a ban on the 
migration and settlement of Bangalee people into CHT. 
 
These demands were rejected and the prime minister advised the hill people to adopt the new 
nationalist Bangalee identity and also threatened to effectively marginalize ethnic minority 
communities by sending Bangalees into the region (Mohsin 2003: 22).  Strong sense of 
nationalism of Bangalee identity based on Bangla language had driven the call for 
independence from West Pakistan in 1971 and it formed the central idea of the constitution of 
Bangladesh. This was reflected in the constitution, as it had no appreciation for the status of 
other minority ethnic groups in Bangladesh. Consequently, the constitution of 1972, focused 
on a distinctive Bangalee identity, language and culture; Article 9 of the constitution states: 
 
“The unity and solidarity of the Bengali nation, which deriving its identity 
from its language and culture, attained sovereign and independent Bangladesh 
through a united and determined struggle in the war of independence, shall be 
the basis of Bengali nationalism.” 
 
One of the leaders of ethnic minority groups Manabendra Narayan Larma expressed the 
frustration of Pahari / hill people in a speech to the Bangladesh Parliament: 
 
“You cannot impose your national identity on others. I am a Chakma not a 
Bengali. I am a citizen of Bangladesh, Bangladeshi. You are also Bangladeshi 
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but your national identity is Bengali … They [the Pahari people] can never 
become Bengali” (Mohsin 2003: 23). 
 
In response to formulated constitution of 1972 of Bangladesh, Manabendra Narayan Larma 
established the Jana Samhati Samiti (JSS) political party in 1972. The JSS had the core 
demands of regional autonomy, and constitutional recognition of Pahari identities. After year 
the JSS’s armed wing ‘Shanti Bahini’ (peace force) was established, however, it was not 
militarily active until the mid-1970s.With the widespread violence in the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts, between 1980 and the early 1990s, thousands of Pahari people sought refuge in India. 
Many thousands more were displaced within the Chittagong Hill Tracts (Amnesty 
International 2000).  
 
In such a circumstances Bangladeshi government tried to control the situation and a key part 
of the counter-insurgency strategies was to resettle hundreds of thousands of Bangalees from 
the Bangladesh’s plain districts into the three districts of the Chittagong Hill tracts. Between 
1980 and 1985, transmigration program was undertaken facilitated by the military forces. The 
policy was not made public and no Pahari were informed of or consulted about this program. 
Shapan Adnan (2004: 29) noted that the whole process of Bangalee settlement in CHT was 
planned and executed with the precision and secrecy of a covert military operation. He also 
stated that the aim was of this transmigration program was to accelerate the settlement of a 
sizeable Bangalee population in the Chittagong Hill Tracts that would be loyal to the 
Bangladesh state. Many Bangalees were settled in ‘cluster villages’ next to army camps and 
they became ‘human shields’ and also potential army recruits for paramilitary operations 
against the ‘Shanti Bahini’ and the wider Pahari population (Adnan and Dastidar 2011). The 
Bangalee settlers were mostly landless families from the plains districts; some of whom had 
were homeless due to river erosion. They were assured by the government that they would 
get land, food rations, cash allowances and the protection of the security forces as incentives 
if they settle in the CHT. The land allotted to them included lands vacated by the Pahari 
people during the armed conflict. 
 
The Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord, which was signed in December 1997 between the 
government and JSS formally stopping the armed conflict. As per the accord, the authorities 
agreed to establish a new system of formal governance to provide the Pahari people with a 
measure of regional autonomy in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Greater autonomy was one of 
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the key demands of the Pahari people during negotiations. After the accord was signed, the 
authorities amended legislation governing local bodies in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, 
establishing a system of local governance that is distinct from other districts in Bangladesh. 
 
LAND LAWS IN CHT 
 
Land administration 
 
Under the indigenous system of administration, the land is divided into separate categories 
depending on the modality of use and management, and revenue is paid to the indigenous 
administrations accordingly (Roy 2000: 59). 
 
In 1860, when the British took control of the Hill Tracts, they recognized it as an indigenous 
area distinct from the rest of the country. Administrations of the CHT, including that related 
to lands, were distinct from the plains districts. However, the indigenous system of land 
tenure in the CHT differed considerably from British concepts of land holding and 
administration, thus, the colonial administrators wanted to restructure the land revenue 
system and to bring it into greater conformity with their own systems of land tenure. Thus, a 
series of administrative and legislative measures were passed culminating in Regulation 1 of 
1900. This regulation remains as the principal instrument for regulating the transmission of 
land rights in the Hill Tracts today (Roy 2000: 59). 
 
Regulation 1 of 1900 (or the CHT Manual as it is also called) partially acknowledges some of 
the collective and customary land rights of indigenous people. One of the principal changes 
enforced by these regulations were the formal demarcation of the CHT into three separate 
‘Circles’, and the designation of the three traditional leaders as ‘Chiefs’. Consequently, these 
leaders, who had enjoyed the status of ‘heads’ within their territories for centuries, required 
the required recognition of the colonial authorities to rule CHT (Roy 2000: 60). 
 
The British formally divided the CHT into territorially defined administrative units known as 
mauzas to replace the earlier system of taluks. A headman was appointed as the responsible 
authority for each mauza; his responsibilities included the collection of revenue. Each mauza 
comprised a number of villages, each of which was generally headed by a Karbari.  
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The land use pattern of the indigenous people provided the basis for the revenue 
administration, with specific taxes levied on each category of land (see sections below). In 
line with Roy (2000), I hold that the promulgation of the 1900 Regulations was the first step 
of the erosion of land rights of the indigenous people in Bangladesh. It is the principal legal 
instrument applicable in the Hill Tracts and it remains valid today (Roy 2000).  
 
Collectively owned land 
 
These lands are those which belong to the community as a whole with a shared and common 
right of access. The people have a right to these lands and its resources, by virtue of their 
collective ownership of the areas. Traditional economic activities such as fishing, hunting and 
gathering are carried out in these areas. Further, Jhum lands fall within this category, as do 
the lands used for grazing and for growing sun grass, which is used to make thatched roofs. 
The forests are also included within this category of mauza common. Traditionally no taxes 
were levied for the use of this category of land. 
 
The government does not formally recognize the rights of the indigenous people to the 
collectively owned/ common lands as a collective legal right (Roy 2000: 61). It rather regards 
this kind of land as state-owned. This kind of land is also known as khas land, that is, state 
land. Besides, forest department categorizes this land as Unclassed State Forests (USFs). This 
kind of land is not demarcated as Reserved or Protected Forests, and also are not settled or 
leased out in the name of any private individual or corporate body. In actual practice, these 
are the common Jhum, forest, hunting and fishing grounds, and homestead lands of ethnic 
groups living in CHT. 
 
Jhum land 
 
The hills and adjacent slopes of the CHT are suitable mainly for Jhum cultivation. The ethnic 
groups have communal rights to these lands, as well as the individual right to its use. In 
earlier times and even in 1918 when the population of the CHT was about 200000, so Jhum 
was a viable system and provided the hill people with their basic necessities, in addition to 
surplus produce which could be exchange at markets for other supplies (Roy 2000: 62). As 
outlined in chapter two, it was the principal occupation for the majority of people, and nearly 
all farmers practiced slash and burn agriculture.  
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Every family of the ethnic groups has the right to cultivate Jhum where they choose, subject 
to the land not belonging to another person or family. Various factors are taken into 
consideration by the Khyangs and other ethnic communities in allowing cultivation a 
particular piece of Jhum land including whether the specified period to allow the soil to 
regain its fertility has been completed. A person retains the right over his ranya (old Jhum), 
and in case of disputes the talukdar or mauza headman resolve the disputes.  
 
Initially, the British discouraged Jhum as they regarded it to be conducive for nomadism, and 
unsustainable as an agricultural system. Thus, they made efforts to stop Jhum and force the 
people to settle and cultivate with the plough (Hutchinson 1906: 51). The policy decision of 
the British administration to discourage Jhum remained unchanged. Thus, by the middle of 
the 19th century, most of the ethnic groups who lived along the riverbanks such as the 
Chakma and the Marma had adopted the plough. Thus, much of the land suitable for plough 
cultivation was being converted to plough cultivation using this method. However, as the 
amount of plough land in the CHT was limited, many of the indigenous people remained 
Jhum farmers. 
 
 Homestead land 
 
As per customary law (Dung), every family of the ethnic groups living in CHT has the right 
to sufficient land for residential purposes (Roy 2000: 70). Most ethnic groups of CHT and the 
Khyang own and build their houses with the help of the entire community.  
 
The allocation of adequate land to build a house is the responsibility of the village authorities; 
the Karbari or headman, and the decision is taken based on certain criteria including land 
availability, the existence of prior claims to the claimed area, as well as family and kinship 
links. No formal lease or deed is required for land holding and revenue is paid to the mauza 
headman.  
 
At present, as I have seen the customary right to lands for house building has been restricted 
mostly to rural areas. The high population density in urban areas makes it impossible to find 
any unoccupied land. Further, in the market areas, commercial plots are formally registered in 
the names of their owners - generally traders and merchants. 
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Forests 
 
As I discussed in chapter two, the people of the CHT (specially the ethnic groups) depend on 
the land and its natural resources, including the forests, for making a livelihood. Traditionally 
the right to use and extract forest produce existed without any restrictions except those 
prescribed under customary law (Dung). However, between 1875-1882 the British 
administration initiated a policy of curtailing the rights of the indigenous people to the forests 
(Roy 2000: 71).  
 
Initially, the forests were divided into two categories: 
1) Reserve Forests; and 
2) Unclassed State Forests. 
However, in the mid-60s a third category was introduced: 
3) Protected Forests.  
 
Reserved forests 
The practice of creating Reserved Forests was institutionalized by Section 3 of the Forest Act 
of 1927. Roy (2000: 72) argues that according to the annotated comments to the Forest Act, it 
is clear that if the land is a part of permanently settled land, it is a private property, and it 
would therefore, not be legal to declare it as part of a Reserved Forest. However, measures 
are not taken to ensure that lands which are to be included in a proposed Reserved Forest are 
not subject to conflicting claims. Furthermore, the ethnic groups of CHT are often ignorant of 
national legislations and do not take the necessary steps to secure their rights. Besides, the 
procedural regulations are cumbersome and complicated for the ethnic minority groups and 
do not facilitate an immediate process of adjudicating conflicting claims. I will discuss the 
Khyangs’ experience in this regard later. 
 
The Bangladesh Forest Department (BFD) is responsible for the management of the forest 
reserves, including the protection of forests, afforestation, research, extension, and collection 
of royalty charges on forest produce and the protection of game. However, there are no 
provisions to recognize the collective rights of ethnic groups to the use and extraction of the 
forests and their resources (Roy 2000: 72).  
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Protected forests 
In 1960, the concept of protected forests was introduced in Bangladesh (then it was the 
Pakistan State). Specific areas of what the British administration had earlier classified as 
Unclassed State Forest, that is, common lands were re-categorized as Protected Forests. 
Although Protected Forests were not initially regarded something to be like an interim phase 
prior to their upgrading to Reserved Forests, sometimes this has been the case, for example 
the Gazette Notification of 21 May 1992 (Roy 2000: 73). 
 
As with the Reserved Forests, the Protected Forests are also created by Government 
notifications in accordance with the Forest Acts, and are under the control and management 
of the Bangladesh Forest Department (BFD). Within the Protected Forest, the BFD has sole 
control to maintain the biodiversity of the forests. The mauza residents have some access to 
forest produce and can cultivate a Jhum in designated areas. In some cases, the Jhum 
practicing people work as waged laborers of the BFD and plant teak and garjan trees in their 
Jhums. The forest department pays some wages (far below the market rate) for taking care of 
the trees. Once the area is covered with trees, the indigenous people are ordered to move from 
the area, and the trees remain the property of the Government Roy (2000: 73). 
 
Village Common Forests (VCF) 
 
Village Common Forest (VCF) is a natural forest, other than the government forest around 
the households. It is cultivated to fulfil ethnic groups’ need of forest resources. Baten et al. 
(2010: 7) argues the community-managed VCF in the CHT is a direct result of resource 
constraints caused by deforestation and the prevention of entry into and use of the resources 
in reserved forests (which were restricted from local people’s use through government 
declaration). These constraints have led local communities to devise newer and more 
sustainable modes of the natural resources management in the form of VCF during the first 
quarter of the 20th century (Baten et al. 2010: 7). 
 
Between 1871 and 1885, three-fourths of CHT’s land was declared as state owned forest 
lands by the British colonial government. Besides, except some privately owned land those 
are obtained through leasehold or freehold, the remaining lands were declared as ‘khas land’ 
(Rasul 2007: 155f). One fourth of the government forest lands (approximately 3484 square 
kilometers) were declared as Reserved Forests (Rasul 2007: 156). Since 1900, the Chittagong 
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Hill Tracts Regulation (CHTR) gave ‘Headman’ of each mauza has given power to manage 
the forest within a mauza. Thus, from 1939, the ethnic minority groups started to manage the 
forests around their homesteads in CHT. Currently, it is estimated that VCF covers around 
202 hectors of the total land in CHT (Baten et al. 2010: 7). 
 
Similar forest management has been seen in Nepal and Anderson (2011) reports in the 1950s 
and 1960s a concern for the protection of natural resources led many Asian countries to 
nationalize all land, forests and water resources that were not private property. In Nepal, the 
government nationalized all forests under the Private Forest Nationalization Act of 1957. 
Traditionally, customary accesses were regulated among villages. They had rights in different 
resource units such as fuel wood, timber, fruits, fibers, fodder, and leaf litter from forest floor 
for composting with manure. These rights were not uniform for every village, but were 
widely respected. Following nationalization of natural resources, heavy deforestation 
occurred; one reason advanced for this deforestation is the disruption of community 
management systems and that state managed forests, in fact, became open access areas. The 
state realized its inability to protect the forests something, which led to several legislative 
changes, aimed at the handing over of forest management to local communities, which 
resulted in the Forest Act of 1993. It provides authority to the village users for management 
of forest resources through a community institution called a Community Forest User Group 
(CFUG), which represented the community of forest users in a village, who were legally 
authorized to take management decisions. The area of forest and size of a CFUG vary 
according to circumstances; the areas range from a just a few to over 4,000 hectares, the 
average being around 80 hectares (Anderson 2011: 26). 
 
There has been a change in how the Khyang and other ethnic groups in the CHT had access to 
land and forest resources. The government policies have shrunken their rights to resources. 
The people of the CHT have been denied access to forests in the name of biodiversity 
conservation and land conservation, however, there is evidence that the minority ethnic 
communities, for example, in Bangladesh and Nepal have a sustainable forest management 
practices. In the following section, I will discuss the process through which the Khyang are 
dispossessed from their land and how the dislocation has been creating a difference at inter 
and intra community level.      
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RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO RESOURCES: DISPOSSESSION AND PRODUCTION 
OF DIFFERENCE 
 
Based on the above and following discussion, I hold that the ethnic minority
11
 communities 
of the CHT have been going through a process of dispossession from natural resources in the 
area. Ethnic minority communities are also losing land to Bangalee people who have been 
migrating to the CHT in a massive number after 1980s. The trend of land loss of the ethnic 
minority communities has been acknowledged by the government  as special measures such 
as were taken in the Peace Accord of 1997 (Adnan and Dastidar 2011). However, the 
mechanisms for land grabbing are many and on different levels like state acquisition, 
transmigration programs, forcible seizure, etc.  
 
The prevalent system of landholding in the CHT is characterized by legal pluralism in terms 
of the co-existence and parallel operation of three major categories of land laws (Adnan and 
Dastidar 2011: 44). 
(a) Formal laws which apply to Bangladesh as a whole 
(b) Formal laws applying specifically to the CHT and ethnic minority communities. 
(c) Customary laws and practices of the ethnic minority communities. 
Land rights based on each of these systems overlap to varying degrees giving rise to instances 
of conflicting legal rights/ claims on the same plot of land. Within this complex framework of 
property rights, the acquisition or grabbing of land in the CHT has been taking place through 
many different processes, which can be grouped under four broad categories. 
 
Acquisition of land by the State  
 
Unlike the rest of Bangladesh, land acquisition in the CHT is conducted under a law specific 
to the region, entitled the CHT (Land Acquisition) Regulation, 1958. This law empowers the 
District Commissioner
12
 (DC) to use force to acquire the designated lands without having to 
                                                          
11
 The constitution of states on the article for the culture of tribes, minor races, ethnic sects and communities 
(23A) states that the State shall take steps to protect and develop the unique local culture and tradition of the 
tribes, minor races, ethnic sects and communities. Article 23A was inserted by the Constitution (Fifteenth 
Amendment) Act, 2011 (Act XIV of 2011), section 14. 
12
 It is office of administrative head for the respective districts in Bangladesh. 
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give prior notice to the concerned landowner. There is also no provision for appeal against 
land acquisition under this law (Adnan and Dastidar 2011: 46). 
 
However, after the peace accord of 1997 the common article 64(1) of all three Hill District 
Council (HDC) Acts, endorsed by the Accord, explicitly specifies that without the prior 
approval of the concerned council, no lands of the district can be settled, leased, sold, or 
transferred in any other way, by any agency, including the government itself. Even though 
the framing of the HDC Acts clearly empower ethnic minority groups to override the power 
given by the CHT Regulation to the DC, in practice, the DC allegedly has continued to 
process land settlements and leases for Bangalee interest groups from outside without 
obtaining the legal/ prior approval of the concerned HDC (Adnan and Dastidar 2011: 46; see 
next section). 
 
On the other hand, even though existing (‘old’) Reserve Forests already cover nearly one 
quarter of the area of the CHT, the Forest Department has been attempting to expand such 
state forests from the late 1980s acquiring more lands. However, this establishment of new 
Reserve Forests (or other state-managed forests) necessarily entails the acquisition of the 
common or private lands of the ethnic minority communities living in the so-called 
Unclassed State Forest (USF) areas of the CHT. Approximately one quarter of the CHT is 
reserved forest in which collection of fuel wood and other forest products is prohibited. In 
addition to the forest that had been declared as reserved from colonial times, there has been a 
further expansion of reserves forests by use of the Forest Act of 1927. Between 1990 and 
1998, 217790 acres of land from 83 mauzas in three hill districts – have been embarked as 
reserved forest. Of these, 140,342 acres have been formally declared as reserved forest (Gain 
2000: 3).  
 
The government’s strategy to seize land from the forest dwellers are also seen in India. 
Karlsson (2000: 3f) writes about the Rabhas who line in forest villages inside or on the fringe 
of the reserved forest ruled and ‘owned’ by the Forest Department, and ultimately by the 
Indian Government. Before the colonial times the Rabhas were shifting cultivator, who were 
denied rights to the forest that was declared ‘reserved’ by the British. The independent Indian 
state has by large continued the colonial system of forest management, and today people like 
the Rabhas still lack any formal or legal rights to the forest. The increasing interests in forest 
and wildlife conservations have led to seizure of livelihood options for the Rabhas.  
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Mohsin (1997: 81) argues, for CHT, in line with Scott’s (2009: 10) argument for Southeast 
Asia, that the colonial state sought to change the mode of production in the CHT from Jhum 
to Plough as Jhum was economically less profitable for the state. In doing so, little 
consideration was given to the values and rights of the hill people. Contrarily they were 
stigmatized as primitive and semi-barbarians, who  practiced a ‘primitive’ mode of 
cultivation through ‘primitive technology’ and the hill people carried their stigma of 
‘primitiveness’ in the state of Pakistan and as well as in Bangladesh.  
 
Another argument for promoting land seizure by the government is (alleged) gradual 
degradation of land. Government perceives that degradation of land and forest owing to 
unsustainable land-use practices, locally known as Jhum (slash and burn), an extensive land-
use characterized by frequent shifting of plot, has become a serious concern in Chittagong 
Hill Tracts (CHT) of Bangladesh. Governments also regard that the practice of Jhum has 
been responsible for loosing tree covers of the hills. Thus, policies and programs aimed at 
promoting alternative settled land use practices in cooperative farms (Mohsin 1997: 124).  
 
People living at the CHT are also blamed for being conservative and not adopting alternative 
land use systems such as: plough cultivation and cultivating cash crops. However, the 
constraints in adopting alternative land use practices have been overlooked by the governing 
authorities. This became evident to me while one morning I was sitting at a small tea stall at 
Rangamati and I saw Thoi Khyang (52 years) going towards his home. As he saw me sitting 
there, he approached me and asked what I was doing. Afterwards he offered me to go with 
him to his house and I happily agreed. When we were climbing the small hill towards his 
home I asked where was he coming from and he replied that he went to buy some vegetables 
and showed me the vegetables he bought and said:  
 
“This small amount of vegetables cost me 20 BDT (0.15 USD).” He further said, 
“beside my home there is some free land but I cannot cultivate any vegetable 
as there is no provision of water supply for irrigation here.” He also said, 
“Khyangs of this area are really in economic hardship. Palash has been trying 
to establish small shop to survive but it is not proving beneficial for him. I 
guess he is also not that committed to run the shop. He opens the shop in the 
morning and closing by mid-day. He is also facing the same problem as me. 
Now he runs his family from the income of selling rice wine.” 
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There is also a problem of marketing and selling of local cash-crop products (discussed later, 
see also chapter two). However, it has been the state policies on land use in CHT over two 
centuries has contributed to the process of land degradation starting during the British 
colonial period with the nationalization of land and forest and large scale commercial logging 
(Adnan and Dastidar 2011). 
 
Designation of previously cultivated land as reserved forest has shrunken the ethnic minority 
groups’ opportunities of making a living. Although the Khyang may also benefit from the 
forestry projects people hardly go to avail these opportunities as the procedure remain 
unknown for most people. Lelung, 55 years in Bandarban, said: 
 
“In 1990 one day we heard that the government have declared some reserved 
forests (which is around seven kilometer from here). Then we did not know 
what is a ‘reserved forest’ and why it is a reserved forest? Eventually we found 
that we have no access to the forest from where we have collected fire woods 
and other fruits for years. Some years ago, we have also come to know that 
Bangalees are also working in forestry projects. We never knew what those 
were and are not interested in those.”   
 
Further, the forests officers behave rudely with the minority people so they do not want to 
face them again thus lose all the opportunities.  
 
Probhat, 58 years from Bandarban said: 
 
“The acquiring process of Pahari lands started in 1960s and many forests of 
the hills were acquired for the purpose of forestry projects. This have evicted 
many Khyang families and isolated them from the livelihood option. Now-a-
days we are even deprived of minimal basic rights of living. The Khyangs and 
other ethnic minority people are also suffering from false cases as timber 
merchants sometimes cut trees and sell in the towns when get caught false 
cases are filed against the minority people as they know Khyangs or other 
minority people will not be able to do anything against the powerful people.”  
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My respondents also told me that the establishment of reserve forest abolished their 
customary rights and forced them to reduce the time between cultivating on the same plot of 
land. Thus, fertility and yield from the land has been decreasing. On the other hand, the 
construction of a hydroelectric dam and the state’s encouragement of migration of lowland 
people into the CHT has created further pressure on land and forced farmers to bring more 
lands that are marginal under cultivation for growing food or annual cash crops and increase 
the cultivation frequency. Therefore, I find that the persistence of extensive land use practices 
is not caused by people’s adherence to indigenous land use practices but by failures of 
policies to create conducive environment.  
 
Seizure of private and common lands by powerful individuals  
 
Seizure of private and common lands of the ethnic minority groups by powerful Bangalees 
and Khyangs result in dispossession of the Khyang and the conversion of common lands into 
private property. Once located in the CHT, many Bangalee settlers use a range of different 
techniques for grabbing Pahari lands. In some cases, they forged land settlement documents 
to justify their (illegal) occupation. Otherwise, they simply occupied lands by force, given the 
backing of the security forces and the civil administration. Such incremental land grabbing by 
Bangalee settlers has continued during the post-Accord period (Adnan and Dastidar 2011: 
97). 
 
The trend of decreasing ownership of land among the Khyang is seen in both Bandarban and 
Rangamati. Ong Thui Khyang (age 55 years) of Rangamati said that: 
 
“The place we are living is called ‘Khyang Para’ however, at present there is 
lot more Bangalee people living inside the area and also adjacent areas. Those 
who have private lands are selling their lands and new comers in the area 
often build multi-storied buildings.”  
 
The marginal position of the Khyang can be exemplified by his response when I asked if he 
did anything to stop this process. In addition, he said: 
 
“Now a big building is being built just in front of my house and there is just a 
small passage left from where I can enter my house but these are small matters 
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and nothing can be done. Those who have money can do this and I have 
nothing to say on this. If I had money may be I would have done the same.”  
 
I found that many types of forgery, involving illegal modification of titles, tenure contracts 
and other land records, have been used for fraudulent transfers of Pahari lands to others. 
Bangalee settlers have often made forged land settlement documents and used these to justify 
fraudulent claims on Pahari lands. Ongsha, 48 years in Bandarban said:  
 
“Bangalee people at first take shelter in Pahari lands and afterwards capture 
the land. We are naive in believing the tricks of the Bangalee people. People 
previously were less educated and could not understand the price of the lands 
so sold lands at a nominal price. Sometime they had written 20 acres of land in 
the deed in place of 2 acres taking advantage of our illiteracy.”  
 
Here, I will refer to the case of Thoi Khyang of Rangamati, which reflects that when 
individual interest rises there is rupture in community interests, and leads to land grabbing by 
one Khyang from another (see page 41-42). 
 
Land grabbing by commercial agencies 
 
In the early 1990s, the government began issuing private leases for commercial rubber and 
horticulture plantations on a large-scale during the counter insurgency. This process has also 
dispossessed the Khyang from the land where they have practiced Jhum for years. 
 
One afternoon I was walking in the hilly areas I saw some small hills enclosed with fences 
and I asked one of the persons (Thoi Khyang) with whom I was with what this was. He said 
that the enclosed areas are privately leased land. When I asked why the lands were not being 
used for any purposes my informant replied that people have taken lease and they will do 
something may be in the future. He further said these are land where the Khyangs were doing 
Jhum when they first arrived in the area.  
 
The areas leased out were mostly taken from the common lands of the indigenous peoples in 
the USF (Unclassed State Forest) areas that they had traditionally used for Jhum cultivation, 
grazing, hunting and gathering, and other purposes. However, their customary rights over 
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these lands were not recognized by the DC office, which treated these as state property (khas) 
and leased the lands to plantation leaseholders. 
 
The beneficiaries of the leases were mostly members of the influential Bangalee elite who did 
not reside in the CHT (Adnan 2004: 127). The whole process amounted to a colossal exercise 
in privatization of land in which vast tracts of Pahari common lands were ‘enclosed’ through 
the use of state power and redistributed to absentee members of privileged classes of the 
majority community. It is important for business people to hold land tittles in the CHT as it 
can grow as a business enterprise or else they can further sub lease the land and profit. The 
lands, which are leased out mostly remain unused, as most of the leaseholders are outsider 
mainly influential Bangalee people, who do not have knowledge of or interest in rubber 
plantations. They have taken lease just to grab the public land with a speculation that in 
future it will be very valuable/ profitable and it was instrumental to borrow money from bank 
with low interest rate in the name of rubber plantation (Rasul and Thapa 2005: 10). 
 
Even though the CHT Accord specified that the leases of plots that had remained unutilized 
for more than ten years were to be cancelled, I have observed that this clause was not 
implemented (as I have mentioned above). Instead, DC offices in the CHT continued to issue 
new plantation leases during the post-Accord period. This process enabled many Bangalee 
civil and military officials, as well as political leaders and professionals, to obtain plantation 
leases for themselves and their relatives and clients (Adnan and Dastidar 2011: 77). 
 
Like the Bangalee settlers, many of the Bangalee plantation leaseholders attempted to take 
over adjoining Pahari lands to expand the area under their control, something which is 
indicative of a process of incremental land grabbing (Adnan and Dastidar 2011: 81). During 
my fieldwork in Bandarban, I also observed the incremental land grabbing by brickfield 
owners. The brickfield was built near the village and agricultural fields. Because of the fumes 
and heat nearby fields were affected in terms of fertility and yield. Thus, the owners of the 
adjoining lands were gradually forced to sell the lands to the brickfield owners. Probhat, 58 
years, was once showing me the brickfield and said: 
 
“A brickfield should not get permission to operate so near to the forests and 
human settlement. However, look, it is just 250 yards from my home. It affects 
the agricultural fields and us. And the brick field is getting bigger each year.” 
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When I asked how is the brickfield becoming bigger? He replied, “as the 
agricultural fields loosing fertility there is no point holding the land, so people 
tend to sell and move away. I would have also moved away. I do not have any 
other place to live so I am bound to live here.” 
 
Distress sell of land 
 
‘Distress’ or constrained sale of land by ethnic minority communities and the Khyang 
constitutes another factor in the various trajectories leading to sale of land and minority 
groups’ situation of dispossession. I found that a critical factor pressurizing the ethnic groups 
to sell their lands has been the gradual encirclement of their homesteads and cultivable plots 
by Bangalee settlers moving in and getting hold of the lands in the surrounding area. One of 
my informants (Ongsha, 48 years from Bandarban) said that:  
 
“My father had sold land for very negligible prices to the Bangalee people. He 
could not realize that the price of land will increase this much. Bangalee 
people are more intelligent than us and could anticipate that land prices will 
continue increase.”  
 
This continues to be a significant factor resulting in their land loss in current times. This trend 
has been seen in both Rangamati and Bandarban. Indebtedness is another reason for distress 
sell of land by the Khyangs (see page 72-73 and 86).  
 
Litigation and land loss 
 
Litigation is an instrument widely used for harassing and pressurizing Paharis until they let 
go of their lands. Bangalee settlers and commercial agencies have typically lodged false cases 
against Paharis in order to compel them to sell their lands (Adnan and Dastidar 2011: 99). 
Correspondingly, litigation has been widely used by the Forest Department to put pressure on 
Paharis, with the aim of compelling them to surrender their lands for afforestation projects. 
Furthermore, litigation has also been used by land grabbers to legitimize illegal land gains 
(Adnan and Dastidar 2011: 99). During my fieldwork, I also found that the threat of litigation 
has been used by the Karbaris to gather more land that is owned individually. Ongsha (48 
years) of Bandarban said that he has some lands, which are not distributed among the heirs 
(parental land), and the lands are sometimes given/ leased to share croppers and sometimes 
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cultivated by their cousins. As there are many cousins and heirs who have not yet distributed 
the lands among themselves, I asked him how they all get their share. He responded that it is 
mostly taken by the people who cultivates and sometime he gets a share of 1 or 2 acre of 
lands. One of his paternal cousins is also the Karbari of the cluster of households and 
controls all the land. My informant also said one could not do anything against a person who 
is economically powerful and more connected with the administration.  
 
“The Karbari (my paternal cousin) of the village did not give me the share of 
our common land which was inherited from my grandfather. However, I 
cannot do anything about it. If I try to get my share, the powerful Karbari can 
make a false case against me.” He said, “even if the Karbari do not file a case 
himself he might use his influence on others to file a case claiming my lands. 
To run a case in the court cost a lot of money and I do not want to get into 
trouble.” (Ongsha, 48 years, from Bandarban).     
 
He further expressed his frustration, as “I cannot do anything because he can get me arrested 
by police in one hour and if I am to file a case against him it could take me one week at least 
only to meet the concerned officials.”  
 
Corruption of Headman land loss 
 
Growing instances of self-interest and corruption among Headmen and Karbaris is also a 
factor contributing to the dispossession of Pahari lands. Some Headmen and Karbaris have 
used their traditional roles as custodians of the land rights of the ethnic minority groups and 
made private settlements (or leases) on common lands that they had previously shared with 
the rest of their communities. In other instances, Headmen are reported to have taken bribes 
for giving their recommendations for transfer of the common lands of their communities to 
Bangalees from outside. During my fieldwork I saw newly built houses by the Bangalees and 
in a discussion with such an owner it became clear that they got the lease with permission 
from the Headman of the area. I was also told that if I want to build a leisure house in the 
hills I could also get some lands on lease if I am willing to spend some money. My 
experience in Bandarban indicates that some Headmen and Karbaris are operating as land 
dealers/ traders who buy cheap from ordinary Paharis and resell at a profit to outsiders (Roy 
2004: 14; Adnan 2004: 89).  
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On the basis of my ethnographic fieldwork in the CHT, it became evident that the economic 
and socio-political power of the Bangalee people and also the Pahari leaders work against 
the Khyang people and create dispossession from land. It seems like there are two broad 
processes going on simultaneously here; the first process involves the loss of land rights by 
the ethnic groups to outside agencies and interest groups, while the other involves transfer of 
land rights among members of the ethnic groups (in this case the Khyang).  
 
On the basis of the above discussion, I argue that both inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic land 
grabbing is going on among the Khyang. I found unfavorable government policies for the 
ethnic groups and growing capitalist interests and privatization as the major factors initiating 
land loss of the Khyangs. 
 
EXPANDING STATE AND MARGINALIZATION OF THE KHYANG 
 
Marginalization through indebtedness  
 
In relation to my discussion in chapter two that the Khyang often face economic loss due to 
monopolization of the distribution of agricultural products by the Bangalees, here I will 
discuss how this process is leading to marginalization of the Khyang through indebtedness 
and land loss. 
  
Once they face economic loss (as I have discussed in chapter two) the Khyang fall in a spiral 
downward, either they are forced to sell land or to take loan at high interest rates, sometimes 
they loan in condition of advance selling of their produce (the price of advance sell is much 
lower than the actual price). This is also linked with the gradual dispossession of land of the 
Khyang. Mongchin in Bandarban said once they face economic loss, to recover the cost of 
the production of cash crops sometimes they are forced to mortgage or sell lands (see also 
page 85-86).   
 
Murray Li (2009: 72) states that in rural India, among small-scale farmers, dispossession by 
debt has intensified. Farmers who had been encouraged to buy productivity-increasing inputs 
on credit faced ruin when state subsidies were abruptly removed. However, in CHT, the 
people are encouraged by the government and NGOs to produce cash crops, but, due to lack 
of proper marketing plan, the Khyang and other ethnic minorities are facing economic loss.  
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Therefore, the Khyang remain depended on middlemen for trade and moneylenders for 
economic needs during production (sometimes middlemen also act as a moneylenders). I 
have observed that the need of cash has also introduced some NGO driven micro credit 
programs. However, at individual level also few people act as micro credit operators. To 
minimize the dependency of the farmers on the money lenders, the government has adopted 
many initiatives including establishing a bank for the agriculturists, which offer loans at a 
nominal rate of interest. Nevertheless, respondents have mentioned that some officials of the 
loan granting agencies indulge in corrupt practices, which further, discourage the Khyang and 
other minority groups members from taking such loans and builds hatred towards such 
officials.  
 
Probhat, 58 years in Bandarban said:  
 
“If you do not have connections to powerful people, there is no way one can 
get a loan of 2000-5000 BDT (25-60 USD) without giving bribe. You either 
pay cash or give vegetables, poultry or some fruits. Even after that we face bad 
behavior and also we have wait hours to meet them.”  
 
On the same issue of credit facilities Ridima, 50 years in Rangamati said:  
 
“We do not want any credit from anywhere even if we have to eat one meal a 
day. I do not want credit and consequently lose my house. Moneylenders give a 
small amount of money and eventually take everything that one has. I have less 
and I am happy with that. I do not want to lose everything I have.”  
 
She said this because she has seen that due to not being able to pay loans on time the private 
moneylenders and NGOs even take away utensils of the households. 
 
Political representation and citizenship 
 
For the development of ethnic minority group the establishment of Chittagong Hill Tracts 
Regional Council (Act of 1998) by the government has created a systemic bias against the 
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Khyang and other smaller groups. The council has to have 12 tribal members elected but the 
formation is proposed as: 
 
a) Five shall be elected from Chakma tribe 
b) Three shall be elected from Marma tribe. 
c) Two shall be elected from Tripura tribe. 
d) One shall be elected from the Mro and Tanchangya tribe. 
e) One shall be elected from Lushai, Bawm, Pangkhua, Khumi, Chak and Khyang tribe. 
 
As we see from the above, the Khyang and other smaller groups are in a disadvantages 
position of representation in order to voice their rights and opinion about development. The 
situation is comparative to Ong’s (2000: 58) analysis in Malaysia and Indonesia of what she 
terms ‘graduated sovereignty’ which refers to the differential treatment of populations by the 
government inserting different groups of people (Khyang and other minority groups) 
differently into the process of development. The Hill District Council is responsible for 
overall supervision and coordination of all development activities CHT; therefore, the smaller 
groups such as the Khyang without any political representation at the council cannot even 
express their worries and wishes. Thoi, 52 years of Rangamati said, “as we have none of our 
people at the council nobody thinks about the problem we are facing to make a living.” 
Another respondent Probhat, 58 years from Bandarban said, “the government would have 
done things to help us but how would they do. They do not know about the problems. It is 
problem of us that we cannot inform them what we need.” 
 
Ong (2000: 58) explains that since Malaysia’s independence from Great Britain in 1957, the 
country has favored the political rights of the Malays on grounds of their status as an 
‘indigenous’ majority population and on their general economic backwardness when 
compared with the ethnic Chinese and Indians who were descended from immigrant 
populations. From the 1970s onward, a system of graduated sovereignty has come into effect 
as the government has put more investment in the bio-political improvement of the Malays, 
through awarding rights and benefits largely denied to the Chinese and Indian minorities. 
This has been done through awarding the Malays shares in government owned trusts, 
government contracts, business credits, scholarships, business licenses, university admissions, 
civil employments, and jobs in large firms. Ong (2000: 59) states that this was the world’s 
first affirmative action system tied exclusively to ethnicity, which is a system of ethnic-based 
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governmentality that has come to racialize class formation and naturalize racial differences in 
Malaysia. 
 
I find that after the independence of Bangladesh nationalism has been established based on 
the majority Bangla language, Islam – religion of the majority, followed by a mass transfer of 
Bangalee people in the CHT along with development initiatives based on settled agriculture 
and private ownership of land. Thus, I see Bangladesh as a comparative case to Malaysia in 
terms of government policies creating graduated sovereignty (c.f. Ong 2000). The favoritism 
towards the ethnic majority groups has marginalized the Khyang and other ethnic minorities 
of the CHT disregarding their problems regarding land dispossession as I have described in 
this chapter. After the government took initiatives to empower the ethnic minorities through 
HDC it has proven again marginalizing for the smaller communities like the Khyang.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Rosaldo (2003: 1) mentions that the nation building project try to build metropolitan centers 
and include minority groups in the process driven by ideas of development, modernity, 
assimilation and nationalism. Such notions marginalize hinterland ethnic groups and demand 
that they transform themselves into citizen (Rosaldo 2003: 1). In other words, the process 
demands that such ethnic groups stop being who they are and assimilate with the national 
community.  If the situation of the Khyang and CHT is looked upon with a similar analytical 
perspective it becomes clear that the initiatives of the governing authority to include CHT in 
the state, or making it into state space, has forced the Khyang into a situation where they 
cannot practice the way of life that they had before. As I have discussed in this chapter that 
with the changes in administration of land and forests in the CHT the Khyang are subjected to 
land loss. The government, powerful Bangalees and Khyangs and also business agencies did 
this land seizure. 
 
Southeast Asia enjoys a high degree of linguistic and ethnic diversity, regional and religious 
heterogeneity, and distinct colonial history (Rosaldo 2003: 2). The new nations have 
undergone a daunting process of transforming colonial subjects into citizens of the nation-
states and they have struggled to define citizenship and elicit nationalist sentiments from 
hinterland populations (Rosaldo 2003: 2). Struggles over electoral politics, national language, 
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religious inclusion, educational access, and codification of national law are the topics of 
negotiation over citizenship (Rosaldo 2003: 2). Rosaldo cites examples of the indigenous 
Penan in Malaysia where the government officials hope to convert the Penan from what they 
see as their present state of savagery into citizens of the national community like themselves 
in the name of modernization and national development. In the case of forested Penan lands, 
development is presented as necessary national good; the government profits from its taxation 
of logging and other such enterprises. They find the Penan system of land tenure 
indecipherable and view Penan existence as hand to mouth, abject poverty and a generally 
miserable way of life. However, Rosaldo (2003: 9) claims the official language of 
inclusiveness, citizenship and equality, which is precisely what is oppressive for the Penan, 
who is thereby diminished as rational beings and as a moral community. Thus, official 
citizenship is at odds with ‘cultural citizenships’13, or with Penan perceptions of how they 
should be treated were they to become full members of the national community. The Khyang 
in the CHT has been experiencing a similar nation building process. They are losing their 
means of production, their way of life is being marginalized (as discussed above) and they are 
forced into becoming citizens of Bangladesh at the cost of their cultural citizenship. The 
changes in economic frontiers (see chapter two) have led the Khyang into a situation of direct 
competition with the Bangalees and the state policies also marginalized the Khyang even 
though those were supposed to develop the CHT and its people. 
 
In line with Rosaldo’s (2003) argument, I hold that in Bangladesh the relations between state 
officials and marginalized hinterland minority groups involve differences of power and 
differences of perception by each group of the other. The Khyangs have accepted being 
minority and believe that those who have power and money can do the things according to 
their wish. The Khyangs further believe that the kind of behavior they get from government 
officials and powerful people is because the powerful people is certain about the fact that 
powerless people will not be able to resist it.  
 
                                                          
13
 Rosaldo (2003: 3) defines cultural citizenship as, in Latino contexts the term calls attention to the range of 
claims that’s citizens (especially groups subordinated by race, gender and class) make against the state. Such 
claims must be understood from the point of view of the subordinated subjects. Socially and historically 
constructed in relation to local definitions of legitimate entitlements and aspirations, they range from jobs, 
wages, houses, and schooling to respects, wellbeing, and dignity as defined and understood by the subjects in 
question. 
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The process of acquiring Jhum land and forcing people to do settled cultivation has occurred 
because of Bangladeshi government, as the British colony and Pakistani government has an 
interest in expanding the state space and create a larger fiscal/ taxable population and in this 
way exercise better control over the population. As Scott (2009: 40f) argues, modern states 
aim to devise an ideal ‘state space’, that is to say a space of appropriation, therefore,  wet rice, 
along with other major grains, has been  the foundation of early state – making. Wet rice 
cultivation was the choice for the state makers because it has reliable and maximum yield 
compared to other mode of cultivations. In a similar way, construction of transportation 
network/ infrastructure facilitated the Governments’ relocation of its population from the 
plains to the CHT. As I have shown in this chapter, transmigration programs and mass 
moving of Bangalee people have made it hard for the minority groups to maintain their 
access to lands on which they practice Jhum and lived for years (see also chapter two). 
 
Ong (2006: 499) states that the ever-shifting landscape of rights and entitlements associated 
with citizenship (on a global level) has been shaped by the flows of markets, technologies and 
populations. This changes challenge the notion of citizenship tied to the terrain and 
imagination of a nation state. She claims the difference between having and not having 
citizenship is becoming blurred as the territorialization of entitlements is increasingly 
challenged by deterritorialized claims beyond the state. Ong argues (2006: 500) that on a 
global level universal market interests, technologies and NGOs become articulated with 
citizenship and make new claims for resources from state and non-state institutions. In the 
case of Bangladesh and CHT, I have, in this chapter illustrated that rights and entitlements of 
the Khyang have shifted as the administrative system changes and as the influx of Bangalee 
people increased. The Khyang are dispossessed from land access through government seizure, 
powerful individuals among the Khyang and Bangalees, and commercial agencies. The 
Khyang are being marginalized in the market places and through debt and distress sell of 
lands. Thus, an unique social, economic and political scenario is created in relation to the 
ethnic minority communities and CHT; resulting in dispossession and creating a condition 
where certain people (the Khyang) can no longer sustain their livelihoods through direct 
access to the means of production, or access to a living wage (c.f. Murray Li 2009: 77; Hall, 
Hirsch and Murray Li 2011: 4). Murray Li (2009: 67) claims, in large parts of rural Asia, 
these conditions of dispossession from means of production or access to living wage have 
become widespread as a result of two sets of forces: what she terms as a ‘new round of 
enclosures’ that have dispossessed large numbers of rural people from the land; and the low 
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absorption of their labor in alternative occupations. I hold that a similar situation is seen in 
CHT today where the state has been seizing land, closing the forest frontier for conservation 
and, Bangalee population has been migrating to the CHT. Further, the ethnic minority 
farmers find it hard to make profit when exposed to competition from the Bangalee 
merchants. Further, as the Khyang are not informed about the possibilities of work in forestry 
projects and are also negligent about this opportunities because of losing their means of 
production as I have discussed in this chapter (see page 65-66), they are not also incorporated 
in the alternative occupations either (see page 31). This situation in CHT indicates a process 
where the government and their policies have selected Bangalee sub set of the population for 
life enhancement while others ethnic groups as the Khyang experience to be encroached upon, 
coerced or excluded from the Bangladesh nation, and their access to resources and livelihood 
options. Consequently, through these new relationships with state and other associated factors 
the Khyangs are being marginalized (c.f. Murray Li 1999: 2; c.f. Ong 2000: 58).  
 
I argue that Bangladesh state’s prioritization of Bangalee nationalism based on Bangla 
language, declaration of Islam as the state religion and standards imposed for developments 
have marginalized the Khyang and other ethnic minorities in CHT. The process of 
‘majoritising’ the Bangalee population simultaneously ‘minoritises’ and marginalizes other 
ethnic groups of CHT, which can be termed as ‘politics of identity’ (c.f. 2009: 243). Scott 
(2009: 244) argues ethnic identities in the hills of Zomia are crafted and designed politically 
to position a group vis-à-vis others in competition for power and resources. The 
marginalization of the ‘hill people’ in the CHT is continued following the colonial rule in 
CHT and it is an ongoing process between the ‘powerful’ and ‘powerless’. Murray Li (1999: 
2ff) terms this as social construction of marginality through which particular spaces become 
subject to simplified, stereotyped and contrastive descriptions according to defined criteria at 
the center. She argues based on her ethnography in uplands of Indonesia where with the locus 
of power shifting towards Islam, many of the cultural standards of the uplands (such as 
production system and forest dependence) were judged distinct and deficient (Murray Li 
1999: 4ff).      
 
In CHT, there is another dimension of marginalization where few members of the groups 
become more integrated with the state and state power and dominate other Khyangs 
economically and politically which marginalized the Khyang as an ethnic group (see page 70-
71). The process of assimilation through socio-economic changes have created its own 
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‘others’ as Kasmir and Carbonella (2008: 14) also point out how dispossession and 
‘production of difference’ works. They cite examples of regularization of London 
dockworkers’ wage payments at the turn of the 19th century where instead of regular 
monetary wages, dockworkers received their chief remuneration in ‘chips’ along with the 
‘takings’ from other workplaces and trades along the Thames river – coal, silk, sugar, coffee, 
tea, pins, cloth and tools. Efforts in the 1970s to regularize the money wage followed with 
dual strategy of criminalizing dockworkers customary takings and eliminating the non-
monetary community. Individuals found guilty of illegal appropriation were subject to public 
whipping, imprisonment, deportation and even hanging. I hold that a similar process can be 
observed among the Khyang as the forest regulation has deprived them of the forest resources 
that they would have been using otherwise. They are beaten when they use forest resources 
from the RF and bear legal cases. They are also facing false cases filed by the timber traders 
and corrupt forest officers. The government’s intention of establishing such projects, that is, 
the new opportunity of benefitting from the social forestry skim is unknown to them.  
 
On the basis of my ethnographic findings, I have shown that the Government, powerful 
Bangalees and Khyangs (who are politically and economically connected with the state 
apparatus), and commercial agencies are seizing land access from the Khyangs. As a group 
the Khyangs are deprived of minority quotas in jobs and education (see also chapter two). 
Even the formation of the CHT regional council proves the Khyang’s marginalization where 
they have no representation. Due to these changes social hierarchy developed among the 
Khyang as the society has been centering itself to money and political power. Thus, most of 
the Khyangs are dispossessed from means of livelihoods and marginalized. 
 
CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, I described the historical trajectory of CHT and how the Khyang are being 
dispossessed from their land. The state acquisition and conversion of land and forest coupled 
with government policies of leasing out lands to commercial agencies has deprived the 
Khyang from their customary rights of the forest resources. These processes together with the 
emerging notion of private property among the Khyang have created a pathway for land 
grabbing by one Khyang from the other and by the state as against its people (powerful versus 
the powerless). The Bangladesh state’s strategy to give equal opportunities in terms of 
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representation in the national forum, economic opportunities, opportunities in education to all 
the ethnic groups has not benefited the Khyang (see also chapter two). Such benefits of 
opportunities and quotas in jobs, in education and in market places that are established have 
been monopolized by the larger ethnic communities living in the CHT. In the present 
situation, as I have described on the basis of my ethnographic information, the Khyang are 
marginalized and deprived in the Bangladesh nation state. Yet, some of them are finding their 
own space in the nation state as a citizen of Bangladesh where economic and political power 
helps them.  The following chapter will analyze the ways transition of economic activities 
and being part of the Bangladesh nation state has affected Khyang identity and social 
networks. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SOCIAL NETWORKS AND ETHNIC IDENTITY AMONG THE KHYANG: 
FORMATION AND DIVERSIFICATION  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The connectivity of social networks and the dynamic exchange among members of other 
groups might allow members of the ethnic/ minority groups a multiplication of resources that 
one owns through reciprocating favor, help, support received in difficult times or any 
moment in daily life (Rosas 2001: 42). In this chapter, I discuss the social networks of the 
Khyang and the ways Khyang identity is a restriction on engagement in networks. I will also 
address how Khyang identity is formed in the present socio-economic situation of the CHT 
and the differences between older and younger generation and between various occupational 
groups. Based on the previous chapters, I hold that the Khyang as subjected to the state 
expansion and development projects are being marginalized because of their identity as 
Khyang. In this chapter, I will analyze the ways changing economic frontiers, state expansion 
and marginalization has affected the Khyang identity and social networks.  
 
I have found that the use of Bangla language in most social arenas and the position of the 
Khyang as people of ‘low status’ restrict their access to, and incorporation in, different social 
networks. The social networks of the Khyang arguably define their perception of identity and 
a persons’ position in the wider context of CHT (occupationally, politically or educational 
background) creates situational identities (c.f. Eriksen 1992 b). For the Khyang the idea of 
having own language and a common history of establishing villages collectively produce a 
historical consciousness of Khyang identity. The existence of a collective identity among the 
Khyang is comparable to what Malkki (1995: 241) has found among the Hutu refugees in the 
refugee camps and in Kigoma town of Tanzania. The camp refugees perceived their identity 
as collective, whereas the town refugees perceived their identity as shifting. I have found that 
there are variations in collective consciousness and collective identity between different 
groups of Khyang people, especially between younger and older generation and between 
urban and rural dwellers. Therefore, I hold that the Khyang interact beyond ethnic boundaries 
and present themselves differently in different contexts in a multi-ethnic stratified society.  
 
Based on my ethnographic information I will illustrate that there are no fixed identity markers, 
which the Khyang are maintaining to preserve their identity, rather, there are a set of factors 
in action. Social position based on education, political power, economic position and ethnic 
identity as Khyang initiate situational identities (c.f. Eriksen 1992 b). Thus, I will argue that 
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the idea of Khyang identity is fluid (Scott 2009) and their ethnic boundary maintenance is a 
dynamic process (c.f. Barth 1969).  
 
FORMS OF SOCIAL NETWORKS 
 
If social network is understood as the particular set of other persons with whom a person 
recurrently interacts – it is based on that person’s own selection among the opportunities that 
occur.  Barth (1983: 133) states in a social context person with different characteristics, such 
as sex, wealth, religious affiliations produce different opportunities for the persons. Therefore, 
through this the processes that reproduce the forms of social life for the Khyang will be 
identified. 
 
Neighborhoods 
 
A person’s neighborhood provides the first and most accessible set of potential parties to 
relationships. There are distinct differences of neighborhood characteristics between my two 
field sites, that is, Rangamati (more connected to the urban center) and Bandarban (isolated 
and far away from the town). The difference may be because Rangamati is more urbanized 
that Bandarban. The neighborhood in Rangamati is formed with people from different ethnic, 
economic/ professional and educational backgrounds, while the neighborhoods of Bandarban 
are more ethnically homogenous. Thus, the forms of interaction between people of 
Rangamati differ from interactional forms in Bandarban.  
 
In Bandarban, I observed that almost all people visit the small tea-stalls during the evening 
and talk while in Rangamati such gatherings are formed based on the economic position of 
the participants. Women also participate at such gathering but the number of women is far 
less than the men and women participate mostly when there are fewer numbers of people 
(men) are involved. However, women establish a small set of reciprocal or unilateral visiting 
relationships; they visit each other at a daily basis and even go together to fetch drinking 
water. The number of partners in groups varies from a pair up to eight (sometimes they have 
their young children with them). Women’s relationships are based on close proximity of 
home, so they are less diverse than that of the men. This is comparable to what Barth (1983: 
142) finds characterize networks of women in Sohar town. 
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Religious and community networks 
 
Among the Khyang of Rangamati, the church based religious network is stronger than the 
Khyang community network itself, while in Bandarban the community network with fellow 
Khyang is strong. This became evident through the Khyang association for supporting fellow 
members in times of economic hardship, for example: if someone wants to sell land, the 
association buys it so that none from the outside could get their community lands. It is 
important for the Khyang community to keep their lands something, which is related to their 
production of Khyang identity. There are many Bangalee people living in the surrounding 
areas who have bought many lands form the Khyang so now they want to keep their lands 
within the Khyangs (see chapter three). In Rangamati, the Khyang take part in the regular 
prayer meetings where they take part as a Christian and not as a Khyang. Bir Khyang, 45 
years, in Rangamati said, “I feel more Christian more than I feel myself a Khyang.” He 
further said, “when I was in Sylhet (district) for my studies I saw my Hindu and Muslim class 
mates to take part in their religious activities regularly, so gradually I also started to go to 
Church.” 
 
Occupational networks 
 
The Khyang are also involved in occupational and professional networks, which are mostly 
hierarchical in arrangement, that is, in those networks Khyang act along the hierarchical 
position they hold in the relationships. Further, among the youth who are studying and 
engaged in pursuits beyond the immediate locality I found a more diverse association with 
networks. These processes affect how the Khyang think of their community (individuality vs 
collectivity). These networks will be discussed in detail in the later parts of the chapter.    
 
Political networks 
 
The Khyang of the Rangamati are more infused with the people of other communities (see 
chapter one) and are more politically active than the Khyang of Bandarban. One of the 
elected members of the local government is from the Khyang community of Rangamati. It is 
important and beneficial for the Khyang because whenever there are some government help 
(there are some regular allowance and some occasional) to be distributed such as old age 
allowance, destitute women allowance, Vulnerable Group Development (VGD), vulnerable 
Group Feeding (VGF), etc., it is on discretion of the members of the respective wards to 
prepare a list who will get the benefit from the development program. Ushoichin (35 years) of 
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Rangamati told me that “for the last two and half years, since we have got an elected member 
from their community in the Union Parishad, most of the insolvent Khyang get benefit from 
the program who did not get this before.” This is important because the population of the area 
who need help and are also eligible for receiving such allowance is too large than to be 
covered by the allocation that comes. I was present during one such distribution and I 
observed that many people were asking for a receipt from the members of the Union Parishad 
and one of the members (who is also a Khyang) said, “I have got an allocation for 100 
households but there are 500 households who are in need of this support.”  In my view, this 
situation shows that the connectivity of social networks (and dynamic exchange among its 
members and with members of other social groups might) allow a multiplication of resources 
people can/may access (c.f. Rosas 2001). This is in line with Hansen and Stepputat (2006: 
306) who argue that fragmented systems of authority are found all over the postcolonial 
world where local strongmen occupy strategic positions between state institutions and the 
population, where proper land titling never has been undertaken and where access to 
entitlements is contingent on having a well-connected patron who can channel claims and 
applications.  
 
In the next section, I will explain the factors that put barriers for the Khyangs’ connectedness 
in networks of people from different ethnic groups. 
 
INTERCONNECTEDNESS AND CONTESTATION OF DIFFERENT NETWORKS 
 
There are some things that the Khyang perceive as hindrances for building their social 
networks: the hegemony of the Bangla language and the general position of the Khyang as a 
minority ethnic group in the CHT and Bangladesh. 
 
Language as a mode of domination 
 
Language occupies a central position in the construction of nationhood of the Bangalees (see 
page 55). Bangla is used in the official correspondence within the state (Mohsin 1997: 61). 
There is no state policy for the protection or promotion of other languages within the state as 
45 ethnic groups in Bangladesh form linguistic minorities in the country, speaking more than 
30 different languages (Rahman 2010: 341). On the other hand, the Khyang and other ethnic 
minority people I met during fieldwork alleged that as the official language being Bangla 
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they face tremendous problems in the courts for example where they often have to attend land 
settlement disputes. These difficulties discourage them from taking resort to legal measures 
as well.   
 
Language is also responsible in two major ways for the economic marginalization of the 
Khyang and other minority groups of the CHT. These are the inability to understand or 
communicate in Bangla language and the refusal of the state to understand or accommodate 
the economic modes associated with the traditional ways of the Khyang (discussed in chapter 
three). In many cases, they have lost their land to Bangalee moneylenders. Ongmui, 57 years, 
in Bandarban mentioned that: 
 
“During the lean seasons many people (Khyangs) borrow money from the 
Bangalees. Their inability to communicate in Bangla make them put their 
thumb stamps on documents that in many instances charge exorbitant interest 
rates. Which have led to loosing land of the Khyangs.”   
 
This is in line with what Murray Li (2009: 73) writes about land dispossession of small 
holders in India and China where people are dispossessed through large-scale enclosures for 
agricultural expansion and conservation and the piecemeal dispossession of farmers through 
indebtedness. 
 
The Khyang experience that their own language is neglected, and that this constrains them 
from making wider connections. The state has set up some tribal institutes at the district 
levels but these are catered towards the promotion of the CHT as a tourist area. All their 
publications are in the Bangla language. No serious attempts have been made by these 
institutes to promote the local languages and cultures; rather the presentation of the culture of 
the Khyang and other ethnic minority groups as a static entity is a distortion of the local 
culture(s). Moreover, the electronic media, radio and television, all have their programs in 
Bangla language. At times programs on the different ‘ethnic minority groups’ of Bangladesh 
are telecasted on the television. However, the programs are presented in the Bangla language, 
only the songs are performed in the local language. Ongsha, 48 years, from Bandarban 
shared his concern regarding this issue and told me that the Khyangs and people of other 
ethnic groups living in the surrounding areas view the programs as telecasted for the 
Bangalees and those do not reflect their culture. Further, I have also observed that the road 
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markers, nameplates, signboards, car plate numbers are all written in Bangla. The moment a 
foreigner enters Bangladesh, she/he would take it as a land of Bangla speaking people only, 
whereas officially 12 ethnic groups including the Bangalee people live in the CHT with their 
own languages and cultures.  
 
The more the Khyang interact with speakers of other languages, especially Bangla, the more 
their own spoken language is eroding. They believe speaking Bangla on a daily basis has 
been a threat to their language, as it has no written scripture. The Khyangs I met identified 
two main reasons for their loss of language; first, in the primary school level there is no 
provision for learning Khyang language. However, for the education of the ethnic minority 
groups the government has taken initiatives to build and run schools and colleges in the area, 
however, the medium of instruction is in Bangla so the minority groups are in not an equal 
level to continue with the Bangalee students. Even there have been no official government 
attempts to give instructions to the ethnic minorities in their own languages even at the 
primary levels (Mohsin 2010: 161). Studying in Bangla and the everyday use because of 
interaction with the Bangalee people is regarded by the Khyang as a reason for the loss of 
their language, which do not have any written script. In this regard, Thoi Khyang, 52 years, of 
Rangamati said that Khyang children find it difficult to compete with the students whose 
mother tongue is Bangla and the dropout rate among students of Khyang is very high. One of 
the reasons of drop out is financial hardship and another is that Khyang children do not find it 
worthy to go to schools or colleges. Sometimes they also feel inferior in schools, and so they 
become motivated not to go to schools. During in-depth personal interviews of young 
students, I found that they had suffered from inferiority complex during their childhood 
because of their different pronunciation and accent of Bangla. They were teased by their 
fellow students so they were shy to speak out in class. They all felt that they could have done 
much better if they had their primary education in their mother tongue.   
 
The second reason often mentioned as a cause for the loss of Khyang language is inter-
marriages, especially in cases when women are from other communities children get used to 
language, which is usually Bangla, or their mother’s language. Dr. Bir Khyang is a medical 
doctor who has passed MBBS from Sylhet Medical College and works as a medical 
practitioner at a Christian Hospital. He has married a Marma woman who herself is a medical 
doctor and works at a Health Complex of sub-district level in Rangamati district. They have 
two sons, five and three years old respectively.  Bir Khyang said that his children do not 
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speak Khyang language and as from childhood, he himself could not practice the Khyang 
language. Though he regards himself as a Khyang and opined that Khyang language is a 
unique trait of them, he could not practice the language during the time of studies (when he 
was away from home) and in his daily activities he cannot use Khyang as he interacts with 
Bangla speaking people. 
 
Starks et al. (2005) discuss the issue of language and ethnic identity in the Pasifika 
communities in Auckland, New Zealand’s largest urban center. This region has the highest 
percentage of Pasifika peoples in New Zealand. The Pasifika label covers a wide range of 
disparate Polynesian communities in the Pacific. The four largest communities in Auckland 
are the Samoan, Cook Islands, Tongan and Niuean groups. All are relatively recent migrants 
with the majority of migration between 1960-1970. They examine the relationship between 
their self-evaluation of their household identity and their language maintenance. The 
quantitative and qualitative findings show that all four Pasifika communities are undergoing 
shift in identity perhaps due to their new and changing environment in New Zealand. They 
claim though in the context of New Zealand these communities are not using their own 
language extensively, it is one of the most important factors to these communities in regard to 
their identities (Starks et al. 2005: 2195). On the basis of my fieldwork I argue that though 
the Khyang language is not used in the daily activities (work places) and though many do not 
even speak the language, the notion of the language is central to the their Khyang identity. 
Most of Khyang have responded that their language is one of the most significant identity 
markers.  
 
In a similar situation Scott (2009: 240) argues that in the area of ‘Zomia’, not all the Miao 
people speak a unique language. They speak three major languages, and within each of those 
languages there are dialects that are mutually unintelligible. Though at the micro level of an 
individual village, the same language could be found, there is difference among the same 
ethnic groups living at different places. A major reason of differences among the same ethnic 
group as identified by Scott (2009: 241) is that hill groups absorbed whomever they could. 
The absorptive capacity (for example through marriages as in the case of Khyang) led to great 
cultural diversity within hill societies. This intermingling has led to the lesser use of Khyang 
language. Further, the Khyang have also adopted irrigated padi cultivation, the other non-
agricultural jobs (see chapter two) and the language of the padi core, that is, Bangla.   
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In the face of decaying Khyang language, few of the Khyang have taken initiatives to compile 
and create a Khyang dictionary with the funding of United Nations Development Programme. 
For this task, Khyang of different areas met several times to compile Khyang words. However, 
this has created another problem regarding the alphabet of the language, as some of the 
Khyang proposed to use Roman alphabets while others demand to use Alphabets, which 
previously were used by the traditional healers (mostly Alphabets of Burmese language). 
Those who want to use the Burmese alphabets regard Roman alphabets as the language of 
Christians. The opportunity of compiling Khyang words has thus widened the divide between 
Christian and Buddhists Khyang.  
 
Ethnic identity as mode of domination  
 
In the CHT the Khyang as an ethnic group are treated as having lower social status than the 
Bangalee people have. The Bangalee people living in the surrounding areas make it visible 
through some spectral violence (c.f. Hansen and Stepputat 2005) which can be described as 
miniature exercise of sovereign power of the Bangladesh state. 
 
Ongtha, 52 years, in Bandarban told me that in 2004 he was beaten by some neighboring 
Bangalee people during their celebration of New Year at an event where young boys and 
girls spill water on each other. However, as the program is arranged in the village people 
from the neighboring areas also go to see the events. In such an event, one Bangalee boy got 
wet which initiated a fight between the Bangalee and Khyang boys. Eventually, Ongtha as 
the head of the event organizer was beaten by the Bangalees and sent to hospital. A police 
case was filed on this issue but he said that but the police did not do anything more than a 
mere investigation.    
 
Ongtha said: 
 
“If I mix with the Khyang during 80 percent of my activities I have to mix with 
the Bangalees in 85 percent of my daily activities. I even invite them in all the 
social programs we arrange. However, I do not know why I was beaten like 
this. As I was born a Khyang, I have to face such incidences. ” 
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This event indicates that in the CHT where Bangalee are the majority it is believed Bangalees 
as the majority has the right over lands and control over social situations of the localities. 
This event was a spectral exhibition and enforcement of the power they assume and the event 
can in line with Hansen and Stepputat (2005: 3) be seen as sovereign power always seeking 
to project itself as given, stable and natural. Sovereign power is established through 
performances within nations, and through construction and maintenance of localized 
sovereign power through exercise of actual and or ‘spectral’ violence. Hansen and Stepputat 
(2005) further states that the sovereignty of the state is an inspiration that seeks to create itself 
in the face of internally fragmented, unevenly distributed and unpredictable configurations of 
political authority that exercise more or less legitimate violence in a territory. Thus, rather 
than the Indians becoming citizens of the new nation-states in Latin America, they were often 
reduced to subjects of indirect government by local strongmen, landowners and other who 
took up local government offices (Hansen and Stepputat 2005: 22). 
 
However, some of the Khyangs have overcome the marginalized position of the Khyang as a 
group and hold position of higher status in their interaction with other people, which is 
basically contingent upon political, economic/ professional or educational background of the 
persons involved. Thoi Khyang (52 years), for example, who runs a medical center in 
Rangamati and provide maternal and general health services, said that his customers are 
mostly Muslim Bangalee as the medical center is located in an area populated mostly by 
Muslims. He further said he does not face any sort of rude behavior or discrimination during 
his interaction with people from other ethnic backgrounds in providing health services to his 
customers. The reason for which, he believes, they get so many customers is the lack of 
enough medical facilities at the locality. Because of the demand and providing good and 
quality care has provided them the status of dependable persons in times of medical/ health 
needs. Here, I have observed that in case of other Khyang, the identity being a Khyang 
remain prominent however, in this case it is evident that Thoi Khyang has presented an image 
of himself as a medical practitioner, which the local people have accepted. Thus, he acts 
accordingly and in line with Jenkins’s (2008: 93) argument of that individuals negotiate their 
identities within the interaction order and presents an image of themselves (of self) for 
acceptance by others, which sometimes could override collective identifications.  Here the 
position of medical doctor (which is a position of high status in Bangladesh) of Thoi Khyang 
get the prominence and though the Khyang group as a whole is somewhat of low status in the 
locality he gets the superior position because of his profession. 
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IDENTITY FORMATION: DIVERSIFICATION IN SELF AND PUBLIC IMAGE 
 
To explore how the Khyang interact and how their identity is produced I have started by 
mapping out what Adrian Mayer (1966) has called action-sets
14
, that is the ego-centered first-
order linkages, to use the terminology of network theory (Eriksen 1992 a). The purpose was 
finding out who does what with whom and for which purposes. However, this was not an 
exhaustive exploration considering the shear hugeness of the entire network. Therefore, 
purposive selection was made in locating persons, or key informants covering a wide range 
regarding profession and age (there is an apparent male bias because of the Khyang being a 
patriarchal society). I will present four cases below to explain how identity and social 
networks work among the Khyang. 
 
Thoi Khyang is a middle-aged Christian man living at Rangamati. He lives in a house built on 
a land leased by the Christian Hospital with his wife and two daughters. He works as an 
administrative officer at CHC. His oldest daughter is a dental medical student and lives in 
another district while his youngest daughter studies at higher secondary level in a nearby 
college. His wife (ethnically Bangalee) is a staff nurse in government hospital and they both 
run a medical center. His action-set has five main components, excluding his nuclear family: 
kin, affine, neighbors, colleagues and patients/ customers. His kin, notably his siblings, live 
in the other areas of Rangamati; his affine live in different parts of the country and in the 
capital city. Thoi Khyang and his family visit both categories at special occasions. His closest 
neighbors are mostly Khyang and Bangalee Christian and Hindu. He participates in the 
Baptist prayer meetings on a regular basis. He and his wife’s colleagues include Muslims, 
Christian, Hindu, other ethnic minority groups and also the Khyang. He frequently engages in 
lively discussions at work concerning the state of the country, public events, or the situation 
at work. In the medical center where they provide maternal and general health services, their 
customers are mostly Muslim Bangalee as the medical center is located in an area populated 
mostly by Muslims. 
                                                          
14
 Action set is a series of links within a personal network which describes ego’s communication for a specific 
purposes (for example, political influence) for a short period of time. In Mayer’s (1966) view a certain number 
of linkages which exist in a total network in a community may be mobilized for a specific and limited purpose. 
The mobilization must involve some transaction between the persons (who are involved) of the action set. The 
transactional element distinguishes action set linkage from network linkage (Mayer 1966: 122; c.f. Mitchell 
1969).  
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A very different type of action-set is that of Shipon (32 years), who lives very close to Thoi 
Khyang, and works as an elected member of the local government (Union Parishad). He also 
owns a small shop, which becomes a meeting place for the young people in the evening. He 
is married but still childless, and has a different range of linkages than Thoi. Apart from his 
kin and affine, to whom he has certain strong obligations, his action-set includes friends 
scattered all over the area, as well as colleagues and political associates. He is politically 
active, and his action-set activates a social field of larger scale than Thoi. Because of being a 
member of local government, he is on cordial terms with his non-Christian and non-Khyang 
colleagues and general people of his area. Sometimes, he experiences role-dilemmas. During 
fieldwork, I observed a clash between young people of the area where he lives and the shop 
owners of the nearest market where he tried to appease both sections of the population as he 
has stakes at both end being a Khyang and also being a member of local government. He 
could not decide who to support (shop owners or people from his neighborhood) as at one 
side was people from the Khyang community and the others were his friends and political 
allies. Therefore, he could not make a decision and wanted to remain uninvolved. However, 
he had to talk with both groups so that the fight does not go further.   
 
Ongtha Khyang is a middle-aged man with two wives and six children. He is a plain land 
cultivator in Bandarban. He has land to produce crops to sustain his big family.  Compared to 
others his action set/ network is limited to the agricultural laborers (who work for him), the 
middleman who buys his produce (vegetables and spices) for trade in bigger markets, and his 
neighbors who are mostly Buddhist Khyang and Muslim Bangalee. During almost all his 
interaction his Khyang identity is the imperative, specially while  selling his produce he must 
depend on the middle man because in the bigger whole sale markets his identity as an ethnic 
minority constrain him to purse business with the Bangalee business men as the syndicate of 
the whole sale buyers do not want to buy at a fair price and sometimes ethnic minority people 
have to sell on loss, therefore, they cannot go to the bigger market rather sale their produce to 
middlemen who are also Bangalee. Though in this interaction with middlemen they hold a 
common understanding, it also reinforces his identity of being an ethnic minority, Khyang.   
 
Usha Ching Khyang is a young male (20 years) from a village of Bandarban. He is a student 
of agricultural diploma and mostly lives in Rangamati town. When he comes home for 
vacation or in peak agriculture season to help his father, he generally feels isolated and out of 
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place in the village where he was born. He states that he cannot mix with anyone in the 
village, he do not share any understanding with his fellows in the village. He cannot talk or 
pass time as people at his village are not familiar with his interests and does not sometime 
support his view, the way of talking which he adopted during his stay at Rangamati town. 
Rather he enjoys his life in Rangamati town. However, he regards himself as a Khyang, 
wants to practice Khyang traditions, and speaks the language. What I assume from Usha 
Ching Khyang’s position is that as his understanding and worldview modified because of his 
studies and living in a cosmopolitan city, he feels alienated in the place he was born and 
raised. He identifies himself as part of a much larger society than the immediacy of his 
village as probably is common amongst young people who engaged in higher education or 
jobs in the bigger cities. 
 
The four persons from two different locations of CHT represent very different positions in 
terms of education and class, but share an identity linked to an imagined shared past, customs, 
norms and practices. They also have a wide range of shared representations and practices 
with non-Khyang such as the Christian Khyang marriage ceremony, which is different from 
the Khyang customs and practices, the use of Bangla language in their daily activities and at 
work. In many regards, Thoi, Shipon and Usha Ching seem to have more in common with a 
townsman or other people of the occupational network than with Ongtha. Therefore, 
situational character of social identities should be kept in mind.  
 
The multi-ethnic character of Thoi’s workplace and the lack of ethnic segregation at work at a 
Christian Hospital or at his medical center indicate the existence of shared understanding 
across ethnic boundaries. When he discusses conditions at work and when he is providing 
services to his patients their status as colleagues or service provider are more important than 
their ethnic ones.  
 
Both Thoi and Shipon identify themselves as Khyang, and they stress that they also are 
Christians. Their shared Khyang identity includes components such as religion, and a shared 
common history of being Khyang (c.f. Malkki 1995). The context for any encounter between 
them is largely defined by their shared historical consciousness, including references to the 
establishment of the locality. Other dimension of Shipon’s and Thoi’s shared identity is 
conditional on their integration into greater society as politician at the local level or at the 
medical center and hospital. 
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What I find from the above cases is that identity is produced from the set of social relations a 
Khyang engages in at a regular basis. Thus, identity is produced in social relations and is an 
ongoing process (c.f. Jenkins 2008: 93; Eriksen 1992 a). It is also evident that educational, 
political and economic position of the individual Khyang places them in a higher or a similar 
level in their interaction vis-à-vis the Bangalee. Otherwise, the Khyang as an ethnic group are 
treated as of lower category by their Bangalees (the hill people versus the valley people, c.f. 
Scott 2009).   
 
TRANSFORMATION OF IDENTITY ACROSS GENERATIONS 
 
Marriage customs and intermarriages 
 
The Khyangs have customary laws (Dung) for marriage and for their wedding ceremonies. As 
I was discussing with Biren Khyang about how marriages are fixed among the Khyangs, I got 
the following information.  Generally, marriages do not take place within the same patri-
lineage and marriage is strictly prohibited between cousins. If it happened by any chance, the 
persons involved were ostracized. If a boy and a girl were found to be attracted to each other 
in any village, their parents and guardians would negotiate and fix a date for their marriage. 
As per the customary laws, in the past the bridegroom’s family had to pay some BDT 50-55 
(less than One USD) as a dowry to the bride’s family if the marriage was arranged by the 
parents. The Khyangs call the amount /payment ‘dafa’. If a boy and a girl fled first and then 
got married, the bride’s parents were allowed to increase the amount of the ‘dafa’ as per their 
will. Sometimes this amount would rise to BDT 500 (USD 6.25). If the father of the groom 
failed to meet the demand, the bride’s parents could take their daughter back. The parents 
were allowed to keep their daughter with them as long as the payment was not made. If a 
time frame were set in this regard, the groom’s relatives would go to the bride’s house on a 
given date to pay the amount. 
 
Marriage never occurs if any side disagrees. In such cases, the boy and the girl often run 
away and get married. First the groom and the bride flee and seek refuge to a relative’s house 
located in another village. That relative informs the parents and the guardians of the village 
about it before the sunrises. The village headmen or the elders ask the villagers to gather, then 
they formalize and celebrate the marriage of the runaway bride and groom in front of all. The 
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parents of the bride do not attend such a wedding party. The groom’s side, together with the 
villagers, arranges the wedding ceremony. Within a week after the marriage takes place, the 
bride and the groom have to return to the bride’s parental home. They carry a suitcase with 
garments for their own use, a tool for reaping Jhum crops, a bottle full of wine and a living 
chicken. Then both of them ask for forgiveness to the bride’s parents. 
 
The change in the marriage custom that became clear through various conversations with my 
respondents is that in recent days more inter marriages occur. One of my respondents, 
Ongthui, 35 years, in Bandarban reported that: 
 
“Now-a-days one can meet a Bangalee at only few minutes walking distance 
however, in my grandparents time there was only a handful of Bangalee 
household in the locality.” He also said, “I have a daughter. If she marries a 
Marma or Bangalee what can I do?” In addition, as Khyang are patriarchal, “if 
a woman marriages in another community she is generally perceived not 
belonging to the Khyang community anymore.” 
 
This statement of a Khyang reflects the Khyang increased interaction with others and their 
worries about preserving and or practice their own customs and traditions. His reference to 
the bigger ethnic communities like Marma and Bangalee refer to the helplessness he feels in 
this regard. 
 
On the other hand, in Rangamati Khyangs do not follow any such customs, which were 
unique to the Khyang as they have converted to Christianity. In Rangamati, there is more 
intermarriage with the Bangalees and are mostly co-workers at the Christian Hospital, or in 
other areas.  
One more reason that is promoting the marriage of Khyang girls with boys of other 
communities is that when a Khyang girl is educated until higher secondary level or higher it 
becomes harder for her family to find a boy who is more qualified than her in terms of 
education. For example, Biren Khyang has a daughter who is studying medical and he said, “I 
will not find any Khyang to marry her I will have to look among the Christian community.”  
 
This change in the marriage practices, specifically in terms of intermarriages with other 
groups, has an effect on the patriarchal nature (c.f. Mohsin 1997: 17ff) of the Khyang, for 
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example, I knew from the fieldwork that the decision making process in the household is 
exclusively on the men of family. However, the household where the wife was from another 
community, for instance, from Marma and Bangalee, I was told that both the husband and 
wife takes responsibility in deciding matters related to their family. Even women were the 
sole decision maker in the household matters, that is, maintaining the homestead and also 
education of the children. The practice of intermarriages affects the Khyang identity as I have 
shown (see page 87-88) that when mothers are not from the Khyang community and do not 
speak Khyang language children often cannot learn the language, which is an important 
identity marker for the Khyang. 
 
Being ‘not as a Khyang’ 
 
Parents play a formative role in their child’s ethnic identity development.  The way parents 
influence their children may be determined by a number of factors as Marks et al. (2007) 
showed evidence that immigrant parents’ levels of acculturation 15  can influence the 
development of their child’s ethnic group identity. For instance, if parents are deeply rooted 
in the culture and behaviors of their country of birth, they may find it difficult to educate their 
children in a way that does not acknowledge these views and beliefs. On the other hand, if a 
strong identity with the home country creates future difficulties for their children – for 
instance, by creating externalities that alienate majority individuals and prevent them from 
provision of equal economic opportunity – then parents may consider this, and direct their 
influence on their children in a way that acknowledges this. Similar adaptation to 
circumstances regarding identity was referred to by Malkki (1995: 156) among the Hutu 
refugees in Kigoma town. Malkki states the town refugees did not define themselves 
primarily as member of the marked collectivity ‘Hutu refugees’. For example, some claimed 
to be Burundian immigrants from the colonial era, and thereby, Tanzanian citizens, the 
adoptive labels converged to negate any uniform, collective self-definition, and those were 
individualistically pursued and deployed. This strategy of not appearing as refugee could 
facilitate numerous routine activities of daily life: avoiding harassment by immigration 
officers, securing jobs, travelling, obtaining license for petty trade, market spots, spending 
leisure time in bars and night spots, and during conversing with strangers (c.f. Malkki 1995, 
see discussion below).  
                                                          
15
 Acculturation explains the process of cultural change and psychological change that results following meeting 
between cultures (Sam and Berry 2010). 
Dispossession and Ethnic Identity in Expanding State Space of Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh 
Social Networks and Ethnic Identity among the Khyang: Formation and Diversification 97 
 
The way the Khyang are trying not to be distinctive when they encounter a Bangalee person 
can be analyzed from their pattern of dressing (see page 44) and the way they name their 
children. During my fieldwork as I was meeting many people, I got surprised listening to the 
names of the young people. The name sounded to me more like Bangla names or even 
English names like ‘Max’. Out of curiosity one day I asked Thoi Khyang, why people are 
having names like this? Thus, he said: 
 
“Khyang names are difficult to write in Bangla alphabets and also difficult to 
pronounce. Therefore, in schools sometimes the teachers asked to change 
name when they are admitted. Sometimes the names are written in a wrong 
spelling. Because of all these now a days we tend to take names which are 
easier to write or spell.”   
 
In reply I asked him, is it the only reason people are taking names like this? Why do not the 
teachers or parents try to write the name in the correct form? To my queries, he further said:  
 
“Previously most of the Khyang parents were illiterate. They could not write or 
read Bangla so the teachers had written how they thought it was correct. 
Moreover, the Khyang children are bullied by the fellow Bangalee students 
because of their names. So now people are giving names to their children 
which are familiar to others.” 
 
The issue with the name was also present during my first interaction with one of my research 
assistant who is student of agricultural diploma and studies in Rangamati. When he was 
introduced to me, he said his name was ‘Emon’, which is a very common name among the 
Bangalees. After a few days as I was moving around the Khyang households with him, 
whenever we met someone, they would refer him as ‘Lupea’. Afterwards, when I asked for 
his mobile number, as I was to travel to Bandarban he saw me writing his name as ‘Lupea’ 
and said, “write ‘Emon’ too. Out of this area, I am known as ‘Emon’”. 
 
Based on these evidences I argue that as the Khyang identity sometimes lead to be treated 
differently by the Bangalees. Sometimes they try to present themselves not as a person from 
the Khyang community or a minority group.  
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In the CHT parents who have not gained higher education (at least until secondary level), 
now want their children to be educated in the national curriculum so that they can get a better 
job and earn money. Some of my respondents mentioned that they are now economically 
poor and have lost their lands because they could not read or write and thus could not 
understand land laws and other official procedures to legalize their land holdings thus, with 
time they have lost much of their lands. Now they want their children to be educated so that 
they do not have to face such situations. However, I think this connection has created a 
situation that has been changing the Khyang group identity. Those who are studying outside 
the villages and are involved in a social arena that requires them to think a member of bigger 
cultural scenario affect their sense of belonging and identity.  
 
Further, the situation of Khyang identity between old and new generation, such as the 
difference in thinking between Usha Ching and Ongtha could be explained by Halbwachs’s 
idea of collective memory (Halbwachs 1980; Malkki 1995). For Halbwachs (1980) collective 
memory is a continuous thought, which is capable of living in the consciousness of groups 
keeping the memory alive. However, young and old, regardless of age are encompassed 
within the same perspective as long as certain national, political or religious situations are not 
altered. However, as soon as a new situation is proposed or imposed, ensuing generations 
start having different streams of thought. In case of the CHT a new socio-economic situation 
has been imposed with the changes in the CHT administration and coming of the Bangalee 
people to the region (discussed in chapter two and three). As I have seen, in  both Rangamati 
and Bandarban the young generations do not trace back their identity to the past; rather they 
see themselves as part the complex web of personal networks beyond their villages, whereas 
among the older generation the memory of their past still remains as a part of their identity. 
Similar pattern of divergence in historical consciousness is seen among the Hutu refugees 
who live in refugee camps and towns (Malkki 1995).  
 
DISCUSSSION  
  
In this chapter, I have illustrated how the Khynags’ social networks take shape and what 
produces the Khyang identity. The case of the Khyang reflects that the notion of identity is 
never completed; it is rather an ongoing process of identification and differentiation. Stuart 
Hall argues the process of establishing an identity implies the construction of the ‘other’, a 
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splitting between that which one is and that which is the other (Hall 1997: 47f; c.f. Barth 
1969, see chapter one). In establishing a new way of thinking about identity, Hall brings his 
own experiences of racism and of becoming ‘black’ or learning an identity as black in Britain. 
Hall writes that he ‘became’ a ‘black person’ as a reaction to the racist practices to which he 
was exposed. English identification was blocked to him and other ex-colonial immigrants; 
hence, they had to find another place to stand. What Hall reveals is that all identities, both 
personal and collective, are constructed in and through relations of dominance and resistance.  
 
The difference in experience of the Khyang living at Rangamati and Bandarban can be 
explained in terms of their different social context (rural and urban) following and during the 
economic transition that has been going in CHT. I find this situation to resemble what Malkki 
(1995) writes about the mass violence in Burundi of 1972 between the Hutu and Tutsi in her 
investigation of identity formation of two groups of Hutu refugees who had fled the mass 
killings. One group was settled in a carefully planned, physically isolated refugee camp, 
while the other lived in the less regimented setting of Kigoma Township. Thus, the ‘town 
refugees’ who live outside of any camp context tended to be dispersed in non-refugee 
neighborhoods. Malkki writes that the most unusual and prominent social fact about the camp 
was that its inhabitants were continually engaged in an impassioned construction and 
reconstruction of their history as ‘a people’. The narrative production of their history was 
based on collective idea of the ‘autochthonous’ origins of Burundi as a ‘nation’. In contrast, 
the town refugees had not reconstructed such a categorically distinct collective identity. 
Rather than defining themselves collectively as ‘the Hutu refugees’ (or even just as ‘the 
Hutu’), they tended to seek ways of assimilating and of inhabiting multiple, shifting 
identities– identities derived or ‘borrowed’ from the social context of the township.  Identities, 
Malkki claims (1995: 3) were like ‘porous sieves’ to move in and out of, and assimilation 
was always intricately situational. Malkki (1995: 3) argues that the opposition between the 
historical-national thought of the camp refugees and the cosmopolitan ways of the town 
refugees reflect the ways social, imaginative processes of constructing nationness and identity 
are influenced by the local, everyday circumstances of life.  
 
I think Malkki’s analysis provides a good comparative case for what I have found regarding 
identity formation among the Khyang in Rangamati and Bandarban. In Bandarban, those 
who live in a more isolated social context than the Khyang of Rangamati, people display a 
collective thinking about their socio-economic situation and themselves. Like in the refugee 
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camps though there was no mass killing of the Khyang at CHT there was violence in the form 
of exercising sovereign power and loss of livelihoods and land, and in some cases what I 
above have described as spectral violence (see also chapter three). But people inhibiting and 
creating different social contexts (Rangamati and Bandarban) have responded differently to 
the given situation and though situational identities are prevalent in both the field sites the 
cases presented above reflects that the collective identity of the Khyang are more prominent 
in Bandarban. Here I think the occupational, political and educational background of 
individual person plays important role. As the people of Bandarban are not so engaged with 
such individual networks, there is a thought of collective identity. 
 
Malkki (1995: 241) also compares the historical consciousness of the refugees in the camps 
that have helped to give form to a historical national consciousness and which is challenging 
the cosmopolitanism among the Hutu living in town. She argues that the historical 
consciousness is embedded in, and emerges from, particular, local, lived circumstances.  
Instead of looking at historical consciousness as a thing already formed, she finds it more 
fruitful to focus on the processes of its formation and transformation. In line with this 
perspective, if we see how the younger and older generation of the Khyang at Bandarban 
think about themselves, it becomes clear that as Khyang people are becoming actors in 
different social milieus they find themselves in different social arenas where the historical 
consciousness of the Khyang as a group living in an area is losing its appeal to the younger 
generations and perhaps a new kind of consciousness is being formed among the young 
Khyang. On the other hand, the marginalized position of the Khyang also reinforces the 
thought of a common historical time of affluence among those who have lived that time and 
are now in a vulnerable position. Thus, among the Khyang there is a transformation of the 
historical consciousness and associated ideas of identity among one group, whereas, the 
marginal situation of the Khyang is also reinforcing the consciousness of the past among the 
others. This tension and difference has been produced by economic diversification of the 
Khyang which has loosened the older solidarities to new form of social and political networks 
and also promoted a wider and more diffused pattern of social integration (c.f. Simmel 2004 
[1978]: 410f). 
 
From the cases I have presented, I argue that the interaction between people from different 
ethnic backgrounds creates ‘situational identities’ (Eriksen 1992 b: 18). In the case of 
Trinidad and Mauritius, virtually any situation, which involves people of different ethnic 
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membership, has an ethnic character (Eriksen 1992 b: 18). Eriksen writes about a multi ethnic 
region in Mauritius where the main ethnic categories are blacks, Indians, Chinese, Europeans 
and culturally ambiguous categories of phenotypically ‘mixed’ people. The people of 
different ethnic backgrounds routinely express mutual suspicion in economic transactions.  
Personal economic failures in Mauritius are frequently explained by the notorious dishonesty/ 
partiality of an ethnic category and where informal economic networks are ethnically 
bounded (Eriksen 1992 b). Similarly, the Khyang have also complained about the Bangalees 
as being dishonest with them in economic transactions and blame them as economic 
exploiters. The cases presented above also reflect the similar situation of the ethnic minority 
groups. Apart from economic transactions, ethnicity serves to organize the social world 
cognitively and normatively. For example, In Mauritius, it is considered good for an Indian to 
conduct business with a Chinese, but it is bad to do it with a Black. Similar tendencies were 
found among the Khyang (chapter two) where the Khyang prefer to work with someone from 
ethnic minority groups rather than with the Bangalees. 
 
Historically the village of Bandarban has constituted something more than merely a physical 
aggregation of households. Ritually, it has been set apart by local religious beliefs and shrines; 
economically, it has represented a self-sufficient community; socially, it has formed the unit 
of status, of reciprocity, and of social insurance for the Khyangs; politically, it has generally 
been a unit of dispute settlement as well as of administration and taxation, until the massive 
economic changes since 1980s which undermined much of the economic basis of village 
autonomy.  
 
On the contrary, in Rangamati the village was established as the Khyang stopped cultivation 
and engaged with non-agricultural activities; the village had no traditional political structures, 
further, as most of the Khyang converted to Christianity, their religious beliefs and ritual were 
also transformed so it was apparent negotiation between two traditions. However, few of the 
bases of Khyang identity, most importantly language persisted and which they are still 
practicing, however, in competition with the Bangla language, which they must use in 
everyday activities, Khyang language is losing its importance with time. The loss of language 
varies and it is more prominent in Rangamati than Bandarban, and I assume as the area is 
more connected with other Bangla speaking people through being part of a multi-ethnic 
social milieu. The occupation based differentiation between Kongtu and Laitu Khyang is no 
longer functioning; intermarriages between different groups of people with different 
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backgrounds are more common. These changes indicate that that their culture, if not their 
tradition, has adapted to the demands of interconnection between different groups of people 
and economic activities. The pattern of multiple occupations, intermarriages and use of 
Bangla language by the Khyang can be analyzed in line with Jordan (2013) as a strategy to 
overcome the marginalized situation with connections and social networks. Jordan (2013: 38) 
describes the Iroquoian ‘satellite villages’ which were useful for military expeditions, 
marriage possibilities, and gathering information about their former home regions and social 
ties (Jordan 2013; see chapter one). On the contrary, the Khyang have taken up individual 
strategies where the Khyangs through intermarriages and personal networks with the 
members of other ethnic groups have sometimes created a social position beyond their 
Khyang community. So what I find is that there are no fixed identity markers which the 
Khyang maintain to preserve their identity, rather, there are a set of factors in play initiating 
situational identities, thus, their boundary maintenance is a dynamic process (c.f. Barth 1969, 
see chapter one).  
 
I find the whole scenario of the Khyang at CHT comparable to Scott’s (2009: 260) 
reconsideration of ‘ethnogenesis’ and his argument that standard attempts by the 
administrators and governments to identify certain traits (e.g., language) as defining 
characteristics of groups or identities are not manageable in the context of Zomia. This is 
because in the CHT, as in the hills of Southeast Asia, I argue that social relations and ethnic 
identities are better understood as continually evolving.  It is not that groups and identities are 
absent in the hills; instead, there are no clear demarcations or boundaries that are readily 
observable by outsiders over long periods.  Because of this, characteristics and traits are fluid 
and ever changing. The various processes of development, which turn the world into a single 
space through creating sameness among people, also create new differences and new 
aspirations in the CHT. In such a moment, the construction of identity is not a once and for 
all act but an ongoing practice of identification. All ethnic identities are relational because 
each asserts a boundary. However, in the CHT as in the case of Southeast Asia (c.f. Scott 
2009: 253) ethnic identity and language differences have become fluid because of being in 
close contact with other groups and thus a certain plasticity of identity is built and many 
Khyangs located in two or more social context act differently and identify themselves 
differently on the basis of social relationships. The diversity among the Khyang is increasing 
and there is no single trait such as religion, clothing, or even language which applies to all. 
Similar condition of the Karen people was mentioned by Scott (2009: 241ff) in the Zomia 
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after the coming of the ‘Padi State’ (low land state/ rice state). Despite having such diversities 
all of them are Khyang; they are Khyang at the locality and neighborhood, Christian at the 
Church, fellow worker at the workplace, etc. They are like ‘ethnic amphibians’ (c.f. Scott 
2009: 241) being able to pass between such identities without a sense of conflict.    
 
CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, I have addressed the factors, which play a pivotal role in forming the social 
identity and networks of the Khyang. Social networks allow Khyang to get access to the 
government benefits, which they sometime are denied from as being a minority community in 
the CHT (see chapter two and three). Further, the Khyang who have better connections with 
the government officials sometimes use power against other Khyangs who are not that 
connected (see page 63-72). This is also evident in the case of benefitting from the minority 
quotas in education and job sectors (see page 31 and 37-38) and in agricultural production, 
marketing and selling of agricultural products (see page 28-29). Their status as Khyang is 
also responsible for them being treated as someone who cannot resist the activities of higher 
governmental officials (see page 66). Moreover, the state making process and government’s 
initiatives to develop the CHT is a result of seeing and identifying the hill people as 
uncivilized and backwards who are in need of modernization (c.f. Scott 2009). To overcome 
their hindrances to connect to wider social networks the Khyangs have adopted Bangla 
language and try to behave or adopt certain occupations and cultural practices that will 
present them as bearer of a cosmopolitan and national culture. 
 
From the various social networks they engage in and their ideas about ‘Khyang identity’ I 
argue that though there is a subjective belief in their common descent as a group, there are 
also internal differences in the group about how much importance they give to these ideas 
and the degree to which a Khyang historical consciousness is reproduced and transformed. 
They have assumed a fluid idea of Khyang identity, something which is a social trait among 
the hill people in Southeast Asia (Scott 2009), when they get themselves involved in different 
social arenas and social relations. In such instances of ethnic intermingling, the ‘Khyang 
identity’ is not the most important aspect and they do not always put the same emphasis on 
the ethnic identity markers, such as language, occupation, historical consciousness (c. f. Barth 
1969). However, this trend is not found among all the Khyang. Political and economic status 
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of the person also influences how they are treated in social interactions. It also determines 
how much a person’s social relationships are influenced by the ethnic identity (of the persons 
involved) in the social interaction. Thus political and economic status of a Khyang, in turn, 
shape the ‘identity of the Khyang’.   
 
Though the Khyang believe in their common history, their specific form of livelihood 
strategies and language as the pillars of their Khyang identity, all the three aspects get 
different preferences in different groups of people in terms of economic, political and 
educational background. Based on my ethnographic findings I argue that the Khyang social 
networks and identity formation process can shed light on how government initiated 
development programs can affect a multi-ethnic region.  In the next chapter, I will situate the 
Khyang and the CHT within the international development discourse and sum up the main 
findings and arguments of my thesis. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS (CHT) AND BANGLADESH STATE IN GLOBAL 
DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In this concluding chapter, I will sum up my findings and central arguments through situating 
the condition of the Khyang and the CHT in Bangladesh within a global process, namely, 
‘Development’. The origins of development are disputed, however, Hopper (2012: 3) states 
that ‘Development’ in its contemporary guise emerged after the Second World War, with the 
creation of the United Nations and in particular, institutions like the World Bank (WB) and 
the International Monetary Funds (IMF). In the 1960s, modernization theory continued to 
define development globally. Whereas in the 1970s the appeal of dependency theories was 
strengthened by the persistence and deepening of global inequalities, with some countries 
showing little sign of breaking free from ‘under-development’ (Hopper 2012: 5). 
International agencies like the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the World Bank 
responded by turning the attention to ‘redistribution with growth’ and ‘basic needs’. These 
ideas continued to stress the necessity of economic growth, but placed greater emphasis upon 
gearing development towards meeting the needs of the poor (Hopper 2012: 5). During 1980s, 
the concept of sustainable development gained increasing acceptance, whereas the 1990s saw 
an inclusion of a new vocabulary of local engagement, participation and poverty reduction 
strategies, which places the onus upon the developing countries themselves formulating their 
own development approaches base on local consultation.  
 
In this chapter I will analyze the effects of development programs at the local level in 
different countries and argue that the global development discourse more often do not take 
into consideration the local context and further marginalize the people who are poor and 
marginalized in the society. I will analyze and discuss how CHT and Bangladesh are tied into 
the global discourse of development and argue the Khyangs’ situation also is tied not only the 
state expansion project of Bangladesh but also to the global development discourse.    
 
GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT AND MARGINALIZED LOCAL LIVES 
 
The evaluation reports and portrayals of development achievements serve to attract attention, 
galvanize support and direct practices towards development initiatives (Crewe and Axelby 
2013: 2). But in making these dramatic claims, the realities of life are distorted – not just the 
everyday experiences of poverty and marginality but other aspects of life are lost: work, play, 
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fun friends, as well as deals, gossip and quarrels (Crewe and Axelby 2013: 2). Through 
‘development’ powerful international actors were able to impose their interests, values and 
beliefs onto people of the developing world. This can be seen as a continuation of colonialism 
by other means (Crewe and Axelby 2013: 9). Crewe and Axelby (2013: 91ff) exemplify this 
point by the efforts of introducing the concept of sustainable livelihood in India. The Institute 
of the Development Studies (United Kingdom) assumes that a livelihood is sustainable if it 
can recover from setbacks, maintain its assets and capabilities, and avoid undermining the 
natural resource base, this approach also give poor people stronger voice in designing 
development projects. However, the state government in India had their own frameworks, 
priorities and institutional pressures, which constrained the impacts. One of the Orissa design 
team compared the sustainable livelihood approach to a wish list that raises expectations but 
it is politically and institutionally impossible to full fill (Crewe and Axelby 2013: 93).  
 
Ferguson and Lohmann (1994: 176) make the same point with regard to the history of 
‘development’ projects in Lesotho. They argued that the development agencies portray 
developing countries in terms that make them suitable for standardized development 
packages and thus the country profiles that the agencies base their interventions frequently 
bear little or no relation to economic and social realities.  For example, in 1975, the World 
Bank issued a report on Lesotho that was subsequently used to justify a series of major Bank 
loans to the country, the report identified Lesotho as dependent on subsistence agriculture and 
promoted agricultural reforms (Ferguson and Lohmann 1994: 176). 
 
However, Lesotho has not been a ‘subsistence’ society since at least the mid-1980s, having 
entered the twentieth century as a producer of wheat, wool, mohair, horses and cattle, for the 
South African market. Ferguson and Lohmann (1994: 177) also argue that Lesotho is a labor 
reserve for South African mining and industry rather than an autonomous ‘national economy’, 
so portraying the dynamics of Lesotho in relation to South Africa would be to stress the 
importance of something which is inaccessible to a ‘development planner’ in Lesotho. 
Though the WB has no disposition to involve itself in political challenges to the South 
African system of labor control, it is in an excellent position, however, to devise agricultural 
improvement projects, extension, credit, technical inputs for the agriculture of Lesotho. For 
this reason, agriculture concerns tend to move center stage and Lesotho is portrayed as a 
nation of ‘farmers’, not wage laborers. Similarly in case of CHT as I have seen and discussed 
in the preceding chapters that the development initiatives of governments and NGOs 
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stereotyped the Khyang and other ethnic minority groups as ‘primitive’ and ‘uncivilized’. 
Thus, they have tried to shift the ethnic minority groups’ livelihoods from subsistence to 
market oriented. However, in the context of Bangladesh the ethnic minority groups have a 
lower status in the social hierarchy compared to the Bangalee population and are in a 
marginal position who were further marginalized in the market places and as well as in job 
sectors and education.      
 
This process of ‘development’ reflects how the global development discourse defines 
‘poverty’ and ‘development’ at a global level but transforms life of the people at local level. 
It also creates friction with the existing values. In another context Broch-Due (2000: 53ff) 
describes the colonial relocation of Turkana from Isiolo town in central Kenya and forced 
them to return to Turkana District in the northwest corner of the country in 1958 as they were 
still herding. Thus in the colonizers’ views they were primitive and problematic. She states 
that the pastoralists Turkana were previously forced to settle in a sedentary life during 1920s 
and 1930s to live on agriculture, service and fishing. The dual relocation of the Turkana in an 
attempt of civilizing them forced Turkana people alien in their own homeland.  
 
Broch-Due also describes the situation of a border area between Nairobi and Lodwar in 
Kenya (Broch-Due 2005: 5). The mid-eighties were the heyday of development spending in 
Kenya the town life corresponding with ‘development’ had busted livestock holdings and loss 
of a pastoralist control of the pasture land of the Turkana. However, in the mid-1990s the 
situation had completely turned away as the development agencies moved away because of 
diplomatic relations with Kenya and with civil wars in Sudan and neighboring areas ‘the 
pastoralist’ was replaced by ‘the refugee’ figure as prime recipient of aid and concern. Thus, 
she argues the life of the Turkana were devastated by the development, which came, and 
gone in 15 years. 
 
From above discussions, I argue that development as perceived by the development 
organizations, often do not consider the local context, thus, produce more unintended and 
sometimes negatives effects instead of improving the life of the marginalized. In the 
following section, I will discuss the situation of the CHT in the context of global 
development discourse. 
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CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS (CHT) AND BANGLADESH STATE IN 
DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE 
 
If I look at the history of development, projects in the CHT on the backdrop of discussion 
above I find some similarities in the process that development initiatives suggested by 
development organizations sometimes marginalize certain segments of the population. Since 
the independence of Bangladesh (this discussion about the state and development is focused 
on the Bangladesh period), the government has undertaken a number of development projects 
in CHT the where stated objective has been the development of the ‘hill people’. However, as 
I discussed (see chapter two and three) the governmental development projects have been 
benefiting the Bangalees (sometime other larger ethnic groups compared to minority groups) 
and consolidated hegemony of the state and majority ethnic groups over the ethnic minority 
groups living in the hills. Such marginalizing impacts of development projects can be 
explained in terms of exclusion of the people from planning and also in terms of the dominant 
and favorable position the Bangalees are given through state policy, which I have argued 
creates graduated sovereignty in the CHT.   
 
As I have shown, early in the 1973 the government made a separate board for the 
development of CHT, which were formalized in January 1976 when the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts Development Board (CHTDB) was duly constituted. Bangladesh government sought 
assistance from development agencies in order to modernize the CHT (Mohsin 1997: 120; 
see also page 15-17). However, in the formulation of the development board and 
development strategies for the hill people no consultative body of the local people was 
formed, instead opinion was sought from international development agencies. The agencies 
are guided by concepts of progress and development that are often insensitive to local 
customs and values. The Forestal Report stated: 
 
“The tribal people had attained a reasonably satisfactory was of life adequately 
adjusted to the limitation imposed by the physical environment before the dam 
was built. After the dislocation a disastrous cycle of over cultivation had led to 
depletion of soil fertility, loss of forest crop, serious erosion and further 
pressure on remaining land … the age old practice of shifting cultivation 
attuned as it may have been in the past to the environment, can no longer be 
tolerated… A change to a system of permanent intensive agriculture must be 
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made… more of the hill tribesmen will have to become wage earner in the 
forests or other developing industries, and purchase their food from farmers 
practicing permanent agriculture.” (Webb 1966: 3232; see also Mohsin 1997: 
120f).   
 
Many of the desired changes, what the government and development agencies wanted, had as 
specified in the Forestal report been achieved (see chapter two). However, the development 
of the ethnic minority groups such as the Khyang is at long distance. Though some of the 
Khyangs at the individual level might have become economically and politically powerful 
and also achieved higher status in the society, I argued in chapter three that the Khyangs as a 
group are now more marginalized, economically vulnerable and the social dynamics of the 
group has been altered. This leads to my fourth chapter, which discusses the social networks 
and identity of the Khyang as fluid in the present day socio-economic context.  
 
With such a background of development having marginalizing effects on the poor, it is 
pertinent to discuss ‘participatory development’. In relation to development works being 
eurocentric, western dominated and top-down the concept of participatory development took 
off in 1970s (Hopper 2012: 159). Participatory development put emphasis upon localism, 
self-determinism, grassroots activity, empowerment and entails involving local people at all 
stages in the development process, including identifying what needs to be done and policies 
that need to be formulated. In this way, it could be ensured that people have a greater say in 
the development planning and decisions that affect their lives (Hopper 2012: 160). In this 
endeavor of participatory development NGOs were at the forefront, and in response to 
dispossession of indigenous communities and rights of these groups of people are hinged on 
collective identity for claim to a territory (Murray Li 2010: 295). Murray Li (2001: 645) 
writes about the Alliance of Indigenous People of the Archipelago in Indonesia who 
advocates ‘cultural distinctiveness’ as the grounds for securing rights to territories and 
resources threatened by forestry, plantation and mining interests backed by police and 
military intimidation. 
 
However, insistence on indigenous collective landholdings cannot be a solution for the 
Khyang. As Murray Li (2010: 399) argues there are two sets of advocates; some consider that 
indigenous people reject individualized tenure, while others insist on their right to buy, sell 
and mortgage their land. She also indicates to the flaws of UN indigenous rights regime, 
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consultation mechanism of development banks who emphasize collective identity and 
landholding. However, if a group is fractured and start favoring individualized property or an 
individual acts alone there remain no existences of collectivity. Based on my ethnographic 
information as I have shown throughout this thesis that with the economic transition and 
marginalization new and differentiated notions about identity (individual vis-à-vis group 
identity) have emerged among the Khyang. Among the Khyang there is now different streams 
of thought regarding identity based on the individual persons’ age, education, experiences, 
political or economic networks. Therefore, I argue the Khyang are exposed to diverse and 
changing forms of dispossessions and development challenges, where the state, international 
development agencies, Khyang leaders (Headman), Khyang from different age, sex, 
occupation and political affiliations, traders, businessmen, Bangalee people all are assembled 
through diverse elements and processes.  
 
SUMMARY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
 
Among the Khyang the changes of economic frontiers came into being through interventions 
of the government (the state) and international agencies. The transformations occurred 
through change in administration of the CHT and deployment of security forces, 
transmigration of Bangalee people, development of market places and urbanization. Most of 
the development projects were introduced by the international development organizations like 
the ADB, ADAB, WB and SIDA. I have argued that this process has created diverse changes 
among the Khyang. The changes were in regard to gender and ethnic division of labor, 
agricultural production, economic activities, and also community dynamics at the intra and 
inter community levels. Consequently, these changes have altered their unique cultural 
identity (see chapter two). On the basis of these findings from the ethnographic fieldwork, I 
argue that the governments’ endeavor to develop the CHT and its people has created a state 
of dispossession among the Khyang.   
 
The constant reformulation of economy and coming of the state has marginalized the Khyang 
(c.f. Scott 2009).  Since 1980s, there has been a massive transfer of Bangalee population in 
the CHT who served, as in the case of Zomia (c.f. Scott 2009), the dual purpose of peopling 
the frontiers with a presumably loyal population and producing cash crop for export to all 
over the country and relieving population pressure from the valleys. I have argued in line 
Dispossession and Ethnic Identity in Expanding State Space of Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh 
Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) and Bangladesh State in Global Development Discourse:  
Concluding Remarks  112 
with Scott (2009) that his process reflects how the state and its valley population marginalize 
the hill people through the expansion of state space and using state administrative and 
military power (see chapter three). 
 
The changes of the administrative system of the Chittagong Hill Tracts and policies regarding 
natural resources especially land and forests have created a situation that has stripped the 
Khyang of CHT from the means of their social reproduction and also commoditized resources 
and forms of labor that had hitherto been outside of capital’s realm (c.f. Kasmir and 
Carbonella 2008: 8). Further, small ethnic groups as the Khyang are in a disadvantageous 
position in terms of receiving and making use of the different opportunities presented by the 
Government. In line with Rosaldo’s (2003) argument for Southeast Asia, I have argued that 
in Bangladesh the relations between state officials and hinterland minority groups involve 
differences of power and perception by each group of the other. This perception of ‘the other’ 
(as backward and in need of development and modernization and also as ‘marginal’ people 
who does not have means of resistance) shapes the production of marginalization (see chapter 
three).    
 
From the various social networks the Khyang are involved with and their ideas about Khyang 
identity it can be argued that though there is a subjective belief in their common descent as a 
group, there are also internal differences in the group about how much importance they give 
to these ideas. The idea of Khyang identity is fluid, as for the hill populations in Southeast 
Asia (Scott 2009). Thus, the identity is situational and ‘shapeable’ and the imperative of the 
Khyang identity vary in different social arenas and social relations. In such instances of 
interaction with different groups of people, the Khyang identity- is not imperative rather other 
aspects such as their political affiliations, occupational superiority, etc. are of importance (c.f. 
Barth 1969). Though the Khyang believe in their common history, their specific form of 
livelihood strategies and language as the pillars of their Khyang identity, these aspects get 
different preferences in terms of generation, economic and educational background (see 
chapter four). The identity and involvement in diverse social networks also led to access to 
resources. Thus, I have argued that the Khyang social networks can shed light on how shared 
meaning and identity are produced and the ways in which government initiated development 
programs affect a multi-ethnic region.   
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In a broader context of global development and ‘state’ formation of Bangladesh the Khyang 
are in a situation of economic transition and marginalization. Bangladesh state’s nation 
building process and its commitment to develop the country socio-economically (encouraged 
by the international development agencies) has led the state’s encroachment to the CHT 
which were beyond direct state control for most of its history (c.f. Scott 2009). As the state 
built infrastructures and planned migration of Bangalee people took place the livelihood 
options for the Khyang changed and their traditional way of slash and burn became banned 
by law. There has been a mutation of citizenship (c.f. Ong 2006) for the Khyang, where their 
rights and access to land and forests are denied through government actions and policies. 
While some of the ethnic minority groups and Bangalee benefitted from these processes, the 
Khyang remains as ‘minority of the minorities’ in CHT. Within this shifting socio-political 
context, there has been a diversification of Khyang identity. Thus, the Khyang now act as 
‘ethnic amphibians’ (c.f. Scott 2009: 241) in the CHT. 
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ANNEX 1: MAP OF BANGLADESH AND FIELD LOCATIONS 
 
 
Source: Barkat et al. 2009. 
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ANNEX 2: PHOTO OF KHYANG HOUSE 
Photo: House in Bandarban 
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Photo: House in Rangamati 
 
Photo: House in Rangamati 
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ANNEX 3: PHOTO OF AGRI-FIELD OF KHYANGS  
Photo: Agri-field in Bandarban 
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